Azerbaijan expands extrajudicial website blocking authority – parliament amends information law

On 10 July 2026, Azerbaijan’s parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization and Information Protection, significantly broadening the executive’s power to block internet resources without prior judicial authorization.

What changed

Before these amendments, extrajudicial (warrantless) blocking was restricted to genuine emergencies – defined as situations in which state or public interests were under threat or lives were in immediate danger. The amended law now permits extrajudicial blocking of websites that allegedly contain: defamation or insult of individuals; invasion of private or family life; promotion of illegal drugs; pornographic material; promotion of gambling; content encouraging suicide; films or games lacking age-rating disclosure; or “false information that could endanger public safety” – a deliberately vague category with no statutory definition. The blocking authority remains the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport.

How we got here

The law was originally adopted in 1998, when internet blocking required a court order. A 2017 amendment introduced Article 13-3, permitting temporary extrajudicial blocking in urgent cases with mandatory court notification within five days. Shortly after 2017, Meydan TV (meydan.tv), Azadlıq Radio (azadliq.org), Azadlıq newspaper (azadliq.info), Turan TV, and Azərbaycan Saatı were blocked under this provision. Further expansions in 2020–21 added “false information of public significance” as a blocking ground during the pandemic and the Second Karabakh War. The July 2026 amendments represent the broadest expansion to date, removing the “emergency” limitation entirely for the newly added categories.

Expert assessment

Lawyer Ruslan Əliyev identified the core risk: under the previous framework, even formal judicial proceedings provided some documentary record and a basis for appeal. Under the new framework, a single official can block content in seconds. “First, the blocking happens, then you become the foot soldier chasing to get it unblocked.” He noted that the new grounds – defamation, insult, false information – lack precise legal definitions, making it impossible to distinguish between legitimate content removal and the suppression of critical journalism. 

Parallel social media regulation

The same legislative period also produced new rules requiring social media platforms serving Azerbaijani users to verify user ages (minimum 16), establish local registration or representation in Azerbaijan, and respond to government data requests. These measures follow a pattern across the South Caucasus and Central Asia of requiring platform localization as a precondition for lawful operation, enabling domestic legal pressure on otherwise internationally domiciled companies.

Relevance for internet freedom monitoring

The July 2026 amendments consolidate Azerbaijan’s extrajudicial blocking architecture and make it applicable to a wider set of content categories without any statutory definition of what qualifies. The vagueness of “false information endangering public safety” and “insult” creates categorical overlap with content that Azerbaijan’s independent press regularly produces – investigative reporting into officials, criticism of government policy, and human rights documentation. Combined with the existing blocking of major independent outlets since 2017, and the practice of blocking government websites from abroad (documented by Meydan TV in May 2026), the amendments represent a significant further restriction on both domestic and diaspora access to independent information.

OC Media blocked in Azerbaijan as new National Cybersecurity Agency takes over internet controls

This entry draws on reporting by OC Media and Qəzetçi.

Access to OC Media, an independent online news outlet covering the South Caucasus, has been blocked in Azerbaijan. The outlet reported that readers first alerted it in early June that the website could no longer be reached from inside the country, and that traffic from Azerbaijan dropped sharply around the same time. Attempts to load the site from multiple regions of the country have since failed unless a VPN is used. Despite this, the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport claimed that no restrictions had been imposed and that there was no problem accessing the site. Azerbaijan’s Presidential Administration did not respond to the outlet’s inquiries.

If confirmed through technical measurement, OC Media joins a long list of independent and opposition news websites blocked in Azerbaijan. The websites of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Azerbaijan service, Meydan TV, Azadliq, Azerbaycan Saati, Turan TV, and OCCRP were blocked between 2017 and 2019 following amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information in 2017, which authorized extrajudicial blocking of online resources. More recently, the websites of Abzas Media and Toplum TV were blocked amid the sweeping crackdown on independent media that began in November 2023, in which around 30 journalists have been placed in pre-trial detention or convicted, most commonly on smuggling and tax-related charges. Meydan TV has said its mirror websites are also periodically blocked, and that its social media pages have been repeatedly attacked.

A new “single engine” for online control

The timing of the block is significant. On June 2, 2026, the presidential website published two decrees that attracted little attention amid the routine flow of official announcements. The first abolished the Electronic Security Service (ESS), the roughly 30-person technical body created in 2013 under the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport. The second established its successor, the National Cybersecurity Agency (NCA), and approved its 50-clause charter.

The NCA is set up as a “public legal entity” – a legal form the government increasingly favors, as it places the body outside standard ministerial constraints while allowing it to generate its own revenue, with its authorized capital drawn from budget funds previously allocated to the ESS. On paper, the reorganization reads as administrative housekeeping aimed at “improving management.” In practice, as OC Media’s analysis of the charter shows, the decrees consolidate functions that were previously dispersed across ministries, courts, and the prosecutor’s office — website blocking, traffic filtering, personal data oversight, protection of broadcasting, even blocking of foreign gambling sites – inside a single well-resourced agency answerable to the minister and, ultimately, the president.

Two aspects deserve particular attention from an internet freedom perspective:

Choke-point control over traffic: The charter assigns the agency network-defense functions, such as filtering malicious traffic. While this is standard language for a cybersecurity body, the same infrastructure that absorbs DDoS attacks can throttle or degrade specific services. Azerbaijan has a documented record of exactly this: nationwide throttling during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, and localized mobile internet disruptions during protests, including the 2019 protest outside the Baku City Administration building, where journalists and demonstrators reported mobile internet failures on site. The decree institutionalizes a permanent, presidentially supervised hand on that choke-point.

Surveillance and data oversight: The charter embeds surveillance-adjacent capabilities into the agency’s mandate and transfers oversight of personal data to it – a concerning combination in a country where Pegasus spyware was used against journalists, activists, and lawyers, and where no independent data protection authority exists.

Human rights lawyer Yalchin Imanov noted that the government has been restricting access to independent media websites since at least 2017, and that the new institutional setup arrives amid the harshest assault on the Azerbaijani press in more than a decade: Abzas Media shuttered and its journalists sentenced to seven to nine years in June 2025 (together with RFE/RL economist Farid Mehralizada); Toplum TV raided; Meydan TV’s Baku-based staff arrested; the BBC’s Baku bureau closed; the Turan news agency suspended; and the accreditations of Voice of America and Bloomberg correspondents revoked.

Why this matters

Until now, internet controls in Azerbaijan operated through a patchwork: the Ministry issued blocking orders (often without court decisions), the Prosecutor General’s Office pursued users and editors over online content, and the ESS handled technical security. The NCA gathers these levers into one institution at precisely the moment parliament is debating amendments that would require social media platforms to register locally, open offices in Baku, and enforce new age restrictions – with fines of 100,000–300,000 AZN and blocking as penalties for non-compliance. A single agency with blocking, filtering, and data oversight powers is the natural enforcement arm for that regime.

It is also worth noting an institutional irony: the ESS – whose officials were publicly explaining how age verification under the new social media rules would work as recently as June – has itself been dissolved, its functions absorbed into a body with a far broader censorship mandate and fewer checks.

how copyright violation requests to platforms are silencing Azerbaijani voices

For years, the promise of the digital town square was built on a simple premise: technology would democratize the truth, allowing the voices of the marginalized to bypass the gatekeepers of state-controlled media. Yet, for independent journalists and activists in Azerbaijan or based abroad, this promise has been inverted. Instead of a megaphone, platforms like YouTube and Facebook have increasingly functioned as automated guillotines, where legitimate dissent is silenced not by a state decree but by a “copyright strike.”

This act of censorship is rarely carried out directly by the state. Instead, it is outsourced to a murky ecosystem of pro-government entities and shadowy third-party agencies. These actors exploit the Notice-and-Takedown systems—mechanisms designed for Silicon Valley legal compliance—to flag critical reports as intellectual property violations. Whether it is political commentary or footage of a protest, takedown requests are considered, and content disappears without any checks or balances on the platforms themselves.

The platforms’ complicity lies in their institutional blindness. Driven by a desire for global scale and automated efficiency, tech giants have retreated behind “black box” algorithms that lack any understanding of national nuances. In the eyes of a YouTube content ID system, a claim from a Baku-based media company looks like a standard commercial dispute; in reality, it is often a state-sponsored attempt to wipe an investigative archive off the map. By failing to invest in regional expertise or recognize the specific patterns of “copyright trolling” used by the Aliyev regime, platforms have effectively handed authoritarian states a “delete” button for the truth.

In Azerbaijan, where independent outlets like Abzas Media and Meydan TV already face the physical threat of imprisonment and exile, the loss of a digital platform is more than a technical hurdle—it is a total erasure of the public record. 

Below are just some of the most recent examples that show platforms’ complicity and their lack of understanding of nuances. 

Meydan TV

On December 16, Meydan TV’s Facebook and Instagram pages received a copyright violation by member of parliament Ulvi Guliyev. Despite the team’s submission of counter-strike evidence that the reported content violated no copyright rules, Meta did not change its original decision. Meydan TV’s Instagram page suffered too. The account, which has almost 1 million followers, was suspended over a similar claim. 

Azad Soz

The online channel had several of its videos removed, and it is facing closure with over 800k subscribers. The targeting is based on bogus court orders submitted to YouTube, which the platform has taken into account without considering that the country’s judiciary lacks independence and fails to guarantee a fair trial. 

The channel’s TikTok accounts are also blocked in the country. 

Afgan Mukhtarli

Exiled journalist reported back in October that his TikTok channel was blocked in Azerbaijan. The process was gradual. The journalist said he noticed a drop in views. After research, Mukhtarli learned that his page was blocked in the country. Before this, his TikTok account was closed by the platform itself in September. He appealed, and the account was reinstated. 

Hamam Times

HamamTimes, an online media outlet, has also faced digital targeting. In the last year alone, its pages on Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok were subjected to fabricated copyright violation reports, resulting in posts being deleted and pages temporarily shut down.

In April, their Instagram account was suspended for 16 days, while on Facebook, several posts were deleted without any notification.

META explained the reason as a “breach of intellectual property rights.” But failed to provide any further evidence. Only with the intervention of third parties was the platform able to restore access to its account and content. The platform believes it was its coverage of Kapital Bank – one of the biggest banks in Azerbaijan, which belongs to the ruling family – and a serious security breach in the bank’s digital systems, which led thousands of bank customers to fall into the hands of scammers and lose vast sums of funds.

Similarly, META deleted Hamam Times’ posts about Kapital Bank without giving any notification.

All of these experiences have led users of social media platforms to believe there is an on-going working relationship between the authorities and the platforms. 

government consolidates control over media

On July 14, the parliament of Azerbaijan adopted amendments to the already restrictive Law on Media, tightening state control over information and extending censorship capabilities to digital platforms. One of the most significant changes is the expansion of the term “Media Entity” to include the local offices and representative branches of foreign media organizations. These entities are now required to register both with the State Tax Service and with a newly empowered Media Register. Any operation conducted without both forms of registration is explicitly classified as illegal. The registration process is not merely bureaucratic—it forms the legal basis for the state to shut down foreign media operations at will.

In addition to registration requirements, the amended law introduces naming restrictions for media outlets. The names of media entities and their editorial offices must not be identical or similar to those of other outlets, must not mislead users, and must not contain expressions deemed contrary to public order, morality, or ethics. These vague criteria offer the authorities broad discretion to deny registration or shut down operations on subjective grounds.

Perhaps most troubling is the provision banning the publication and dissemination of “false information.” The law does not define what constitutes “false,” giving the authorities the power to interpret and enforce this standard arbitrarily. In Azerbaijan’s legal environment, where courts often side with the state and media freedom is already tightly constrained, this creates enormous risks for journalists, especially those engaged in critical reporting. Content that challenges official narratives can now be punished not because it is untrue, but because it is unwelcome.

Moreover, the law places significant and arguably unattainable demands on news agencies. In order to qualify for legal operation, agencies must have formal agreements with at least twenty other media outlets and employ journalists accredited in a minimum of five foreign countries. These requirements appear less intended to encourage professionalism than to impose exclusionary thresholds that many independent or critical outlets simply cannot meet.

The Media Development Agency, an entity under close government control, has been granted expansive new powers under the amended legal framework. It now has the authority to take measures against content it deems prohibited, including on online platforms. This effectively formalizes internet censorship. The agency can also request the State Tax Service to dissolve foreign media offices that fail to comply with registration requirements or that are found to be operating without an applicable international agreement. Most notably, this process can now be conducted without following the standard legal procedures for dissolving entities laid out in Articles 59 through 61 of the Civil Code. A similar change has been made to the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal Entities, which now explicitly states that failure to appear in the Media Register—or removal from it—is a valid ground for dissolution.

Key changes include:

  • Expansion of “Media Entity” definition: Now explicitly includes branches and representative offices of foreign media organizations operating in Azerbaijan.

  • Registration requirements: Such entities must first register with the State Tax Service (STS) and then apply for inclusion in the Media Register. Operating without both registrations is explicitly prohibited.

  • Illegal operation penalties:

    • Media activity without Media Register inclusion is now defined as illegal.

    • Administrative penalties are introduced for the publication or dissemination of print media by entities not listed in the Register.

  • Naming regulations: Media outlet names must not:

    • Resemble or imitate existing media names;

    • Contain expressions that contradict public order, morality, or ethics;

    • Mislead users.

  • Prohibition on “false information”: The law prohibits the publication and dissemination of false information, but provides no clear definition of what constitutes “falsehood.” This vagueness opens the door to arbitrary enforcement and censorship.

“Critical reporting could be punished not because it’s false — but because it’s inconvenient,” noted one media analyst.

  • Operational burdens on news agencies:

    • Must maintain agreements with at least 20 media entities;

    • Employ journalists accredited in at least five foreign countries;

    • Meet minimum content production thresholds.

Critics argue these criteria are unrealistic for most independent or local outlets, and function as gatekeeping tools to limit access to legal operation.


Unprecedented Powers for the Media Development Agency

The Media Development Agency, an entity under close government control, now wields broad new powers:

  • Can take measures against materials it deems “prohibited”, including online publications;

  • Has authority to request that the State Tax Service dissolve foreign media branches and representative offices, without following the dissolution procedures outlined in Articles 59–61 of the Civil Code;

  • Can enforce removal from the State Register of Legal Entities for non-compliant foreign media entities.

Additionally, amendments to the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal Entities make removal from the Media Register or operation outside of international agreements grounds for forced dissolution.


What These Changes Mean

  • Media freedom under siege: Foreign and local media are subject to restrictive registration, vague censorship provisions, and harsh penalties. Independent journalism, particularly if critical of the government, faces heightened risk.

  • Government agencies have unchecked power: The Media Development Agency now acts as a censorship body with legal tools to dismantle non-compliant entities — without judicial oversight.

  • Azerbaijan drifts further from international norms: These laws contravene constitutional protections and international obligations under the ECHR and undermine any remaining democratic space.


journalist and editor-in-chief arrested

On February 5, 2025, Azerbaijani authorities detained independent journalist Shamshad Aghayev, editor-in-chief of the online media outlet arqument.az. His residence was searched, and personal belongings, including electronic devices, were confiscated. Aghayev has been charged with smuggling under Article 206.3.2 of the Azerbaijani Criminal Code, which pertains to smuggling committed by a group of persons in collusion. He has been placed in pretrial detention for two months and one day. 

Aghayev’s lawyer, Shahla Humbatova, contends that there is no basis for his arrest, noting that he was already under a travel ban as a witness in a Toplum TV case. Aghayev denies the charges, asserting that his detention is linked to his journalistic activities. 

On February 6, journalist Shahnaz Huseynova (Beylergizi) was arrested and placed in pretrial detention for three months and 15 days. The journalist affiliated with Toplum TV is facing multiple charges, including engaging workers in any form of employment without a legally binding employment contract, large-scale illegal entrepreneurship, legalization of property through criminal means by an organized group (money laundering); the same actions committed on a large scale; smuggling committed by an organized group; tax evasion committed by an organized group. 

These arrests attest to Baku authorities’ continued relentless crackdown against remaining independent media and journalists in the country. Since November 2023, journalists from several online news platforms, including Abzas Media, Toplum TV, Kanal 13, Kanal 11, and Meydan TV have been targeted with arrests. 

media development agency wants another website blocked

According to reporting by Meydan TV, the Media Development Agency (MEDİA) has filed a lawsuit to block the news site “Anaxeber.info.” The website’s editor-in-chief, Azer Talibov, told Meydan TV that the blocking request is linked to the website’s critical reporting covering corruption, government misconduct, and social issues. He claimed that despite multiple requests from the Media Agency and other institutions to remove specific articles, he refused, and this legal action is a form of retaliation. He also mentioned that he did not register with the Media Registry.

Previously, the Media Development Agency had taken similar actions against other websites. On November 14, 2023, the “dia.az” website was blocked, followed by “teref.info” and several others, based on Baku Court of Appeals rulings.

Azerbaijani lawmakers passed the controversial law on media in December 2021. It came into force in 2022. As part of the law, authorities introduced the Media Registry in September 2022, which sparked protests from independent media outlets, journalists, and editors who feared the registry would have grave consequences on media freedom in a country with rampant censorship. 

Critics of the draft law worried the new legal document would seriously threaten media freedom, including online media resources, as it contains provisions granting a discretionary power to the state to regulate media excessively, especially online media, as well as introduce further restrictions on journalists’ work, media companies, and relevant entities. Critics were also vocal about the absence of a broad and meaningful public consultation of the law before its adoption. 

As part of the new law, a registry system for online media outlets and journalists working for online media platforms or working as freelance journalists was envisioned. This and other provisions of the law raised several questions regarding the compliance of the law with the international standards on media freedom.

The Venice Commission issued a negative opinion on the law, and a group of Azerbaijan journalists and media leaders filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan in 2023, arguing that the law contradicts Azerbaijan’s Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitutional Court has yet to review the case.

The first time Talibov’s website was blocked was in 2018 when the website existed under a different URL – Anaxeber.az. Despite Talibov’s attempt to challenge the decision, he was unsuccessful. In the same year, access to “Az24saat.org” and “Xural.com” were also blocked.

On June 13, 2024, the ECHR ruled in favor of four blocked media outlets, finding that their blocking violated their right to freedom of expression. The court ordered the Azerbaijani government to pay each applicant €5,000 in compensation, but Talıbov claims that the compensation has not yet been paid.

The practice of blocking of websites in Azerbaijan began in 2017 with the blocking of “Azadlıq” Radio (azadliq.org), “Azadlıq” newspaper (azadliq.info), Meydan TV (meydan.tv), Turan TV (turan.tv), and “Azərbaycan Saatı” (azerbaycansaati.org).

At the time, the authorities argued the reasons for blocking these websites were, calls aimed at “forcible change of the constitutional order,” “organization of mass riots,” and other illegal activities. These websites were considered independent and/or platforms affiliated with opposition parties. As a result, the decision to block them was based on legal claims that lacked evidence. This was further reflected in the review process when the decision to block these platforms was implemented. According to EHRAC, “no effective and independent review took place in the first instance decision to block access to the websites in 2017, and in subsequent appeals. The courts accepted the authorities’ allegations at face value and did not attempt to consider or explain adequately why the content was unlawful.”

The intentions behind the blocking decision were further reflected in subsequent actions by the Government of Azerbaijan against the online platforms. Such that, at the time of the first decision to block these websites for access in 2017, the Azerbaijani Government claimed these websites continued disseminating their content through VPN services or social media platforms and therefore the action taken against them did not cause significant changes to the published content. However, in February 2020, the Ministry of Transportation, Communications and High Technologies “requested the domestic courts to impose a ban on the applicants’ ability to share their content through VPN services and social media platforms.”

arrests targeting independent online news outlet Meydan TV [updated June 2025]

In its official statement released on 6 December 2024, Meydan TV disclosed the sudden detention of seven collaborators—including staff reporters and freelancers. Homes were searched, personal belongings seized, and equipment confiscated. The detainees, charged with “smuggling foreign currency,” included Ramin Jabrayilzade (Deko), Aytaj Ahmadova (Tapdig), Aynur Ganbarova (Elgunesh), Natig Javadli, Khayala Aghayeva, Aysel Umudova, and Ulvi Tahirov. Meydan TV rejected the accusations as “illegal” and groundless, describing the arrests as a continuation of longstanding persecution, including surveillance, travel bans, Pegasus spyware attacks, and prolonged cyber censorship.

On 8 December, the Khatai District Court ordered four-month pretrial detention for the detained Meydan TV journalists. In adjacent developments, a freelance photojournalist, Ahmed Mukhtar, was briefly held on hooliganism charges and fined 20 days. Since then, their pretrial detention periods have been extened, most recently in June 2025. 

In February 2025, the crackdown expanded. Several other freelance journalists inlcuding Nurlan Gahramanli (“Nurlan Libre”), Shamshad Agha, editor of Argument.az and collaborator with Meydan TV, and Fatima Mövlamli, another Meydan TV freelance journalist, were arrested on similar accusations.

In May, Ulviyya Ali, a VOA correspondent (not Meydan TV staff but targeted in the same campaign), was arrested in a home raid and accused of currency smuggling. She became the 11th journalist arrested in relation to the “Meydan TV case”. 

Below are the names of journalists targeted thus far: 

Aynur Elgunash

Aysel Umudova

Aytaj Ahmadova

Fatima Movlamli

Khayala Aghayeva

Natig Javadli

Nurlan Libre

Ramin Jabrailzada

Shamshad Aghayev

Ulvi Tahirov

Ulviyya Ali

ministry of education wants to censor teachers and academics

According to local media reports, the ministry of education adopted a series of amendments to the “Rules of ethical behavior of educators” document on May 15. According to the changes, educators (as in all teachers and academics employed within the institutions under the Ministry of Education) must adhere to the principles of lawfulness, honest behavior, loyalty, cultural behavior, impartiality, and public trust.

The document, specifically addresses the educators behavior on the social media and while speaking with media platforms, calling on them to follow the rules set out by relevant institutions where they are employed when sharing content on these platforms. Specifically it calls on the educators to abstain from sharing audio and video content that would otherwise result in personal and institution’s reputational damage.

In the previous iteration of the document these warnings did not exist.

The amendments also warn educators to refrain from sharing content critical of state institutions and their directors. Commenting on the amendments the chief adviser of the Regional Education Department, Elshan Ammadov said, “such content [on corruption and poor conditions of educational establishments] spread by individual teachers and other employees of these institutions which has led to criticism in society and damaged the [public] image of [other] employees is wrong. Such content violates the principle of subordination. Instead, it would be approrpriate to share our best achievements in the field of education on social media platforms.”

another wave of arrests targets online news platform

On March 6, police stormed the office of Toplum TV, an online news platform in Baku. While the office was searched, the police questioned some fifteen staff members. Among those detained were interns and the tech team. While nine were released after questioning, at least six other journalists were sent to pre-trial custody on bogus smuggling charges.

Shortly after detention, social media accounts belonging to Toplum TV were compromised. 

As a result, all 3600 videos on Toplum TV’s YouTube channel were deleted.  

Previously Toplum TV’s Facebook page was hacked via SMS interception. 

authorities arrest another blogger and block access to a public forum

Farid Suleymanov was arrested on January 8, 2024. He was sentenced to 30-day administrative detention. And although Suleymanov was scheduled for release on February 7 – the day of snap presidential elections – he was instead taken back to BandOtdel – the department for combating organized crime at the Ministry of the Interior. 

Suleymanov is an activist, lawyer, and blogger from Azerbaijan. Active on a number of social platforms, Suleymanov ran a TikTok channel called “I saw it, I showed you.” Through his videos, Suleymanov raised awareness of the illegal activities of the traffic police, exposing their unlawfulness. For this, he has been questioned several times but let go. He also informs his audience via his social media channels of other challenges and issues in the country. 

According to this video on Suleymanov’s YouTube channel, he was approached by a group of unknown men, who, without introducing themselves, shoved him into a white Mercedes and took him to BandOtdel.

Separately, Az-net Watch received an anonymous email from a reader informing the platform of the blocking of a Russian-language forum  www.baku365.com. According to the information shared in the email, all three main mobile operators and local ISPs have blocked access to the website. On what grounds remains unclear. Earlier, Suleymanov’s daughter shared a post about her father’s unlawful arrest and detention.