Tag: censorship

Court in Baku blocks access to an online TV channel

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On September 13, the court in Baku ruled in favor of blocking access to the YouTube channel of an online news site “Hürriyyət” [Hurriyyet]. The decision was based on the request from the General Prosecutor’s Office. 

The court in its ruling said the news site violated the law on Information, informatization, and protection of information, by publishing prohibited information. Specifically, the court referred to a guest on the show, Elnur Mammadov, who is a reserve colonel and who allegedly shared untrue information about the leaders of the Azerbaijan Army and the Ministry of Defense, thus damaging their reputation. 

Earlier, on July 24, the General Prosecutor’s Office requested the arrest of the editor-in-chief of the news site Vugar Mammadov and Elnur Mammadov. Both were sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention for spreading prohibited information online. 

Mammadov in his interview discussed cases of corruption and nepotism within the Ministry of Defense as well as raised allegations against the Minister of Defense Zakir Hasanov. 

journalist removes social media posts under duress

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A confession from journalist Elmaddin Shamilzadeh about the forced removal of social media posts under duress is a testament to persistent violence and intimidation used in Azerbaijan against civic groups. According to the reporting by Voice of America, Shamilzadeh was severely beaten by law enforcement during his detention last month. After the journalist agreed to remove all his social media posts on Facebook where he was critical of the police violence he was finally let go.

Shamilzadeh was filming protests in the village of Soyudlu. He was also able to take photographs of several police officers who used disproportionate force against village residents which were then published by Mikroskop Media.

Once the photographs were out, the journalist received a call from the state service for mobilization and conscription. The same day, he was taken from the courtyard of his home by two plain-clothed men. When the journalist tried using his phone, the two men grabbed his phone and taken to a local police station.

At the station police demanded Shamilzadeh to share the phone password which he refused to do. “When I said that I would not give them my password, one of the policemen punched me in the face,” the journalist recalled in an interview with Voice of America Azerbaijan Service. The beating continued despite the journalist’s requests to stop. “When I told them not to hit me in the face, they started cursing. From the blows, I fell to the floor.” The journalist was beaten by at least three officers. The violence was recorded by another officer in the room.

The physical violence forced the journalist to agree to remove all of the posts on Facebook about the police involved in the protest. Shamilzadeh used the opportunity when handed the phone back and posted “Torture” on his profile. Now, his friends and colleagues knew he was missing. According to the journalist, this also prevented the police from using further violence against him.

Instead of force, finally, the police started talking to the journalist. “They said that I can delete my posts myself. Then they will let me go. I thought it might be true, I picked up the phone and deleted the post with the word ‘torture’ and other posts about the police.”

But it did not stop there. After keeping the journalist for about an hour in some dark room, they brought him back to the officer of the operative who then threatened Shamilzadeh with rape.

The journalist caved and gave away his phone password. “When I handed over my phone the battery was almost fully charged, after two hours, when they finally returned my phone, the device was almost out of power. I don’t know what they did with my phone during those two hours,” said the journalist.

Shamilzadeh was also forced to sign a letter of confession where he apologized for his actions and vowed not to repeat the same mistakes. He was released afterward.

the trickery behind blocking news websites in Azerbaijan

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Azerbaijan started blocking access to independent news websites in 2017 [more on how this blocking has taken place here]. At the time, the state argued the reasons for blocking these websites were, calls aimed at “forcible change of the constitutional order,” “organization of mass riots,” and other illegal activities. In reality, these websites were considered independent and/or platforms affiliated with opposition parties. As a result, the decision to block them was based on legal claims that lacked evidence. This was further reflected in the review process when the decision to block these platforms was implemented. According to EHRAC, “no effective and independent review took place in the first instance decision to block access to the websites in 2017, and in subsequent appeals. The courts simply accepted the authorities’ allegations at face value and made no attempt to adequately consider or explain why the content was unlawful.”

The intentions behind the blocking decision were further reflected in subsequent actions taken by the Government of Azerbaijan against the online platforms. Such that, at the time of the first decision to block these websites for access in 2017, the Azerbaijani Government claimed these websites continued disseminating their content through VPN services or social media platforms and therefore the action taken against them did not cause significant changes to the published content. However, in February 2020, the Ministry of Transportation, Communications and High Technologies “requested the domestic courts to impose a ban on the applicants’ ability to share their content through VPN services and social media platforms.”

In a report published in February 2023, in partnership with OONI, we identified the blocking not only continued but expanded to blocking news websites from other countries as well as social media platforms [OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023]: 

  • Blocking of news media websites. Azerbaijan continues to block access to several independent news media websites. OONI data also suggests that some ISPs in Azerbaijan may have started blocking access to the Guardian on 25th December 2022.
  • Azerbaijan and Russia block each other’s news media. In early June 2022, Azerbaijan started blocking access to Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti media website. Since (at least) 7th June 2022, Russian ISPs have been blocking access to Azerbaijani news media websites (`haqqin.az`, `minval.az`, `oxu.az`, `ru.oxu.az`, `ru.baku.ws`). These blocks remain ongoing.
  • Temporary blocking of TikTok amid border clashes with Armenia. During the September 2022 border clashes, both Azerbaijan and Armenia blocked access to TikTok. While the TikTok block was lifted in Armenia by 21st September 2022 (only lasting about a week), the TikTok block remained in place in Azerbaijan until November 2022 (lasting about 2 months). 
  • Blocking of circumvention tool sites. Azerbaijan continues to block access to numerous circumvention tool websites, potentially limiting the ability to circumvent internet censorship in Azerbaijan. However, most OONI measurements suggest that tested circumvention tools (Tor and Psiphon) appear to be reachable.
  • Variance of censorship across networks. While most ISPs in Azerbaijan appear to adopt similar censorship techniques (as we continued to observe connection timeouts in most anomalous measurements across ASNs), different ISPs block access to different websites over time.

The intentional blocking and total control in the hands of the state in implementing these blocks were once again highlighted in June 2023 when co-rapporteurs from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Jan Liddel-Granger and Liz Kristoffersen visited Azerbaijan. According to reporting by Meydan TV, throughout the visit of the co-rapporteurs access to blocked websites was restored. 

In the past, a similar temporary lifting of restrictions was observed in Azerbaijan during visits of international organizations. 

OONI measurements show ongoing internet censorship in Azerbaijan

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Azerbaijan is known to block access to independent news media websites – we previously reported on this in July 2021. At the time, we analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2020 to May 2021 and found that ISPs in Azerbaijan were blocking access to several independent news media and circumvention tool sites. We also found that amid the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, ISPs in Azerbaijan temporarily blocked access to social media services, and attempted to block access to Tor and Psiphon.

But how has Azerbaijan’s internet censorship landscape changed (if at all) over the last year?

We attempt to address this question as part of this report. Specifically, we analyzed OONI data collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023 with the goal of evaluating which tested services presented signs of blocking, and whether new blocks had emerged over the past year (in comparison to our previous report). 

Key Findings

As part of our analysis of OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023, we found:

  • Blocking of news media websites. Azerbaijan continues to block access to several independent news media websites. OONI data also suggests that some ISPs in Azerbaijan may have started blocking access to the Guardian on 25th December 2022.
  • Azerbaijan and Russia block each other’s news media. In early June 2022, Azerbaijan started blocking access to Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti media website. Since (at least) 7th June 2022, Russian ISPs have been blocking access to Azerbaijani news media websites (`haqqin.az`, `minval.az`, `oxu.az`, `ru.oxu.az`, `ru.baku.ws`). These blocks remain ongoing.
  • Temporary blocking of TikTok amid border clashes with Armenia. During the September 2022 border clashes, both Azerbaijan and Armenia blocked access to TikTok. While the TikTok block was lifted in Armenia by 21st September 2022 (only lasting about a week), the TikTok block remained in place in Azerbaijan until November 2022 (lasting about 2 months). 
  • Blocking of circumvention tool sites. Azerbaijan continues to block access to numerous circumvention tool websites, potentially limiting the ability to circumvent internet censorship in Azerbaijan. However, most OONI measurements suggest that tested circumvention tools (Tor and Psiphon) appear to be reachable.
  • Variance of censorship across networks. While most ISPs in Azerbaijan appear to adopt similar censorship techniques (as we continued to observe connection timeouts in most anomalous measurements across ASNs), different ISPs block access to different websites over time.

Methods

Since 2012, OONI has developed free and open source software, called OONI Probe, designed to measure various forms of internet censorship. OONI Probe is run by volunteers in around 160 countries every month, and their test results are automatically published by OONI as open data in real-time. More than a billion network measurements have been collected and published from 25 thousand networks in 241 countries and territories over the last decade.

To examine internet censorship in Azerbaijan, we analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023. The goal of our analysis was to identify which websites and apps presented signs of blocking (“anomalies”) in Azerbaijan during the analysis period, particularly in comparison to blocks previously identified as part of our past research.   

Specifically, we analyzed measurements collected from OONI’s Web Connectivity test, which is designed to measure the blocking of websites (these websites are publicly hosted on the Citizen Lab test list Github repository). This test measures the accessibility of websites by attempting to perform a DNS lookup, TCP/IP connection, and HTTP GET request from two vantage points: (1) the local vantage point of the user and (2) a control network (non-censored network). The results from both networks are automatically compared and if they match, the tested URL is annotated as “accessible” (if the testing succeeds from the control vantage point). If the results differ, the tested URL is annotated as “anomalous”, which may provide a signal of potential blocking.

Depending on why the anomaly emerges, the anomalous measurement is automatically annotated as a DNS, TCP/IP, HTTP diff, or HTTP failure anomaly. For example, if the DNS lookup resolves to an IP address which differs from that resolved from the control vantage point, the measurement is annotated as a “DNS anomaly”, which may be a sign of DNS tampering.

However, false positives can occur, which is why we look at anomalous measurements in aggregate in order to determine if a tested URL consistently presents a large volume of anomalous measurements (in comparison to successful measurements) on a tested network. If a tested URL presents a large volume of anomalies, it may provide a stronger signal of potential blocking. If the types of anomalies are consistent (for example, always presenting DNS anomalies on a tested network), they offer an even stronger signal of potential censorship (since they suggest the use of a specific censorship technique, such as DNS hijacking). But beyond aggregating anomalous measurements, we also analyze the raw data pertaining to anomalous measurements in order to identify the specific errors that occurred as part of the testing, offering insight into how a tested URL is potentially blocked.

Based on our current heuristics, we automatically confirm the blocking of websites when a block page is served and we have added the fingerprint of that blockpage to our database. We also automatically confirm the blocking of websites based on DNS answers containing IP addresses that are known to be associated with implementing internet censorship. For other forms of censorship, we analyze OONI data in order to aggregate anomalous measurements and identify why and how those anomalies occur, offering insight into additional cases of potential blocking.

Acknowledgement of limitations

The findings of this study present several limitations, including:

  • Date range of analysis. The findings are limited to OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023. As a result, findings from measurements collected in different date ranges are excluded from this study.
  • Type of measurements. As part of this study, we primarily focus on OONI Web Connectivity measurements which pertain to the testing of websites for censorship. This focus was selected due to known website censorship in the country, while aggregate views of OONI measurements from other OONI Probe experiments did not present an important volume of anomalies that would have warranted more dedicated analysis.
  • Tested websites. OONI Probe website testing in Azerbaijan is primarily limited to URLs included in 2 Citizen Lab test lists: the global list (including internationally-relevant URLs) and the Azerbaijan list (only including URLs relevant to Azerbaijan). As these lists are tested by OONI Probe users and there are bandwidth constraints, they are generally limited to around 1,000 URLs. As a result, the lists may exclude other websites which are blocked in Azerbaijan, and the findings are limited to the testing of the URLs included in these lists. Given that the lists are community-curated, we acknowledge the bias in terms of which URLs are added to the lists. 
  • Testing coverage of websites. Not all URLs included in test lists are measured equally across Azerbaijan over time. Whether OONI data is available for a particular website depends on whether, on which networks, and when an OONI Probe user in Azerbaijan tested it. As a result, tested websites received different testing coverage throughout the analysis period, which impacts the findings.  
  • Tested ASNs. The availability of OONI measurements depends on which networks OONI Probe users were connected to when performing tests. As a result, the measurement coverage varies across ASNs throughout the analysis period, impacting the findings. 
  • Measurement volume. OONI measurement coverage from Azerbaijan has been rather limited over the years (in comparison to other countries), limiting our findings and confidence in confirming censorship events. The availability of OONI data depends entirely on volunteers running OONI Probe locally in Azerbaijan, which can be challenging in light of the political environment, potential risks involved with running OONI Probe, and the relatively limited digital rights community engagement opportunities in Azerbaijan. That said, we observe an important spike in the overall measurement volume from 14th September 2022 onwards (which has subsequently remained relatively stable), increasing our ability to detect censorship events thereafter. This is visible through the following chart. 

Chart: OONI Probe Web Connectivity testing in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 23rd February 2023 (source: OONI data). 

Background

In its latest Freedom on the Net report by Freedom House, Azerbaijan was ranked “not free” among 70 countries assessed for the report. Internet freedoms have been on an overall decline in the country for a number of years, however, the situation escalated during the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since then, while blocking of social media platforms, and internet throttling have reduced, the state continues to implement various forms of digital surveillance combined with offline measures targeting civil society representatives on a regular basis. 

News websites critical of the authorities remain blocked, while the Law on Media enacted in February 2022 is yet another measure imposed by the state to restrict not only media freedom, and freedom of speech but also access to independent and opposition news. 

Journalists across the country remain concerned about the new law. Most recently they have joined in calls to abolish a new media registry introduced in the Media Law. 

Meanwhile, civic activists continue to face online targeting. Az-Net Watch in its December 2022 report, shared some of the findings of such attacks, identifying persistent trends of phishing attacks, questioning by the law-enforcement bodies over criticism voiced online, interference with personal data and devices, hacking attempts and installed spyware programs.

Findings

As part of our analysis of OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan (between January 2022 to February 2023), we found a number of independent news media websites and circumvention tool websites blocked throughout the analysis period. Many of these blocks have been in place since at least 2020. Amid border clashes in September 2022, access to TikTok was blocked in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. We share further details in the sections below.

Blocking of news media websites

Several news media websites (which have been blocked over the last few years) continue to be blocked in Azerbaijan, according to recent OONI data analysis. 

The domains that presented the largest volume of anomalies (and overall testing coverage), thereby presenting the strongest signals of blocking in our analysis period, include:

  1. `azerbaycansaati.tv`
  2. `www.24saat.org`
  3. `www.abzas.net` 
  4. `www.azadliq.info` 
  5. `www.azadliq.org`
  6. `www.meydan.tv`
  7. `www.rferl.org`
  8. `www.gununsesi.org`
  9. `ria.ru`
  10. `www.theguardian.com`

While most of the above domains have been blocked in Azerbaijan over the last few years, the testing of `www.theguardian.com` only started to present anomalies (on several networks) in late December 2022 onwards (we discuss this case in more detail in the next section of this report). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan reportedly started blocking access to RIA Novosti (Russian state-owned news media) in early June 2022 over the publication of slanderous materials against Azerbaijan. At the time, RIA Novosti’s website (`ria.ru`) was only included in other countries’ test lists; we therefore added it to the Global test list to ensure that it gets tested by OONI Probe users in Azerbaijan and around the world. This is why OONI measurement coverage of `ria.ru` in Azerbaijan only begins in June 2022.  

Independent Azerbaijani media websites (such as `azadliq.info` and `meydan.tv`) have reportedly been blocked since early 2017 for “posing a threat” to Azerbaijan’s national security. The state prosecutor reportedly accused these websites of sharing content that promotes violence, hatred, extremism, violates privacy and constitutes slander. However, the blocking of these media outlets may have been politically motivated. Azadliq, for example, reported on the business dealings of Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva’s private foundation, while the website of Gunun Sesi (which has reportedly been blocked since August 2018) is operated by Parviz Hashimli, a former political prisoner. The blocking of the RFE/RFL website (`www.rferl.org`) also reportedly began in 2017 following an Azerbaijani court order.

The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage (from 26 ASNs) for the news media domains that presented the strongest signals of blocking in Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023.

Chart: Blocked news media websites in Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023 (source: OONI data).

Most OONI measurements from the testing of these media websites (excluding `www.theguardian.com`, which is discussed in the next section) presented anomalies throughout the testing period, providing a signal of blocking. In contrast, most of the other URLs tested from the Citizen Lab test lists during this period were found accessible (on the same networks in Azerbaijan).

What is evident from the above chart is that the vast majority of anomalous measurements presented connection timeouts (for sites hosted on both HTTP and HTTPS). A consistent failure type can offer a strong signal of blocking, since it suggests the use of specific censorship techniques. In this case, the connection timeouts may indicate the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology for the implementation of blocks, given that the timeout only happens after the TLS ClientHello message. The fact that we observe the prevalence of connection timeouts across anomalous measurements aggregated across tested ASNs further suggests that most ISPs in Azerbaijan adopt similar censorship techniques.

This is further evident when viewing a per-ASN breakdown of the specific failures in the measurement of each of the blocked news media sites. The following chart, for example, presents the specific failures that occurred when `www.24saat.org` was tested on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan during our analysis period. 

Chart: Measurement results (`OK` and specific failures) from the testing of `www.24saat.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

From the above chart we can see that most failures (across most tested ASNs) involve timeout errors (annotated in red). But we also observe some successful measurements (annotated as `OK` in green) on some of those networks too. To understand why those measurements were successful, we provide a further breakdown by testing targets. The following chart only presents measurement results (including specific failures observed in anomalous measurements) for the testing of the HTTPS version of the site (`https://www.24saat.org/`) across networks.  

Chart: Measurement results (`OK` and specific failures) from the testing of `https://www.24saat.org/` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

As we can see, the testing of the HTTPS version of the site was entirely successful on some networks, and presented consistent signs of blocking (consistently presenting connection timeouts) on others. In contrast, the testing of the HTTP version of the site (shared in the next chart below) shows that it presented signs of blocking on all of these tested networks.

Chart: Measurement results (`OK` and specific failures) from the testing of `http://www.24saat.org/` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

The fact that we observe more prevalent blocking of the HTTP version of the site (even though it supports HTTPS) suggests that the block is not implemented properly on certain networks.

Similarly, we observe the prevalence of connection timeouts in the testing of many other news media websites across ASNs. The following chart provides a per-ASN breakdown of the measurement results from the testing of `azerbaycansaati.tv`, showing that none of the measurements were successful, and that most presented connection timeouts.

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `azerbaycansaati.tv` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

The fact that the testing of `azerbaycansaati.tv` was not successful on any of the networks which received the largest volume of testing coverage, and that it consistently presented connection timeouts on most networks, provides a strong signal of blocking. 

Similarly, we observe that the testing of `www.azadliq.org`, `www.meydan.tv`, and `www.rferl.org` mostly presented connection timeouts on tested networks, as illustrated through the following charts.   


Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.azadliq.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.meydan.tv` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 


Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.rferl.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data).

OONI data also suggests that the site (www.occrp.org) of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is blocked in Azerbaijan as well. The blocking of the OCCRP site reportedly began in September 2017, following the publication of a major investigation (“Azerbaijani Laundromat”) into corruption, bribery, and money laundering in which powerful figures were allegedly involved. The following chart provides a per-ASN breakdown of the measurement results from the testing of `www.occrp.org`, showing that (similarly to the aforementioned blocked media sites) it presented connection timeouts on most networks.

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.occrp.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data).

Overall, the prevalence of connection timeouts (observed for different websites measured on many different networks in Azerbaijan) provides a strong signal of blocking. These blocks appear to have been implemented several years ago, and remain ongoing. 

Blocking of the Guardian?

On 25th December 2022, the testing of `www.theguardian.com` started to present anomalies in Azerbaijan. The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage from the testing of `www.theguardian.com` on 10 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st October 2022 to 24th February 2023.

Chart: OONI Probe testing of the Guardian (`www.theguardian.com`) on 10 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st October 2022 to 24th February 2023 (source: OONI data). 

However, these anomalies were not observed on all tested networks in Azerbaijan. To better understand the anomalies, we provide a breakdown of the specific failures observed in anomalous measurements on networks that received the largest testing coverage (through the following chart).

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from ASNs in Azerbaijan where the testing of `www.theguardian.com` presented anomalies between November 2022 to February 2023 (source: OONI data).

As is evident from the above chart, all anomalous measurements presented connection timeout errors (for both the HTTP and HTTPS versions of the site). The prevalence of connection timeouts, coupled with the fact that it is the same failure that we also observe in the blocking of other news media websites (discussed previously), provides a signal of blocking. 

While the data suggests that access to `www.theguardian.com` may be blocked on a few networks in Azerbaijan (particularly on AS29049 where we observe the largest volume of anomalies, which is consistent from 25th December 2022 onwards), it’s worth noting that it’s accessible on other networks (such as AS28787, where almost all measurements are successful). As we didn’t come across any news articles reporting the recent blocking of the Guardian in Azerbaijan (which could have helped corroborate the anomalous data), and the overall measurement volume is quite low, our confidence in confirming this potential block is rather limited.  

Azerbaijani news media websites blocked in Russia

Following the blocking of Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti media website in Azerbaijan in early June 2022, we were informed that certain Azerbaijani news media websites (`haqqin.az`, `minval.az`, `oxu.az`, `ru.oxu.az`, `ru.baku.ws`) were reportedly blocked in Russia. On 7th June 2022, we added these URLs to the Russian test list so that these websites could get tested by OONI Probe users in Russia. 

OONI data confirms that these Azerbaijani websites have been blocked in Russia since at least 7th June 2022, and that these blocks remain ongoing (as illustrated below).

Chart: OONI data on the blocking of Azerbaijani news media websites in Russia between 7th June 2022 to 24th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

The above chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage from numerous networks in Russia, showing that at least 5 Azerbaijani news media domains were blocked in Russia between June 2022 to February 2023. Throughout this period, we observe that almost all measurements are anomalous, suggesting that access to these Azerbaijani media sites is blocked on most tested networks in Russia. Russian ISPs adopt a variety of censorship techniques and, on some networks, we are able to automatically confirm the blocking of these Azerbaijani news websites based on fingerprints (as IPs known to be associated with censorship are returned as part of DNS resolution).

Temporary blocking of TikTok in Azerbaijan and Armenia amid border clashes

On 12th September 2022, fighting erupted between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops along their border. The next day (13th September 2022), both Azerbaijan and Armenia started blocking access to TikTok amid the border clashes. 

On 14th September 2022, Azerbaijan’s state security services announced the temporary suspension of TikTok. According to the statement, the content circulating on the social media platform was revealing military secrets and forming wrong opinions in society. As a result, the State Security Service decided to temporarily block access to the platform. Similarly, OONI data shows that the testing of TikTok also started to present signs of blocking in Armenia from 13th September 2022 onwards.

At the time, we published a report documenting the block in both countries based on OONI data. Specifically, we found that Azerbaijan blocked access to the main TikTok website (`www.tiktok.com`) and several endpoints essential to its functionality on at least 3 networks (AS29049, AS41997, AS31721). On all networks where we identified blocking, it seemed to be implemented by means of TLS level interference by dropping packets after noticing a disallowed server_name. We also observed some level of inconsistency, as ISPs in Azerbaijan blocked TikTok based on different lists of TikTok endpoint domains.

In Armenia, TikTok was blocked on at least two networks (AS44395, AS43733). Not all tested networks in Armenia implemented the TikTok block and censorship techniques varied from network to network. TikTok interference was observed at the DNS level by returning an NXDOMAIN error, an IP address associated with www.google.com, or a set of unrelated IP addresses which offer an invalid TLS certificate (it’s an expired certificate for `it.domain.name`). Several endpoints used by the TikTok app and website were also blocked on at least one network in Armenia.

By comparing aggregate OONI measurements from the testing of TikTok’s website (`www.tiktok.com`) in Azerbaijan and Armenia between 1st September 2022 to 24th February 2023, we can see that both countries started blocking access to TikTok amid the September 2022 border clashes, but that the block remained in place in Azerbaijan for much longer than in Armenia. 

Chart: OONI Probe testing of TikTok (`www.tiktok.com`) in Armenia and Azerbaijan between 1st September 2022 to 24th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

Specifically, we observe (through the above chart) that the TikTok block was lifted in Armenia by 21st September 2022 (only lasting about a week), while the TikTok block remained in place in Azerbaijan until November 2022 (lasting about 2 months).

Similarly to the testing of `www.tiktok.com`, OONI data suggests that Azerbaijan blocked numerous TikTok endpoints as well during the same period (between mid-September 2022 to mid-November 2022), as illustrated through the following two charts.  

Chart: OONI Probe testing of TikTok endpoints in Azerbaijan between 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022 (source: OONI data).Chart: OONI Probe testing of TikTok endpoints in Azerbaijan between 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022 (source: OONI data).

The fact that TikTok’s website (`www.tiktok.com`) and numerous TikTok endpoints presented anomalies on multiple tested networks in Azerbaijan during the same period provides a strong signal of blocking. 

Between September to November 2022, the anomalous measurements from the testing of TikTok in Azerbaijan show that many of them time out when attempting to establish a TLS handshake to the target endpoint. While many such measurements are annotated (on OONI Explorer) as presenting DNS inconsistency, we were able to exclude that by validating that the returned IPs are able to complete a TLS handshake with a valid certificate for the target domain name. Moreover, when issuing an HTTP request with the appropriate headers, the response payload is consistent with the response from an endpoint served to a user in Europe. By inspecting the response header and server certificate, it seems to be an Akamai cache.  

Blocking of circumvention tool websites

Circumventing internet censorship in Azerbaijan can potentially be challenging, as numerous circumvention tool websites have been blocked in Azerbaijan over the past years. Our latest analysis shows that these blocks remain ongoing.

The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage for popular circumvention tool websites that presented a large volume of anomalies throughout the testing period in Azerbaijan.

Chart: Blocked circumvention tool websites in Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023 (source: OONI data). 

Multiple circumvention tool websites (including `www.torproject.org`, `psiphon.ca`, and `www.tunnelbear.com`) continue to show signs of blocking on some networks in Azerbaijan, as illustrated through the above chart. Specifically, OONI data shows that when these sites were tested, we frequently observed the timing out of the session after the ClientHello during the TLS handshake. It’s worth noting though that these sites are not blocked on all networks in Azerbaijan, as some measurements were successful. 

While many popular circumvention tool sites appear to be blocked in Azerbaijan, it’s worth highlighting that certain circumvention tools may work in the country. OONI Probe also includes tests designed to measure the reachability of the Psiphon, Tor, and Tor Snowflake circumvention tools. 

Between January 2022 to February 2023, OONI Probe testing of Psiphon shows that it was reachable on tested networks in Azerbaijan, as illustrated below.

Chart: OONI Probe testing of Psiphon on 29 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 25th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

Most measurements (collected from 29 ASNs during the testing period) show that it was possible to bootstrap Psiphon and use it to fetch a webpage, suggesting that the circumvention tool worked on tested networks in Azerbaijan.

While the testing of Tor presented anomalies throughout the testing period, most measurements from September 2022 onwards (when we also observe a spike in the overall measurement volume) suggest that Tor was reachable on most tested networks in Azerbaijan. 

Chart: OONI Probe testing of Tor on 28 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 25th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

In Tor anomalous measurements, we see that attempted connections to Tor directory authorities failed on some networks. However, we also see that most connections to both Tor directory authorities and Tor bridges were successful (on many networks), indicating that it may have been possible to use Tor in Azerbaijan. 

Quite similarly, OONI data shows that it was possible to bootstrap Tor Snowflake on most networks in Azerbaijan throughout the testing period.

Chart: OONI Probe testing of Tor Snowflake on 20 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 25th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

This suggests that while the Psiphon and Tor Project websites appear to be blocked on some networks in Azerbaijan (as discussed previously), their tools appear to work in the country (at least on tested networks). 

Conclusion

Azerbaijan continues to limit press freedom by blocking access to several independent news media websites – the blocking of which appears to be politically motivated. OONI data also suggests that some ISPs in Azerbaijan may have started blocking access to the Guardian on 25th December 2022, but the relatively limited measurement coverage and the seeming absence of news articles reporting the block limit our confidence in confirming this. 

In early June 2022, both Azerbaijan and Russia started blocking access to each other’s news media websites. In early June 2022, Azerbaijan started blocking access to Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti media website over the publication of slanderous materials against Azerbaijan. Since (at least) 7th June 2022, Russian ISPs have been blocking access to Azerbaijani news media websites (`haqqin.az`, `minval.az`, `oxu.az`, `ru.oxu.az`, `ru.baku.ws`). 

Amid the September 2022 border clashes, both Azerbaijan and Armenia started blocking access to TikTok. However, while the TikTok block was lifted in Armenia by 21st September 2022 (only lasting about a week), the TikTok block remained in place in Azerbaijan until November 2022 (lasting about 2 months). But this was not the first time that Azerbaijan blocked access to a social media platform during the conflict. Azerbaijan previously blocked access to social media platforms during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Both social media blocks during times of conflict and long-term news media blocks (as those seen in Azerbaijan) generally indicate government attempts to control political narratives. While numerous circumvention tool websites appear to be blocked in Azerbaijan (potentially limiting the ability to circumvent blocks), it’s worth noting that several circumvention tools (such as Tor and Psiphon) may work in the country. 

This study was carried out through the use of open methodologies, free and open source software, and open data, enabling independent third-party verification of our research findings. We encourage researchers to expand upon this study by running OONI Probe and analyzing OONI measurements from Azerbaijan.   

Acknowledgments

We thank OONI Probe users in Azerbaijan for contributing measurements, and supporting this study.

A year in review – from online attacks to overall environment of internet censorship in Azerbaijan

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The following overview covers some of the prolific trends which illustrate the scope of digital authoritarianism and information controls in Azerbaijan observed and documented in the past year. 

Introduction 

This report covers the online attacks targeting personal information and devices of human rights defenders, activists, and democracy advocates in 2022. The data is collected through media monitoring and information that was made available by targeted individuals who received support and assistance in mitigating the targeting.  

Overall, 2022 has been no different than recent years in terms of online attacks and internet censorship observed in Azerbaijan. Activists, human rights defenders, and democracy advocates received phishing attacks and were summoned to law-enforcement bodies for criticism voiced online where their personal data and devices were often interfered with in the absence of the owner’s consent. 

In some cases, there were reported hacking attempts and installed spyware programs. In January – December 2022, we observed overall 10 such cases.

Hacking and phishing attacks usually targeted the social media and email accounts of targeted community members. These were possible through the interception of SMS messages (set up as 2FA). In fact, SMS interception has been the main practice, leading to the hacking of scores of personal accounts, the paralyzation of social media accounts, the deletion of online posts, and the dissemination of personal information belonging to the targets.

Among some of the prominent cases was political activist Bakhtiyar Hajiyev whose social media accounts were targeted on multiple accounts. Hajiyev was also kidnapped twice in April and August 2022 and he was taken to the law-enforcement bodies. Police gained access to his social media accounts by force and removed posts that were critical of the authorities and state institutions. Hajiyev was arrested on December 9, on bogus charges, and sentenced to 50 days in administrative detention [shortly after his arrest Hajiyev announced he was going on a hunger strike. According to media reports, he stopped the strike on December 29, 2022]. 

Another civil society member, Imran Aliyev was also kidnapped by the Main Department for Combatting Organized Crime where his devices and social media accounts were compromised against his will.

Abulfaz Gurbanli, also an active member of civil society, was phished through an email and WhatsApp messages in February 2022. A file disguised as grant-related information from a known donor organization containing a virus was sent to Gurbanli via his email. On WhatsApp, the activist received a message from someone impersonating herself as a BBC Azerbaijan Service journalist. The targeting resulted in the installation of spyware on his device and the hacking of his social media accounts. 

At the time, Az-Net Watch requested assistance from Qurium media to analyze the link shared in the email and despite the journalist’s assurances, the link did contain a virus. “The mail pointed to a RAR compressed file in Google Drive that once downloaded required a password to be decrypted. The password to decrypt the file was included in the phishing e-mail: bbc. Compressed files that are password protected are common in malware phishing attacks as the files can not be scanned by antivirus,” concluded Qurium in its preliminary report. The further forensic report identified malware written in AutoIT. Once the link (in our case the link to a drive where the alleged journalist left questions for the political activist) was opened, the hacker through the deployed malware installed a persistent backdoor in the system. “The software connects to the domain name smartappsfoursix{.}xyz to download the rest of his software requirements. It downloads gpoupdater.exe and libcurl.dll which look responsible for uploading files to the command and control server. During the execution of the malware several (10) screenshots of the Desktop were uploaded to the server,” read the Qurium analysis.

Meanwhile, after taking over Gurbanli’s Facebook account, the hacker also deleted all of the content on at least seven of the community pages, where Gurbanli was an admin (screenshots below are from just two pages). 

Az-Net Watch previously documented attacks through phishing emails sent to civil society activists last year. At the time, an email impersonating a donor organization was sent to a group of activists encouraging them to apply for a Pegasus Grant. Preliminary forensic results carried out at the time indicated that the malware sent around in this email was similar to a phishing campaign from 2017, that was widely covered and reported by Amnesty International: “The victims and targets identified, as well as the political theme of bait documents, indicate that the campaign is largely targeting human rights activists, journalists, and dissidents. This campaign also aligns with findings by VirtualRoad.org in their report, “News Media Websites Attacked from Governmental Infrastructure in Azerbaijan”, which links some of the same network address blocks with “break-in attempts” and “denial of service attacks” against several independent media websites. “The malware that was observed is not sophisticated and is in some manner extremely crude. However, combined with social engineering attempts and an unprepared public, these tactics can remain effective against many targets.”

In another case, an online media outlet – ToplumTV – social media accounts were hacked by intercepting incoming SMS, set up as a two-step authentication method. This resulted in the removal of countless news posts as well as subscribers to the channel’s social media account. The media outlet was previously targeted in September and November 2021 – in both instances, the social media accounts were hacked by SMS interception.

Feminist activists also witnessed a surge in online phishing attacks and hacking attempts ahead of the International Women’s Day protest scheduled to take place on March 8, 2022. At least three activists received support to ensure online safety during this period. Similar attacks and targeting were documented last year. In addition to compromised accounts, some feminist activists have faced account impersonation. Most recently, activist Narmin Shahmarzade reported to Az-Net Watch, that a fake Instagram account impersonating the activist shared Sharmazade’s photos in the absence of her consent with inappropriate captions. Az-Net Watch is currently working with the platform to remove the fake account. 

Users of social media platforms, who posted critical of the government comments and posts, were also summoned to law- enforcement bodies where they were either forced to hand in their devices and passwords to their social media accounts or to delete their posts that were critical of the government. At least in 5 cases, activists and bloggers faced administrative arrests and interference with their social media accounts for their criticism online and activism. 

One of the most recently documented cases includes a blogger who was called into questioning after sharing a video on Facebook of the traffic police accepting a bribe. The blogger was forced to remove the video after the questioning at the police station. Aziz told Meydan TV that police threatened to keep him less he removed the video. After Aziz told the local media about the pressure from the police, the blogger was called back into the questioning together with his parents. 

In November, prominent lawyer, Elchin Sadigov said the law enforcement refused to return his mobile devices after the lawyer, would not share his passwords. Sadigov was arrested in September 2022 together with an editor of an independent outlet. In an interview with Meydan TV, Sadigov said, he considered demands that he shares his login credentials were a violation of privacy. 

Also in November, a member of D18 political movement, Afiaddin Mammadov, who was arrested on bogus charges and sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention said he was tortured by the local police officers after refusing to share his password to his device.

Other documented instances of social media users targeted over their online criticism this year include: 

In April, Meta released its pilot quarterly Adversarial Threat Report in which the platform said it identified “a hybrid network operated by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs.” According to the document, this network relied on, what Meta refers to as, “Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior [CIB]” in combination with cyber espionage, “compromising accounts and websites to post” on behalf of the Ministry. According to the report, these coordinated online cyberattacks targeted journalists, civil society activists, human rights defenders, and members of opposition parties and movements in Azerbaijan. The ministry’s press office was quick to dismiss the findings, saying the findings were fictitious. 

Azerbaijan was also among countries identified in Pegasus leaks targeting some 80 government critics among one thousand other Azerbaijanis identified in the targeting with Pegasus spyware. 

The attacks and support provided, in the course of the past year, illustrate that no matter how well-prepared political activists and members of civil society are in Azerbaijan, digital security awareness is insufficient in autocratic contexts like Azerbaijan. 

We also observed that existing legal remedies in the country are insufficient to find perpetrators behind such targeting and hold them to account. While in a few instances targeted community members filed official complaints, the investigative authorities showed reluctance in effectively investigating the incidents. 

This year, Az-Net Watch published this detailed report about litigating Pegasus in Azerbaijan in which together with a legal expert we conclude that existing national legislation concerning privacy and surveillance is insufficient, and is left to vague and often overt interpretation in the hands of law enforcement and prosecutor office. As such, Azerbaijan continues to systematically fail in providing effective legal remedies and sound investigations against state-sponsored digital attacks and surveillance. Moreover, despite evidence-based reports of targeted and coordinated cyber attacks against activists, the government thus far has not investigated and/or provided effective legal guarantees. And in all cases filed for investigations, nearly a year later after Pegasus spyware has been identified to be in use, the law enforcement authorities are yet to take formal investigative actions. 

In another report published this year together with a legal expert, Az-Net Watch identified serious gaps in data privacy protection mechanisms in Azerbaijan. Our analysis indicated that the national legislation on personal data protection does not effectively protect individuals against the arbitrary use of their personal data by both public and private entities. The analysis also indicated that the national laws restrict and control personal data with intrusive measures, such as equipping telecom networks with special devices, and real-time access to vast amounts of personal data, in the absence of a criminal investigation or judicial order. 

Conclusion 

These and other instances of digital threats and offline persecution for online activism illustrate that internet freedom in Azerbaijan continues to decline with no signs of abating. For yet another year, Azerbaijan was ranked “not free” in Freedom on the Net 2022 report released by Freedom House. In addition to scores of news websites currently blocked in the country (a practice observed since 2017), the state has also resorted to blocking or throttling access to social media platforms and communication applications in recent years. In September 2022 the state demonstrated its control over the internet by blocking access to TikTok on the grounds the platform was casting a shadow over military activities, revealing military secrets, and forming wrong public opinion. The blocking was carried out amid renewed military tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Other users said they experienced issues accessing WhatsApp, Telegram, and slow internet connectivity speeds. Previously, during the second Karabakh war (in 2020), users in Azerbaijan faced internet restrictions as well. 

Civic activists in Azerbaijan express concern over state control of the internet at a time, when social media platforms, and independent as well as opposition online news sites have become the sole sources of alternative information accessible to the public outside of traditional media. 

The present environment is further exacerbated by the continued crackdown on civic activists as in the case of Bakhtiyar Hajiyev mentioned earlier in the report. In addition, a number of critical bills approved by the parliament this year, demonstrate a profound lack of interest on behalf of the state to ensure basic freedoms including freedom of the media and of association. As of February 2022, a restrictive new media law compels online media outlets to register with the government agency and has imposed a number of other critical requirements and criteria that critics say only serve the purpose of silencing independent journalists and news platforms. 

On December 16, 2022, the parliament also approved a critical bill on political parties, introducing a new set of exhaustive restrictions on political parties. 

As such, Azerbaijani civil society is facing a turbulent year ahead both offline and online in an environment dominated by state control on all forms of dissent leaving many wondering how far the state is willing to go to silence the critics. 

Azerbaijan’s Media Registry leaves media platforms in limbo [Updated January 5, 2023]

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[Update] The first media platform to take State Media Registry into court became the online news site, 24saat.org according to reporting by Meydan TV. The site was refused its registry on the grounds that the activities on the said news website were not regular. The site’s management claims the decision was unlawful. 

***

In Azerbaijan according to the new law on media that was adopted in January 2022 and approved by the President in February 2022, all online media outlets as well as journalists working for online media platforms or working as freelance journalists were ought to register with a new media registry system. This media registry system began to operate on October 14, 2022, according to reporting by Turan News Agency. The law itself was heavily criticized by the local civil society prior to its adoption, and many anticipated many of its restrictive features put in practice. AIW published this overview of the law in March 2022 describing some of its most problematic features including the media registry clause.   

According to the new law, Azerbaijan must establish a registry system of online media outlets and journalists working for online media platforms or working as freelance journalists. This and other additional provisions of the law raise a number of questions regarding the compliance of the law with the international standards on media freedom.

Article 62.1 reads that permission from state bodies is not required for setting up online media. But Article 62.2 requires that an online media entity must apply to the relevant executive authority (Media Registry) 7 days prior to the publication or dissemination of the relevant media material.  In other words, while there is no need to apply for creating an online media platform, there is a requirement to apply for a permit once the online resource becomes operational and starts publishing. Article 62.4 requires an additional opinion issued by the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations before an online media focusing on religion and religious content is set up. In addition, Article 78.3 obligates online media to apply to the Media Registry within 6 months since the platforms become operational.

Article 60.5 requires online media to publish at least 20 articles per day to qualify as an online media platform.

Article 26 obligates the founder of the online media to be a citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic permanently residing in the Azerbaijan Republic. In case the founder is a legal entity, then the highest share (75 percent) in the authorized capital must belong to a citizen (citizens) of Azerbaijan permanently residing in the country.

The Cabinet of Ministers has been instructed to prepare regulation on the provision of registration at the Media Registry within 3 months as per presidential order “on the application of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan ‘On Media’ and regulation of a number of issues arising from it” dated February 8, 2022. And Article 60 of the new law requires that online media outlets disclose their organizational information on their respective websites. Article 60.2 also requires online media to register with the tax authorities, and identify and appoint a person responsible for editorial.

Article 26.3 prohibits previously convicted individuals from setting up media platforms. The list of previous convictions is exhaustive including serious or especially serious crimes; crimes against public morality; persons whose convictions have not been expunged or revoked; including political parties (excluding print media); and religious organizations (excluding print media). Prohibiting religious and political organizations from establishing online media is a failure to comply with the international standards on the right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.

Importance of registering with the Media Registry for online media platforms

The Media Register is an electronic information resource managed by a Media Development Agency which is managed by the Supervisory Board consisting of the Chairman and 6 (six) members appointed by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In order to be registered at the Media Registry as a media entity (subject), a media entity can apply either as a legal entity or as a sole entrepreneur (Article 74).

Article 74.2 sets out a list of requirements journalists must comply with for their inclusion in the registry. These requirements include a degree in higher education as well as another number of different merit-based criteria. Article 74.2.5 requires that journalists obtain and provide an employment contract with a media entity. Individuals or freelance journalists must have a civil contract with at least one media entity registered at the Media Registry in order to be able to register at the media registry.

Those outlets who succeed at registering with the Media Register are issued certificates (which grant access to government events, press conferences and etc.), and journalists are issued press cards (valid for three years and subject to renewal upon request). Media entities, including online media outlets not included in this registry, will not be considered mass media, and subsequently, unable to hire journalists. Also, in case the online media platform is not registered by the registry, journalists who have contracts with these online media platforms, won’t be admitted to the Media Registry and won’t be issued press cards.

Registration with the Media Register is one of the main guarantees for the free operation of media outlets and journalists. For example, according to Article 72.6 of the Law, only media entities and journalists included in the Media Register may carry on with their work during military and/or state of emergency situations, in special operations against religious extremism, and in operations against terrorism.

In the absence of certificates issued exclusively by the register, journalists may also not be allowed to conduct polls on the streets.

These and other requirements as outlined in the law, create additional challenges for freelance journalists working (on contracts) with international media outlets or local online media outlets not registered with the Media Register.

Now, according to Turan News Agency, at least 15 online news platforms have been denied registry. Among them is 24saat.org – a news website that remains blocked in Azerbaijan according to AIW/OONI measurement reports. To bypass censorship, the founders of the website, created a new URL az24saat.org which according to the website’s director Vugar Gurjanly is still accessible. However, in an interview with Turan News Agency, Gurjanly lamented the registration process and getting it denied. Gurjanli believes the decision was not justified and aimed at eventually stopping the news site from working. “Our website meets all the necessary criteria,” Gurjanly told Turan News Agency. According to Article 78.3 of the new Media Law, active mass media must apply to the Agency within six months from the day the Registry starts working. In the event media fails to do so, or the information provided during the registration process is found incorrect the agency has a right to take the media to court. 

Speaking to Azadliq Radio, Azerbaijan Service for Radio Liberty, media law expert, Khalid Aghaliyev said, the currently applied regulations on media platforms trying to register with the Agency are unconstitutional because according to the law, the registration regulations of the new law should apply to the media platforms established after the said law was adopted. “The media that existed prior to the adoption of the law should be registered automatically,” said Aghalyev. 

But this is not the only problem concerning media platforms. The law also demands that the media platform must publish at least 100 news items per week. But the agency already showing a biased approach to this specific regulation. According to Aghaliyev, a number of news sites that were registered have failed to meet the criteria, and yet those that have met the 100 items per week criteria have been denied registry. 

Articles 74.1.2 and 60.5 of the Law, define the criteria of published content as well as what the Media Agency means when it demands a continuity of activities. As such, media platforms applying for registration must demonstrate continuity in their work for at least 20 days a month and publish a minimum of 20 news items per day for their activity to be considered “continuous.” 

Those who have been denied the registry are now planning to appeal in local courts. According to information provided by the Media Agency, it has so far registered 100 media platforms, denied 15, and is reviewing 40 applications.

OONI Measurements Report September 2022

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This new OONI report provides an update based on the analysis of OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between May 2022 to September 2022. Access to the full report is available here. 

Key findings 

Blocked websites – measures show that at least 7 news media websites previously reported as blocked, remain inaccessible in the country. Among them are Radio Liberty, Azerbaijan Service for Radio Liberty, Meydan TV, and others. In addition, the measurements indicated that the authorities continue to block access to the Russian state-owned RIA-Novosti news site. This access block rolled out in June of this year. On June 4, the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport said in a statement the decision to block the Russian news website was a result of the news site running a story that was of defamatory nature against Azerbaijan. Specifically, the statement was referring to an interview published by RIA Novosti with Artak Beglaryan, the Minister of State of the disputed territory of Karabakh. In response, Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry accused Russia of “spreading slanderous information against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and promoting separatism” and violating “the 1997 Agreement on Friendship, Security, and Strategic Partnership between Azerbaijan and Russia, as well as the 2022 Declaration on Allied Cooperation, which requires both countries ‘to refrain from any activity directed against the principles of the UN Charter and each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,’ as well as ‘counter the threats of separatism.” On June 10, local media said RIA-Novosti removed the interview however, the site remained blocked in Azerbaijan. 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, both Russia and Azerbaijan have blocked or discussed blocking each other’s news sites. The most recent OONI measurements show that the Russian internet regulator– Roskomnadzor blocked access to at least five Azerbaijani media domains from within the country. 

Blocking of circumvention tool websites remained. TunneBear, Psiphon, Torproject were among circumvention tool websites that indicated signs of blocking. It is worth noting that not all networks were blocking these sites. And while the Psiphon and Tor Project websites might be blocked in Azerbaijan, their tools appear to work in the country (at least on tested networks).

Azerbaijan temporarily blocked access to the social media platform TikTok – the block remains in place according to the most recent measurement.  

Stay tuned for the next quarterly report on measuring internet censorship in Azerbaijan. 

Facebook user questioned over a Facebook status post

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Seymur Aghayev, a student, said police unlawfully took him to a police station where he was held for some two hours on September 27. The men who first asked Aghayev to confirm his identity were ununiformed explained Aghayev following his release. When Aghayev asked the reason for this inquiry his questions remained unanswered. The men put him in a car against his will and took him to the Baku Police Station. 

“I was standing outside a grocery store when two men approached me, asking if I was Seymur. I told them that was my name. They were plainclothed and only later at the police station did I learn that the two men were the officers at Criminal Search department at the Baku City Police Station. They left my questions unanswered as we drove [to the police station],” Aghayev wrote the following day on his Facebook profile.

At the station, Aghayev was told the reason he was brought in was a Facebook status Aghayev shared about police violence against citizens. 

In an interview with Toplum TV, Aghayev said, the status was referring to an old video of police using physical violence against a citizen. At the station, following the questioning (police officers also asked about his family members, their employment history, and any religious affiliation) Aghayev was forced to remove his Facebook status. 

In its response to media inquiries, the Ministry of the Interior said there was nothing unlawful in Aghayev’s visit to the police. “He was questioned upon an invite. This is not unlawful,” said the Ministry’s media spokesperson in an interview with Meydan TV. 

Parliament members in Azerbaijan discuss blocking Sputnik [update June 13]

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[Update] On June 10, the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan, Antonava-Tryzno Veranika, had her local residency permit revoked according to reporting by Meydan TV. Olegovna, a citizen of Belarus, lived in Azerbaijan together with her husband, Pavel Antonava. The decision was made by the State Migration Service on June 6. The couple was denied their application for the residency extension and were given ten days to leave Azerbaijan. In a separate development, Roskomnadzor sent a warning letter to Azerbaijan’s Russian language 1news.az website with a demand that the website removes one of the articles about the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.  

According to the editor-in-chief of 1news.az Kamala Mamedova, the letter claimed that the information resource (i.e., 1news.az) contained information distributed in violation of the law. The description of the information distributed in violation of the law was as follows: “Inaccurate socially significant information aimed at destabilizing the social and political situation in the Russian Federation.” Mamedova said, that information was taken from an official Ukrainian source and that’s what Roskomnadzor did not like. The editor said she responded to Roskomnadzor, thanking them for paying such close attention to their website and expressing her resentment “over why the media in Azerbaijan should follow incomprehensible laws of Russia, where wording undesirable to the Kremlin should be subject to sanctions.” 

Last month Russia’s chief media regulator – Roskomnadzor – blocked access to four Azerbaijan news websites. In retaliation, Baku is mulling over blocking Sputnik – Russia’s state-owned news platform active in Azerbaijan since 2015. By June 13, at least six Azerbaijan news sites were blocked by the Russian internet regulator– Roskomnadzor. 

In an address during a parliamentary session on April 26, Azerbaijan Parliament Member Vahid Ahmedov asked the State Agency for Media Support and the Press Council to block Sputnik on the territory of Azerbaijan in response to Russia blocking access to four Azerbaijan news websites last month. 

Responding to Ahmedov’s calls, the head of the Press Council, Aflatun Amashov said he welcomed the call, adding, “This agency disrupts objective and balanced report. That is why it is worth considering the future of this agency’s work in Azerbaijan,” reported Turan News Agency. 

In March, Roskomnadzor blocked access to minval.az, oxu.az, baku.ws, and haqqin.az in the absence of any explanation. Following the blocking, a group of Azerbaijani journalist organizations appealed to Roskomadzor to revoke its decision. “This decision [to block access] was taken without any information or warning to the editorial office of the portal […] We believe it is necessary to note that the government of Azerbaijan has never blocked Russian media outlets in those crucial times for its security, even during the second Karabakh war,” read the statement. 

Meanwhile, inside Azerbaijan, the local authorities continue blocking access to a number of independent news websites reporting on Azerbaijan. 

In a separate case, Russian authorities accused the PR director of Baku Magazine, sports journalist, Rovshan Askerov of “rehabilitating Nazism.” The Investigative Committee of Russia said, “the investigation established that no later than April 6, 2022, Askerov published on his Facebook page (banned on the territory of the Russian Federation) deliberately false information insulting and discrediting the memory of the great Russian commander and defender of the Fatherland, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.”

Baku magazine is the “brainchild” of Leyla Aliyeva, daughter of Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, and according to the magazine’s website, “is a digital ‘magazine about everything’; it supports conservation and wildlife charities, and it’s also a hub for news, events, and features, from Azerbaijan and around the world.” The magazine is published by Darius Sanai and Condé Nast in London on behalf of Leyla Aliyeva, reads the further description on the magazine’s website. 

In his defense, Askerov said the allegations were “fictitious.”

The Facebook post the Russian authorities were referring to in their statement was indeed published by Askerov on April 6 [which Askerov has removed since then] in which Askerov, criticized the point of having the statue of Zhukov in the first place. According to Turan News Agency, if found guilty, Askerov is facing up to 5 million rubles in fines, or imprisonment for up to five years.

Askerov, is a dual citizen [even though according to Azerbaijani legislation, the country does not recognize dual citizenship.]

On May 11, according to reporting by Meydan TV, the Russian Ministry of the Interior issued a search warrant for Askerov. According to reporting by Turan News Agency, the Moscow court arrested Askerov in absentia on May 24. 

editor of an online news site detained then released

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On April 13, Zahir Amanov, editor of an online news site cenub.az was detained according to Azadliq Radio, Azerbaijan language service for Radio Liberty. 

Amanov, 70, is also the founder of the said website which covers regional news in southern Azerbaijan. 

According to reporting by Turan News Agency, Amanov was detained on charges of extortion by threat however, colleagues say the accusations are bogus and are related to his work exposing the extent of local and regional corruption at a government level. The case involves Israfil Aliyev, the head of a local administrative office in the village of Sygdash, Masalli region who claimed Amanov blackmailed him. “We have known Zair Amanov for 30 years, as the head of one of Azerbaijan’s leading regional media outlets and an experienced journalist. Therefore, the accusation of extorting money and arresting him red-handed seems implausible.  We have no doubt that the case has been fabricated and we will follow up on it,” said Arif Aliyev, director of the Baku Press Club in an interview with Turan. 

If convicted, Amanov is facing up to five years in jail. 

According to the latest updates, Amanov was released on April 15 while investigations into extortion continue.