Social media activist known for his vocal criticism of the Azerbaijani government, detained and placed in pre-trial custody

Dayanat Chalabilyev was detained on December 22. Two days later, the Khatai District Court ordered his arrest. In a controversial procedural move, the trial was presided over by Judge Rafael Sadikhov, whose official judicial powers had reportedly expired just days prior to the hearing.

Chalabilyev, an English language teacher by profession, faces charges of intentionally causing serious harm to health. If convicted, he faces a prison sentence ranging from 6 to 11 years.

Chalabilyev has pleaded not guilty, maintaining that the charges are a direct retaliation for his online activism. Only 24 hours before his arrest, he posted a scathing critique of the administration on Facebook, stating:

“The Aliyev family rule has not strengthened the country; it has weakened it. The state has been personalized, the people marginalized, and the future has been mortgaged.”

This arrest follows a pattern of digital repression in Azerbaijan, where social media posts often serve as the catalyst for criminal prosecution under unrelated penal codes.

A Pattern of Harassment

Chalabilyev previously served a 30-day administrative sentence on charges of “hooliganism” and “disobeying police orders”—common charges often leveled against civil rights defenders and digital activists in Azerbaijan to silence dissent.

In Azerbaijan, authorities often resort to the “Defamation” Trap: While Azerbaijan has moved toward decriminalizing libel in some spheres, authorities frequently use “hooliganism” or “drug possession” charges to arrest individuals whose primary “offense” is a viral Facebook post or a critical YouTube comment.

further restrictions discussed on dissemination of forbidden information

On November 24, a joint online meeting of the Milli Majlis Committees on Legal Policy and State Building and on Human Rights was held.

According to the Parliament’s Press and Public Relations Department, the chair of the Committee on Legal Policy and State Building, Ali Huseynli, stated that the agenda included a single item: a draft law on amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses and to the Law “On Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information.”

It was noted that the main purpose of the draft law is to protect public morality, in particular to shield adolescents and young people from harmful and unethical information disseminated on social networks, as well as to improve existing legislation by clarifying accountability mechanisms in the online environment.

At the end of the meeting, the draft law was recommended for consideration at the Milli Majlis plenary session in its first reading.

According to the draft, it would be prohibited to post information in publicly accessible information resources that involves actions demonstrating blatant disrespect toward society, the use of obscene expressions, or the display of parts of the human body in a manner contrary to moral norms and national and spiritual values.

It was reported that corresponding amendments would also be made to the Code of Administrative Offenses, imposing relevant penalties.

Independent experts believe that adopting this draft would further tighten the law in question. In their view, in many cases, the cited provisions could be used to curtail freedom of expression artificially.

Previously, a number of amendments were made in Azerbaijan to the Law “On Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information.” Amendments adopted in 2017 granted executive authorities the power to block electronic resources without a court decision. In the same year, the websites of Radio Azadliq (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Azerbaijani service), Meydan TV, and the Azadliq newspaper were blocked by court order. This was justified by claims that certain materials published on these sites posed a “threat to interests protected by the law of the state and society.” However, during court proceedings, representatives of the outlets stated that the allegations were unfounded.

In subsequent years, this practice continued.

on a mission to spread propaganda

The blocking of 3,932 YouTube channels linked to Azerbaijan-backed influence operations by Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) in the first two quarters of 2025 indicates a persistent and significant effort to spread propaganda. These channels were specifically noted for “sharing content in Azerbaijani, supportive of Azerbaijan, and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijani government.”

This sustained activity points to:

  • Systematic Information Warfare: The large number of channels suggests a well-organized and extensive campaign, likely state-sponsored or state-aligned, aimed at shaping public opinion both domestically and internationally.
  • Targeted Narratives: The content’s focus on supporting Azerbaijan while criticizing Armenia and domestic critics indicates a clear agenda to control narratives related to geopolitical conflicts and internal dissent. This aligns with the broader context of the Azerbaijani government’s tightening control over information, as evidenced by recent legislative changes impacting NGOs and media.
  • Use of Digital Platforms for Influence: YouTube, as a widely accessible platform, is being leveraged to disseminate these narratives, highlighting the importance of social media in modern propaganda efforts.
  • Google TAG’s Role in Countering Disinformation: Google TAG’s consistent identification and blocking of these channels underscore the ongoing battle between state-backed influence operations and platform efforts to maintain integrity and prevent the spread of harmful or manipulative content. The continuous blocking action suggests an arms race where propagandists attempt to create new channels as old ones are shut down.

In the context of the legislative changes, which aim to restrict independent media and NGOs, the aggressive online propaganda campaigns further demonstrate the Azerbaijani government’s comprehensive approach to controlling information and stifling dissenting voices. The blocking of these channels by Google TAG effectively highlights the digital front of this broader struggle for information control.

Here is a breakdown: 

  • Q1 2025: 1,562 (January) + 787 (February) + 542 (March) = 2,891 channels
  • Q2 2025: 356 (April) + 457 (May) + 228 (June) = 1,041 channels
  • Total Azerbaijan-linked channels blocked in Q1 and Q2 2025: 3,932 channels.

Last year, Google TAG identified and took down over 14,000 YouTube channels serving a similar purpose.

government consolidates control over media

On July 14, the parliament of Azerbaijan adopted amendments to the already restrictive Law on Media, tightening state control over information and extending censorship capabilities to digital platforms. One of the most significant changes is the expansion of the term “Media Entity” to include the local offices and representative branches of foreign media organizations. These entities are now required to register both with the State Tax Service and with a newly empowered Media Register. Any operation conducted without both forms of registration is explicitly classified as illegal. The registration process is not merely bureaucratic—it forms the legal basis for the state to shut down foreign media operations at will.

In addition to registration requirements, the amended law introduces naming restrictions for media outlets. The names of media entities and their editorial offices must not be identical or similar to those of other outlets, must not mislead users, and must not contain expressions deemed contrary to public order, morality, or ethics. These vague criteria offer the authorities broad discretion to deny registration or shut down operations on subjective grounds.

Perhaps most troubling is the provision banning the publication and dissemination of “false information.” The law does not define what constitutes “false,” giving the authorities the power to interpret and enforce this standard arbitrarily. In Azerbaijan’s legal environment, where courts often side with the state and media freedom is already tightly constrained, this creates enormous risks for journalists, especially those engaged in critical reporting. Content that challenges official narratives can now be punished not because it is untrue, but because it is unwelcome.

Moreover, the law places significant and arguably unattainable demands on news agencies. In order to qualify for legal operation, agencies must have formal agreements with at least twenty other media outlets and employ journalists accredited in a minimum of five foreign countries. These requirements appear less intended to encourage professionalism than to impose exclusionary thresholds that many independent or critical outlets simply cannot meet.

The Media Development Agency, an entity under close government control, has been granted expansive new powers under the amended legal framework. It now has the authority to take measures against content it deems prohibited, including on online platforms. This effectively formalizes internet censorship. The agency can also request the State Tax Service to dissolve foreign media offices that fail to comply with registration requirements or that are found to be operating without an applicable international agreement. Most notably, this process can now be conducted without following the standard legal procedures for dissolving entities laid out in Articles 59 through 61 of the Civil Code. A similar change has been made to the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal Entities, which now explicitly states that failure to appear in the Media Register—or removal from it—is a valid ground for dissolution.

Key changes include:

  • Expansion of “Media Entity” definition: Now explicitly includes branches and representative offices of foreign media organizations operating in Azerbaijan.

  • Registration requirements: Such entities must first register with the State Tax Service (STS) and then apply for inclusion in the Media Register. Operating without both registrations is explicitly prohibited.

  • Illegal operation penalties:

    • Media activity without Media Register inclusion is now defined as illegal.

    • Administrative penalties are introduced for the publication or dissemination of print media by entities not listed in the Register.

  • Naming regulations: Media outlet names must not:

    • Resemble or imitate existing media names;

    • Contain expressions that contradict public order, morality, or ethics;

    • Mislead users.

  • Prohibition on “false information”: The law prohibits the publication and dissemination of false information, but provides no clear definition of what constitutes “falsehood.” This vagueness opens the door to arbitrary enforcement and censorship.

“Critical reporting could be punished not because it’s false — but because it’s inconvenient,” noted one media analyst.

  • Operational burdens on news agencies:

    • Must maintain agreements with at least 20 media entities;

    • Employ journalists accredited in at least five foreign countries;

    • Meet minimum content production thresholds.

Critics argue these criteria are unrealistic for most independent or local outlets, and function as gatekeeping tools to limit access to legal operation.


Unprecedented Powers for the Media Development Agency

The Media Development Agency, an entity under close government control, now wields broad new powers:

  • Can take measures against materials it deems “prohibited”, including online publications;

  • Has authority to request that the State Tax Service dissolve foreign media branches and representative offices, without following the dissolution procedures outlined in Articles 59–61 of the Civil Code;

  • Can enforce removal from the State Register of Legal Entities for non-compliant foreign media entities.

Additionally, amendments to the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal Entities make removal from the Media Register or operation outside of international agreements grounds for forced dissolution.


What These Changes Mean

  • Media freedom under siege: Foreign and local media are subject to restrictive registration, vague censorship provisions, and harsh penalties. Independent journalism, particularly if critical of the government, faces heightened risk.

  • Government agencies have unchecked power: The Media Development Agency now acts as a censorship body with legal tools to dismantle non-compliant entities — without judicial oversight.

  • Azerbaijan drifts further from international norms: These laws contravene constitutional protections and international obligations under the ECHR and undermine any remaining democratic space.


Exiled blogger sentenced to seven years in absentia

On July 28, Imameddin Alimanov, a blogger living abroad and the founder of the YouTube channel called “Xalq TV,” was sentenced to 7 years on charges of making public calls against the state. In May 2021, a search warrant was issued for the blogger. In March of this year, several other bloggers living abroad were summoned, all suspects under various crimes, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan alleged they committed. Several have already been sentenced to prison in absentia.

On May 31, 2025, a court in Baku issued arrest warrants against exiled bloggers Tural Sadigli, Ordukhan Temirkhan (Babirov), and a government critic, former rector of Azerbaijan International University Elshad Abdullayev.

Sadigli was charged with Article 178.3.1 (fraud by an organized group), Article 220.2 (incitement to mass unrest), and Article 320 (forgery of documents). Temirkhan (a Dutch citizen) was charged under Article 220.2 and Article 281.2 (open provocation against the state). Elshad Abdullayev (a former university rector living in France) was charged under Article 311.1 (bribery), Article 213.1 (tax evasion), and Article 130.1 (illegal organ trafficking).

The arrest warrants follow an investigation launched in March 2025 against several exiled bloggers, including Rafael Piriyev, Ilgar Hajiyev, Mahammad Mirzali, Gurban Mammadov, Elshad Mammadov, Gabil Mammadov, and Tural Sadigli.

meclis.info website founders on trial

In April 2024, police arrested Imran Aliyev, one of the founders of the meclis.info website, at the Baku Haydar Aliyev International Airport. Aliyev was accused of smuggling charges and sent into pretrial detention. Since then, additional charges have been leveled against him, including abuse of power, illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion, and document forgery – all of which he denies. On June 10, 2025, Aliyev and the website’s second founder, Elgiz Gahraman, heard the full indictment in their case at a hearing in Baku. 

According to the indictment, meclis.info’s website and social media accounts were not properly registered. As a result, Aliyev, Gahraman, and a third colleague, Tamella Musayeva, are accused of receiving undeclared foreign funding through meclis.info and engaging in smuggling. The indictment also claims all three forged documents while committing smuggling, purportedly in cahoots with Abzas Media journalists. If convicted, Aliyev, Gahraman, and Musayeva face a minimum of seven and up to twelve years in prison.

Elgiz Gahraman and Tamella Musayeva were placed under police supervision in February 2025, facing the exact charges as Aliyev. Gahraman has been under a travel ban since April 2024 due to an investigation related to the Abzas Media case.

Majlis.info was launched in 2023 and published analytical pieces about the activities of the Azerbaijani parliament and the often-controversial statements made by its members.

activist receives conditional sentence

Civic activist Famil Khalilov has been handed a conditional sentence of 3 years with a 2-year probation period. Khalilov was arrested on May 2, 2024, on spurious drug charges. He was transferred under house arrest in December 2024. The activist was accused of drug charges – possession of a large amount of drugs with the intent to sell. Police claimed they confiscated 13 grams of methamphetamine in his pocket during his arrest. The activist refuted the allegations at the time, saying drugs were planted on him during his arrest. On February 6, 2025, when the verdict was being read, the activist was found guilty under drug possession charges, except “without the intent to sell.”

 Khalilov was deported from Sweden in 2023 after unsuccessfully seeking asylum there.

Paralyzed in both arms, Khalilov lived with his wife and three children. The activist was vocal on social media platforms, often criticizing the authorities and calling for protests.  

Drug possession charges are commonly used to target political and civic activists in Azerbaijan. Authorities in Azerbaijan have also been closely monitoring social media platforms, taking various measures against citizens using the platforms to express their criticism against the state. While administrative detentions, fines, or prophylactic “conversations” at police stations are standard measures, long-term arrests are also common. 

While it is difficult to estimate an exact number of politically motivated drug-related charges handed down for online criticism, some of the well-known cases include that of Jabbar Savalan (2011) – a political activist who was arrested on drug charges after calling for protests on Facebook; Hilal Mammadov (2012) – journalist and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Tolishi Sado (charges against the journalist were later expanded to include treason and inciting ethnic hatred); Rashad Ramazanov (2013) – a blogger. There are many others. According to documentation by Azerbaijan Internet Watch, government critics targeted with drug charges include Elshan Teymurov (2020), Elmir Abbasov (2021), Sardar Asgarov (2021), Shahin Haciyev (2021), Razi Humbatov (2022), Mahir Azimov (2023), Ruslan Vahabov (2023), Zeka Miragayev (2023), Elvin Sadigov, Movsum Mammadov (2023). 

media development agency wants another website blocked

According to reporting by Meydan TV, the Media Development Agency (MEDİA) has filed a lawsuit to block the news site “Anaxeber.info.” The website’s editor-in-chief, Azer Talibov, told Meydan TV that the blocking request is linked to the website’s critical reporting covering corruption, government misconduct, and social issues. He claimed that despite multiple requests from the Media Agency and other institutions to remove specific articles, he refused, and this legal action is a form of retaliation. He also mentioned that he did not register with the Media Registry.

Previously, the Media Development Agency had taken similar actions against other websites. On November 14, 2023, the “dia.az” website was blocked, followed by “teref.info” and several others, based on Baku Court of Appeals rulings.

Azerbaijani lawmakers passed the controversial law on media in December 2021. It came into force in 2022. As part of the law, authorities introduced the Media Registry in September 2022, which sparked protests from independent media outlets, journalists, and editors who feared the registry would have grave consequences on media freedom in a country with rampant censorship. 

Critics of the draft law worried the new legal document would seriously threaten media freedom, including online media resources, as it contains provisions granting a discretionary power to the state to regulate media excessively, especially online media, as well as introduce further restrictions on journalists’ work, media companies, and relevant entities. Critics were also vocal about the absence of a broad and meaningful public consultation of the law before its adoption. 

As part of the new law, a registry system for online media outlets and journalists working for online media platforms or working as freelance journalists was envisioned. This and other provisions of the law raised several questions regarding the compliance of the law with the international standards on media freedom.

The Venice Commission issued a negative opinion on the law, and a group of Azerbaijan journalists and media leaders filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan in 2023, arguing that the law contradicts Azerbaijan’s Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitutional Court has yet to review the case.

The first time Talibov’s website was blocked was in 2018 when the website existed under a different URL – Anaxeber.az. Despite Talibov’s attempt to challenge the decision, he was unsuccessful. In the same year, access to “Az24saat.org” and “Xural.com” were also blocked.

On June 13, 2024, the ECHR ruled in favor of four blocked media outlets, finding that their blocking violated their right to freedom of expression. The court ordered the Azerbaijani government to pay each applicant €5,000 in compensation, but Talıbov claims that the compensation has not yet been paid.

The practice of blocking of websites in Azerbaijan began in 2017 with the blocking of “Azadlıq” Radio (azadliq.org), “Azadlıq” newspaper (azadliq.info), Meydan TV (meydan.tv), Turan TV (turan.tv), and “Azərbaycan Saatı” (azerbaycansaati.org).

At the time, the authorities argued the reasons for blocking these websites were, calls aimed at “forcible change of the constitutional order,” “organization of mass riots,” and other illegal activities. These websites were considered independent and/or platforms affiliated with opposition parties. As a result, the decision to block them was based on legal claims that lacked evidence. This was further reflected in the review process when the decision to block these platforms was implemented. According to EHRAC, “no effective and independent review took place in the first instance decision to block access to the websites in 2017, and in subsequent appeals. The courts accepted the authorities’ allegations at face value and did not attempt to consider or explain adequately why the content was unlawful.”

The intentions behind the blocking decision were further reflected in subsequent actions by the Government of Azerbaijan against the online platforms. Such that, at the time of the first decision to block these websites for access in 2017, the Azerbaijani Government claimed these websites continued disseminating their content through VPN services or social media platforms and therefore the action taken against them did not cause significant changes to the published content. However, in February 2020, the Ministry of Transportation, Communications and High Technologies “requested the domestic courts to impose a ban on the applicants’ ability to share their content through VPN services and social media platforms.”

activist handed down jail sentence over online posts

On January 28, 2025, the Baku Court for Serious Crimes sentenced Elshan Karimov to six years in prison.

The charges were based on his social media posts defending political prisoners in Azerbaijan, which authorities interpreted as incitement to overthrow the government. Karimov and his supporters assert that his arrest and sentencing are politically motivated, aiming to suppress dissent. 

The activist was detained in April 2024 in the village of Rustamli, Yevlakh region, while attending his father’s funeral. He was charged under Article 281.1 of the Azerbaijani Criminal Code, which pertains to public calls for the violent seizure of power. 

website editor sentenced to 8 years

The director of the website “dunyaninsesi.az”, Arshad Ibrahimov, who has been in prison since December 2023 on extortion by threat charges, was sentenced to 8 years on January 24, 2025

Ibrahimov refutes allegations leveled against him. During his defense, Ibrahimov said the charges were bogus and were linked to the website’s reports of police misconduct in various districts across the country he has reported. 

In his final statement, Ibrahimov claimed he had been under pressure from the Organized Crime Department for a long time due to his website’s reports on police misconduct. In 2014, he was arrested by the Organized Crime Department and convicted under the same criminal article. At the time, he was sentenced to 11 years. The sentence was later reduced to 10 years on appeal and then to 5 years by the Supreme Court. He was released early through a presidential pardon.

Ibrahimov also said that a year before his most recent arrest, he was detained, held for a day, and forced to delete critical articles about the police. Ibrahimov said that the head of the department, Abulfat Rzayev, warned him that if he continued publishing adverse reports about the police, he would be arrested—which eventually happened.

During the hearing, Ibrahimov’s lawyer, Zabil Gahramanov, argued that people who the website editor allegedly blackmailed said they had no complaints against Ibrahimov. During the testimony, they said the Organized Crime Department pressured them to file a complaint. 

His lawyer announced that they would appeal the verdict.