The State of Internet Freedom in Azerbaijan, a legal overview

This is part five and the final installment, in a series of detailed legal reports and analyses on existing legal amendments, and new legislation affecting privacy, freedom of expression, media, and online rights in Azerbaijan and their compliance with international standards for freedom of expression.  

This final report, “The State of Internet Freedom in Azerbaijan, a legal overview” was prepared in partnership with human rights lawyer, Emin Abbasov. It is a comprehensive overview, of the existing legal framework in Azerbaijan on internet freedoms.

The following report identifies gaps within the legislation, policy, and practice that fail to comply with international legal standards in the field of internet freedoms.

As such, the aim of the report is to:

  • identify and report key developments concerning internet freedoms covering the period between 2020-2021;
  • analyze and review legislation, policies, and practices in line with international standards;
  • provide recommendations to strengthen and develop legislation, policies, and practices already in place;

Executive Summary

Azerbaijan’s track record on freedom of expression and freedom of the media has been on a steady decline according to a number of key reports by international media freedom watchdogs. This has been the case especially since 2014.

The most recent rankings by the Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index in 2020, place Azerbaijan at the bottom of the index, where the country ranks 169 out of 180 countries monitored. Freedom House’s annual Freedom on the Net report ranked Azerbaijan in 2020 as “Not Free.”  

From a legal perspective, despite routine calls on the government of Azerbaijan to ensure the domestic legislation and its application comply with international standards, particularly in line with the ECtHR case-law requirements on freedom of expression, media, and internet rights, the legislative authority, continues to adopt restrictive new bills that further deteriorate fundamental rights and freedoms.

During the reporting period, the parliament in Azerbaijan adopted several amendments to existing national legislation, imposing further restrictions and increasing state control over the internet.  In the meantime, relevant authorities failed to carry out effective and prompt investigations and prosecution into the cases of blackmailing and online sexual harassment against activists and politicians. Further, the government prepared a draft law on the media, with proposals to license Internet televisions and radios, and a new media registry with strict requirements for journalists, media owners, and media platforms. 

The report also identifies the government’s failure to present, sufficient mitigation policies to remove the infrastructural barriers related to internet access when switching to online education during country-wide restrictions imposed in March of last year as a result of COVID19. These barriers were more profound in remote areas of the country where access to the internet is poor due to inadequate infrastructure and among economically vulnerable populations.      

Finally, this report concludes that domestic legislation in Azerbaijan does not provide effective safeguards for the protection of the rights and freedoms of people online. On the contrary, it gives law enforcement a wide range of powers while failing to provide an independent review mechanism neither by the courts nor by other independent institutions over the exercise of those unlimited powers.

In response to these challenges, the report offers a number of recommendations for the government to improve its domestic legislation in line with international standards with the view of better protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms online. The full PDF report can be accessed here. Below are some of the key findings.

Key Developments between January 1, 2020June 31, 2021

  • The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decision No.22 on January 29, 2020, approving the “Rules of the organization of operation of the information system on activity against foreign technical intelligence,” and “Level of access of information resources of state bodies within the information system on activity against foreign technical intelligence.” However, the specifics of these rules and what they entail were not disclosed;
  • Azerbaijan tightened control over online content, specifically the definition of “prohibited information”. On March 17, 2020, the parliament amended the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan On Information, Informatization and Protection of Information (30-VIQD). According to the amendment, “prohibited information” includes false information endangering human life and health; causing significant property damage; mass violation of public safety; disruption of life support services; and of financial, transportation, communication, industrial, energy, and social infrastructure facilities; or leading to other socially dangerous consequences.”
  • During the reporting period, the number of attacks and direct targeting against activists, politicians, and their family members with intimate photos, videos, and personal messages that were leaked online, increased significantly;[1]
  • On June 29, 2020, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Telecommunications and appointed the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies as an administrator of domain name registration in Azerbaijan;[2]
  • On September 27, 2020, authorities in Azerbaijan imposed restrictions on access to the internet by limiting the speed of the internet, blocking access to social media platforms and messenger services such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and others during the second Karabakh war;[3]
  • On January 13, 2021, the government established Azerbaijan State Agency for Media Development, according to the Presidential decree “On deepening media reforms in the Republic of Azerbaijan” [signed on January 12, 2020]. The agency was given broad powers to control the online media landscape;[4]
  • The Government announced a new draft law on media with provisions to license Internet TV channels;
  • Azerbaijan parliament members announced plans to draft a new law on Hate Speech.

Key findings

  • The regulation of the internet in Azerbaijan is controlled by the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies, (MTCHT). The MTCHT is a government agency, in charge of regulating communications and the development of information technologies. It also controls the internet telecommunications infrastructure.
  • Despite the Law on Telecommunication obligating the state, to ensure healthy competition and antimonopoly activity in the field of telecommunications[7], the import and distribution of the internet in the country is mainly distributed through state companies or private companies under strict government control.[8] According to the Law on Telecommunication (Article 6) regulation of telecommunication activity in Azerbaijan is carried out by the state through broad powers, notably, through the licensing and certification of telecommunication activity, the application of tariffs for the use of telecommunication services, and radiofrequency, and etc.
  • The activities of internet service providers (ISPs) and operators are required to register with the MTCHT. According to the “Rules of registration of operators and providers of Internet telecommunication services” approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan [No. 427] and dated October 12, 2017, operators and providers of internet telecommunication services must register for a license by applying through the MTCHT, within 15 (fifteen) days of the start of the service.[9]  The Rule further states that in accordance with the Presidential Decree No. 507 dated June 19, 2001 “On the division of powers of search operations’ entities while carrying out search operations,” ISPs are required to have a copy of the guarantee, on the installation of special equipment that provides access to information, for search operations.[10] The Rule also requires that the operators and providers submit, approved copy (copies) of the agreement (contracts) concluded with the first subscriber (subscribers), to the registration authority namely the MTCHT.[11]
  • The State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are authorized for the organization of search operations within the communication networks in accordance with the Rule approved by the Presidential Decree № 638 dated October 2, 2015 “On approval of the Rules on information security during search operation activities on communication networks”.[12] This respective rule was never published. According to the Constitutional Law “On normative legal acts” laws and presidential decrees signed by the President must be officially published within 72 hours after the signing.[13] The Constitutional Law also allows that certain provisions of normative legal acts reflecting state secrets are not published.[14]
  • On June 17, 2021, the National Television and Radio Council (NTRC) announced the provisions in the draft law “On Media” concerning television and radio broadcasting.[18] According to the draft law a number of restrictions on freedom of expression and information, as well as regulation of media activities is envisioned. For the purpose of this report, only those restrictions that concern and impact freedom on the internet are considered here.
  • The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers recommendation CM/Rec(2007)16 to its member States to promote the public service value of the Internet[19] indicates the importance of diversification of competitive market structures in internet resources and ICTs. According to the Recommendations, member states should develop, in co-operation with the private sector and civil society, strategies that promote sustainable, economic growth via competitive market structures in order to stimulate investment, particularly from local capital, into critical Internet resources and ICTs, with particular reference to: developing strategies which promote affordable access to ICT infrastructure, including the Internet, promoting technical interoperability, open standards and cultural diversity in ICT policy covering telecommunications, broadcasting and the Internet. Azerbaijan has so far, failed to meet these recommendations.
  • In the context of its Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1 to member States on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers refers to the term “online media” and stresses its importance for media pluralism.  It further notes that states have a positive obligation to foster a favorable environment for freedom of expression, offline and online, in which everyone can exercise their right to freedom of expression and participate in public debate effectively, irrespective of whether their views are received favorably by the State or others.[25] Moreover, in 2012, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a key resolution on the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, “calling upon all States to promote and facilitate access to the Internet and international cooperation aimed at the development of media and information and communications facilities in all countries.”[26]
    • So far, the relevant government institutions have failed to offer such assurances in Azerbaijan. The extent of government control and monopoly, as well as poor internet infrastructure, are reflected in numerous international reports. The 2021 Inclusive Internet Index, ranked Azerbaijan 84th globally in the “readiness category,”[27] and the country’s overall performance scores have deteriorated year on year.[28] According to June Speedtest Global Index, (results are updated mid-month for the previous month), Azerbaijan ranked 122nd out of 181 countries in the category of fixed internet speed. The country’s score improved in the category of mobile internet speed, scoring 66th place out of 137 countries ranked in this category.[29]
  • The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights also recognize the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights, independent of State obligations or the implementation of those obligations (see A/HRC/17/31, annex; and A/HRC/32/38, paragraphs 9- 10). They provide a minimum baseline for corporate human rights accountability, urging companies to adopt public statements of commitment to respect the human rights endorsed by senior or executive-level management; conduct due diligence processes that meaningfully “identify, prevent, mitigate and account for” actual and potential human rights impacts throughout the company’s operations; and provide for or cooperate in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts (see A/HRC/17/31, annex, principles 16-24).[35]
    • These internationally recognized standard-setting instruments are usually not legally binding but elaborated from different binding human rights treaties and standards. Such documents set out a number of recommendations, standards, and commitments on the regulation of Internet infrastructure, as well as the regulatory role of states in accessing the Internet. However, none are implemented in the context of Azerbaijan.
  • During the period of martial law, access to the Internet remained blocked to the public, in the absence of any administrative decisions or justifications, the guarantees associated with the decision, and clearly stated reasons for such restrictions in place.
  • Azerbaijan signed the Budapest Convention – the Council of Europe Convention against Cybercrime – in 2008 and has ratified it, in 2010.[58] The Budapest Convention is a treaty on crimes committed on the internet and on computer networks. In Azerbaijan, regulation of intelligence services and online policing online, including investigation and prosecution of offenses committed online, are regulated by the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Law on Search and Operation, Law on Police, and Law on Prosecutors office, including other normative legal acts of the Republic of Azerbaijan. However, there is no dedicated strategy or other specific policy documents on cybercrime currently available or being developed in Azerbaijan.[59]
    • In the absence of such policies, the law enforcement agencies, especially the police, which do not have significant capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes committed online, often interferes with the freedom of expression of the social network users.
    • In recent years, the police increasingly play the role of an arbitrator in resolving public conflicts and disputes between internet users. By complaining to the police, individuals can force others (whom they are in conflict with) to delete their status and comments from social network accounts. In return, police promptly identify those who complained about/against or people who criticize the government, and especially the law enforcement agencies on social networks, forcing them to apologize to the public on camera. Police then share the apology videos with the media.[60]
  • Local civil society activists suggest that during the quarantine period, a large number of people who were held administratively or who were criminally liable for organizing and/or participating in wedding or funeral ceremonies were brought to the police stations, where their forced confessions of repentance were filmed and later broadcasted on national television channels. According to credible reports received by the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center, an Azerbaijani NGO, most people did not give consent to such video recordings. As such, the broadcast of the videos took place against Article 51 of the Code of the Administrative Offenses, which prohibits the dissemination of materials (audio, video, photo) in the mass media without the consent of the person against whom the administrative proceedings are conducted.[62]
  • Such practice was also used against LGBTQI+ people at least on one occasion. In July 2020, police shared the testimonies of two persons, who were accused of allegedly promoting drug use via their TikTok accounts. The video of their forced confession was shown on state media (Azertag), to discredit LGBTQI+ people and to create a negative public image.[63]  
  • Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on May 28, 2003 at the 840th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), contains ten principles. According to the seventh principle, “In order to ensure protection against online surveillance and to enhance the free expression of information and ideas, member states should respect the will of users of the Internet not to disclose their identity. This does not prevent member states from taking measures and co-operating in order to trace those responsible for criminal acts, in accordance with national law, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and other international agreements in the fields of justice and the police.”[68]
    • But in the case of Azerbaijan, and following the decree on amendments, no such measures were taken into account. Moreover, at the time of writing of this report, there is no information on whether this mechanism was finalized.

 Conclusions & Recommendations

The analysis of the domestic legal framework shared in this report demonstrates that the current legal framework provides law enforcement authorities with unlimited powers to operate in online spaces. The analysis also explains, how this framework empowers the state to exercise full and unchecked control over telecommunication infrastructure.

In such an environment, internet and mobile operators as well as the ISPs have no power or independence to challenge the unlimited powers of the state. Further, our analysis indicates that the legal national framework is designed in such a way, that it fully disregards or undervalues the rights of individuals online while granting authorities ambiguous powers to control everything online in the absence of an independent review of the regulatory authorities’ decisions and actions.

The most striking example of such unlimited powers is an obligation placed on the ISPs to allow law enforcement authorities to set up special technical devices on the ISP’s infrastructure, in order to monitor users online and collect information about them. This is done in the absence of explicit legal provisions which normally would require a court order to carry out such activity, as well as in the absence of independent oversight by a regulatory body, that Azerbaijan failed to establish since 2016. As a result, the lack of an independent regulatory body in the field of telecommunications, as well as the lack of an independent judiciary that is capable of providing effective protection and independent judicial review against the government’s interferences, leaves citizens without any remedies to pursue.

Finally, this report also illustrates the weakness of the legislation on emergency powers, which at the moment fails to indicate the exact limits of government bodies during a state of emergency or war. Such loopholes allow the state authorities to exercise their exclusive powers in a way that can exceed the needs created as a result of such circumstances.

Based on the overview presented above, the following set of recommendations can help improve the overall environment of internet freedom in Azerbaijan:

  • Amend the legislation, notably the law On Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information, including the Code of Administrative Offences and Criminal Code to remove restrictions on content, such as false information, insult, and slander. Consult with the independent civil society groups to amend the legislation on content regulation in order to strengthen the national legislation and make it in line with international standards. Provide self-regulation opportunities for providers and private companies to regulate inapplicable content in online spaces;
  • Consider wider consultation and public discussions when reviewing new legislation and policy to ensure the voices of all key stakeholders are heard;
  • Avoid adopting the draft law on media, that currently requires licensing of the Internet TVs and radios. Instead, ensure the provisions of journalistic activity online is not subject to specific authorization;
  • Establish an independent National Regulatory Authority in line with international standards including, civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders;
  • Provide effective and prompt investigation and prosecution of online harassment, and blackmailing against activists, politicians, and/or their family members;
  • Amend the Law on Telecommunications, the law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information and Law on Private Information, including other normative legal acts to indicate what specific measures and in what circumstances the government is undertaking to exclude the anonymity of the internet users, including installing special software and hardware systems for the provision of blanket surveillance in online spaces.
  • Amend the legislation to provide effective safeguards against abuse of power of law enforcement authorities, notably, amend article 10 of the Law of The Republic Of Azerbaijan On Operational-Search Activity to ensure that a respective court decree is required for conducting online tracking, interception, and seizure of private information from the telecommunication channels about individuals;
  • Ensure that the Martial Law and the Law on Emergency Situations contain explicit provisions, notably safeguards, against the abusive application of emergency powers online. In doing so, amend the respective laws to include clear procedures of imposing any limitation over the internet and provide that such decisions are subject to effective safeguards;

[1] Azerbaijan Internet Watch, Targeted harassment via telegram channels and hacked Facebook accounts, March 9, 2021, https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/targeted-harassment-via-telegram-channels/

[2] The law on amendments to the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On Telecommunications”, 29 June 2020, available (in Azerbaijani) at: http://e-qanun.az/framework/45676

[3] Azerbaijan limits internet access to prevent Armenia’s large-scale acts of provocation – short notice from the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies, available (in English) at: https://mincom.gov.az/en/view/news/990/azerbaijan-limits-internet-access-to-prevent-armenias-large-scale-acts-of-provocation-

[4] Presidential decree on deepening media reforms in the Republic of Azerbaijan, 12 January 2021, available (in Azerbaijani) at: http://e-qanun.az/framework/46675

[7] Article 11.1 of the Telecommunication law. “Operators, providers, other legal and physical persons operating in the field of telecommunication, as well device producers and suppliers are equal subjects in the creation and development of telecommunication services.”

[8] Article 3.1.8, article 11.2, and article 11.2.1 of the Law on Telecommunication

[9] The Rules of registration of operators and providers of Internet telecommunication services Available (in Azerbaijani) at: http://e-qanun.az/framework/36773

[10] Presidential Decree On the division of powers of search operations entities in the implementation of search operations, June 19, 2001, available (in Azerbaijani) at: http://e-qanun.az/framework/3569

[11] Article 3.3.3 of the Rule of registration of operators and providers of Internet telecommunication services.

[12] Presidential Decree “On approval of the” Rules for ensuring information security in the implementation of search operations in communications networks ” 2 October 2005, available (in Azerbaijani) at: http://e-qanun.az/framework/30840

[13] Article 83.1 of the Constitutional Law (№ 21-IVKQ) “On normative legal acts” dated 21 December 2010. Available (in Azerbaijani) at: http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/21300

[14] Article 82.7 of the Constitutional Law (№ 21-IVKQ) “On normative legal acts”

[18] Azadliq Radio, Internet TV channels may require a license, June 17, 2021, https://www.azadliq.org/a/internet-tv-lisenziya/31313244.html

[19] Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on November 7, 2007, at the 1010th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805d4a39

[25] The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1[1] to member States on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership,  (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 March 2018 at the 1309th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680790e13

[26] The promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet: resolution / adopted by the Human Rights Council, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/731540?ln=en

[27] The Readiness category examines the capacity to access the Internet, including skills, cultural acceptance, and supporting policy.

[28] The Inclusive Internet Index, https://theinclusiveinternet.eiu.com/explore/countries/AZ/

[29] The Speed Test global Index,  https://www.speedtest.net/global-index/azerbaijan#fixed

[35] Report by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, para., 45.

https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Kaye-Report-March-2017-AHRC3522.pdf

[58] The Law on Ratification of the Budapest Convention, available (in Azerbaijani) at: http://e-qanun.az/framework/18619

[59] Council of Europe, the status of the ratification of the Budapest Convention concerning to Azerbaijan, https://www.coe.int/en/web/octopus/country-wiki-ap/-/asset_publisher/CmDb7M4RGb4Z/content/azerbaijan?_101_INSTANCE_CmDb7M4RGb4Z_viewMode=view/

[60] On June 3, 2020, Baku residents Tatyana Ulankina, Ramin Bakhishov, Allahverdi Imanguliyev, Shirzad Shirzadov, and Taleh Bakhshiyev were detained in the Baku Metro for allegedly resisting police. Police asked that the detained individuals comply with the lawful demands relating to the rules of the special quarantine regime. A video was shot and broadcast on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in which each of the detainees apologized and regretted their actions to the police department. Afterward, a criminal case was launched under Articles 139-1 (violation of anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic or quarantine regimes when there is a real threat of the spreading of the disease or the actual spreading of the disease) and 221 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code, and the investigation was launched. The CCTV footage from the subway that appeared on social media showed there was a minor dispute between one person and two police officers over the wearing of a protective mask, which the person in the video claimed he had and others joined to support him, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBC-l9EuiCQ&t=136s

[62] Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), Briefing Document, Measures against the COVID-19 pandemic in Azerbaijan: Deepening pressure on freedoms and Political Crisis, https://smdtaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/EMDS-briefing-22.09.20.pdf

[63] Azertag,az, People who registered on the social network “Tik-Tok” under the names “Maya” and “Banu” and posted videos promoting drug use were detained, July 23, 2020, https://video.azertag.az/video/98901

[68] Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on  May 28, 2003, during the 840th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805dfbd5

free or not free – the battle over internet freedom in Azerbaijan

On January 26, during the appointment of the new head for the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies, Rashad Nabiyev, president Ilham Aliyev in a video conference boasted about free, uncensored internet in Azerbaijan. “Everybody knows, internet in Azerbaijan is free, there is no censorship, no restrictions,” said the President during the video conference. 

But international watchdogs, as well as local activists, beg to disagree. In its most recent ranking of Internet Freedom across the world, Freedom House ranks Azerbaijan as “not free”. Among some of the factors contributing to this ranking are outdated infrastructure, state control over information and communication technology, government manipulation of the online information landscape, presence of blocked websites, jailed critics over their online activism to name a few. Similarly, activists and opposition party representatives say, if President Aliyev’s claims are true, then why do activists are called in for questioning after their critical posts on social media platforms? Or why do opposition activists experience internet disruptions during rallies? 

And this has been the case for over a decade now. Over the years of exercising control over internet freedom in Azerbaijan, the ruling Baku has successfully relied on defensive techniques that require widespread filtering and direct censorship; legal measures techniques that often involve the use of legislation on defamation, and slander to deter users of online platforms from posting critical of the government content; and finally, offensive techniques, such as cyber-attacks against civil society. 

These techniques, defined by Ronald Deibert, is how authoritarian regimes have become savvy at restricting access to their users relying on technology, legal and extralegal techniques, described above. Suffice to say, that these techniques are widely implemented not just in Azerbaijan but other countries where governments exercise full control over the internet domain. Moreover, all of these restrictions have been documented in recent years, concluding a rather stark difference to what President Aliyev claimed on January 26, that Azerbaijan’s internet freedom is far away from being free.

This is also reflected in the work carried out by Azerbaijan Internet Watch. Just within last year alone, Azerbaijan Internet Watch has documented and reported on the score of cases where the evidence suggests to the contrary of what President Ilham Aliyev claimed last month. From discussions on control mechanisms over social media to arrests and intimidation of activists for their online criticisms to internet restrictions and disruptions, and the use of sophisticated surveillance technology to stifle independent voices. That in addition to lack of quality infrastructure and services, is yet to indicate, how does the President come to a conclusion that access to the Internet is free and unrestricted. 

Azerbaijan among top VPN users worldwide according to recent reports

Azerbaijan ranked among the top countries where VPN services were in high demand last year between September and November during the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Proprivacy and NordVPN research “global events in 2020 have caused surges in VPN demand, as citizens from Belarus to Hong Kong set out to secure their online privacy and protect themselves from censorship and persecution for their online activities.” Azerbaijan was among the top ten countries where interest in VPN providers spiked in 2020.

Source: https://proprivacy.com/privacy-news/vpn-spikes-2020

“In late September, as the violent clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia continued to escalate over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies of Azerbaijan took action to restrict internet access across the country. Extensive social media restrictions were put in place that took down major communications services, including: Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, Zoom, Skype, Messenger,” said the joing report.

In a different report Azerbaijan was once again among the top countries where the biggest increase of VPN usage was recorded. “On September 29, NordVPN saw online privacy tool usage increased by 148 times due to internet access restrictions,” said the report. 

Not surprisingly, NordVPN, a Lithuanian by origin, was among the top targeted providers by pro-government media outlets, which said the service was owned by Armenians and therefore users in Azerbaijan should avoid using this provider.  

Finally, Surfshark, analyzed 185 countries and their social media blocking practices from 2015 to the present day. There Azerbaijan is ranked among the most recent cases of social media blocking [Surfshark too was discredited by Azerbaijan media outlet as being allegedly owned by Armenians, even though the company is registered in BVI. You can check out it’s ranking here.] 

Source: https://surfshark.com/social-media-blocking

On November 10 Azerbaijan and Armenia signed an agreement to end the active phase of fighting. On November 12, the government lifted the blocking and access to all social media platforms.  

For disruptions observed throughout the 44 days read this timeline. For the country ranking in Internet Freedom, you can read the most recent report on Net Freedom by Freedom House here.

Azerbaijan not free in Freedom on the Net annual report

Azerbaijan ranked “not free” in this year’s Freedom House, Freedom on the Net report. Among key factors are the overall infrastructural challenges, a monopoly over ISPs, and distributed Internet traffic, state control over the information and communication technology, blocked access to most websites that host unfavorable news coverage, and new forms of restrictions introduced during COVID-19. 

According to the report, there is an overall decline in internet freedoms across the world:

Global internet freedom has declined for the 10th consecutive year: 26 countries’ scores worsened during this year’s coverage period, while 22 countries registered net gains. The largest declines occurred in Myanmar and Kyrgyzstan, followed by IndiaEcuador, and Nigeria. A record number of countries featured deliberate disruptions to internet service.

On the bright side, countries like Sudan and Ukraine experienced the largest improvements, followed by Zimbabwe find the report. And while Iceland was the top performer China was found to have the worst conditions for internet freedom. 

The report highlighted some new trends that have emerged globally: 

[…] this year Freedom on the Net observed intentional disruptions to connectivity in a record 22 out of 65 countries. Many of these disruptions, including Iran’s November 2019 countrywide blackout and shutdowns in Moscow in August and September 2019, were directly precipitated by protests. Such practices are an ultimate expression of contempt for freedoms of association and assembly, as well as for the right to access information.

Azerbaijan was ranked partly free last year. 

journalist facing jail time

Anar Mammadov is editor of criminal.az – website that was blocked by the authorities in Azerbaijan in 2018. Mammadov was sentenced to 5.5 years of imprisonment with a two-year probation period on charges of anti-state appeals, abuse of power and official forgery in March 2019. The official cause of the criminal prosecution was the publication of news about the assassination attempt on the former head of the city of Ganja Elmar Veliyev.

On January 6, Mammadov was pressed with a set of new allegations facing arrest. The accusation comes from a woman, named Malahat Gurbanova. Mammadov wrote about Gurbanova’s legal battle with former Minister of Social Services earlier on. Gurbanova now, alleges Mammadov’s language used to describe Gurbanova in his coverage was slanderous and insulting. Mammadov refutes these claims in his defense adding, if anything, it is he who feels insulted.

Criminal.az is an independent website covering predominantly crime-related stories. The website was blocked by the authorities in 2017, along with a number of other critical and independent news websites. It later began operating under the criminalaz.com domain, which was also blocked shortly after.

*Criminalaz.com, Fia.az, bastainfo.az and topxeber.az were blocked in Azerbaijan after the prosecutor’s office claimed these news websites misinformed their audiences and shared news of provocative nature that were untrue. [Turan News Agency]

**Since May 2017, over 20 websites have been blocked in Azerbaijan, among them: Azadliq Radio (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Azerbaijan Service) and its international service, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Azadliq Newspaper (independent of the Azadliq radio), Meydan TV, Turan TV and Azerbaijan Saadi (Azerbaijan Hour), OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Unit), abzas.net, obyektiv.tv, and others on the ground these outlets promoted violence, hatred, extremism, violated privacy or constituted slander.

***Websites blocked since then are blocked for slander and spreading misinformation. At some point, an editor of the blocked az24saat.org was asked to remove four articles that mentioned Ali Hasanov, now a former aide to President Ilham Aliyev. Monitortv.info, which was among the blocked websites, also received a note requesting the removal of articles mentioning Ali Hasanov on the grounds these stories contained slander and lies. [Open Democracy]

At the time of the verdict against the journalist Mammadov, several international journalism organizations, and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media criticized the court’s decision.

The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists called on the Azerbaijani authorities to drop charges against Mammadov and pointing to the unfounded prosecution.

“Informing the general public about important events is what journalists do, and the authorities should support this work, and not punish reporters,” said Gulnoza Said, CPJ Program Coordinator for Europe and Central Asia.

In June 2019, the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of Anar Mammadov.

Timeline

15 May 2019 – Mammadov summoned to the prosecutor’s office. This time the journalist was questioned over a story about the state oil company – SOCAR.

Meydan TV, an independent online news website covering Azerbaijan was also targeted. Although the website of Meydan.tv was blocked already in 2017, following the publication of stories about SOCAR, the website was heavily DDoSed.

9 July 2018 – Mammadov, questioned by the police. The journalist’s home was searched and his personal devices, including his laptop and phone, were seized by the police.

Mammadov was questioned after publishing reports on an attempt on the life of the mayor of Ganja, Elmar Valiyev, on 3 July.

24 July 2018 – Mammadov was summoned to the prosecutor’s office. The journalist was questioned about the publication of reports on the assassination attempt and was warned not to spread “investigative secrets”.

Happy Holidays from Azerbaijan Internet Watch

May 2020 bring us all across the world censorship-free internet and for everyone documenting, reporting, monitoring, advocating, and fighting for it, here is to a year full of progress and solidarity in standing together for the good cause.

And with just a few hours (depending on what part of the world you are in) left to mark the new year, here are a few highlights from Azerbaijan as documented by AIW in the last three months:

* The authorities in Azerbaijan continued to deploy information controls against its civil society; 

* Countless social media activists were targeted for facebook posts;

* More than 50 independent, and opposition news websites remain blocked; 

* Political activists remained under surveillance, as their phone conversations were leaked to pro-government media outlets;

* In one case, the television anchor who leaked the conversation later deleted the whole segment, as the leaked phone call took place between two international diplomats speaking with the political activist;

* One journalist’s conversation on facebook messenger was intercepted and leaked to a news outlet;

* While its size is unknown, the Azerbaijani troll army continued reporting to social media platforms alleged content abusing platforms’ copyright violation rules. in none of the cases that were examined, the reported content was an actual violation;

* An article that was published on OpenDemocracy examined closely how some of this content was taken down; 

* Azerbaijan was ranked “not free” by freedom house in its annual freedom on net report for 2019; 

“The already poor state of internet freedom in Azerbaijan continued to deteriorate during the coverage period. Access is inhibited by infrastructural challenges—illustrated by a major power outage in July 2018—and by state control over the information and communication technology (ICT) industry. The government manipulates the online information landscape, blocking websites that host unfavorable news coverage and using automated “bot” accounts to spread propaganda. Digital rights are not respected, and those who voice dissent online can expect prosecution if they reside in the country or various forms of intimidation if they live abroad.”

“Power in Azerbaijan’s authoritarian government remains heavily concentrated in the hands of Ilham Aliyev, who has served as president since 2003. Corruption is rampant, and after years of persecution, formal political opposition groups are weak. The regime has overseen an extensive crackdown on civil liberties in recent years, leaving little room for independent expression or activism.”

* In October, during one opposition rally, Azerbaijani citizens reported wide internet connectivity issues; most of the businesses in downtown Baku said the Internet was down throughout the day, which affected the local businesses;

* The national parliament picked up on the earlier discussions on introducing new measures to monitor the Internet in the country but now new developments have taken place since;

AIW will continue monitoring and documenting, internet censorship in Azerbaijan in 2020. Stay tuned and thank you for following!

Azerbaijan ranked “not free” in a new report by Freedom House

On November 5, Freedom House released the new edition of Freedom on the Net report. The report ranks 65 countries.

According to 2019 Freedom on the Net report, Azerbaijan was downgraded to “not free” scoring 39 out of 100.

The already poor state of internet freedom in Azerbaijan continued to deteriorate during the coverage period. Access is inhibited by infrastructural challenges—illustrated by a major power outage in July 2018—and by state control over the information and communication technology (ICT) industry. The government manipulates the online information landscape, blocking websites that host unfavorable news coverage and using automated “bot” accounts to spread propaganda. Digital rights are not respected, and those who voice dissent online can expect prosecution if they reside in the country or various forms of intimidation if they live abroad.

Read the report.