Azerbaijan expands extrajudicial website blocking authority – parliament amends information law

On 10 July 2026, Azerbaijan’s parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization and Information Protection, significantly broadening the executive’s power to block internet resources without prior judicial authorization.

What changed

Before these amendments, extrajudicial (warrantless) blocking was restricted to genuine emergencies – defined as situations in which state or public interests were under threat or lives were in immediate danger. The amended law now permits extrajudicial blocking of websites that allegedly contain: defamation or insult of individuals; invasion of private or family life; promotion of illegal drugs; pornographic material; promotion of gambling; content encouraging suicide; films or games lacking age-rating disclosure; or “false information that could endanger public safety” – a deliberately vague category with no statutory definition. The blocking authority remains the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport.

How we got here

The law was originally adopted in 1998, when internet blocking required a court order. A 2017 amendment introduced Article 13-3, permitting temporary extrajudicial blocking in urgent cases with mandatory court notification within five days. Shortly after 2017, Meydan TV (meydan.tv), Azadlıq Radio (azadliq.org), Azadlıq newspaper (azadliq.info), Turan TV, and Azərbaycan Saatı were blocked under this provision. Further expansions in 2020–21 added “false information of public significance” as a blocking ground during the pandemic and the Second Karabakh War. The July 2026 amendments represent the broadest expansion to date, removing the “emergency” limitation entirely for the newly added categories.

Expert assessment

Lawyer Ruslan Əliyev identified the core risk: under the previous framework, even formal judicial proceedings provided some documentary record and a basis for appeal. Under the new framework, a single official can block content in seconds. “First, the blocking happens, then you become the foot soldier chasing to get it unblocked.” He noted that the new grounds – defamation, insult, false information – lack precise legal definitions, making it impossible to distinguish between legitimate content removal and the suppression of critical journalism. 

Parallel social media regulation

The same legislative period also produced new rules requiring social media platforms serving Azerbaijani users to verify user ages (minimum 16), establish local registration or representation in Azerbaijan, and respond to government data requests. These measures follow a pattern across the South Caucasus and Central Asia of requiring platform localization as a precondition for lawful operation, enabling domestic legal pressure on otherwise internationally domiciled companies.

Relevance for internet freedom monitoring

The July 2026 amendments consolidate Azerbaijan’s extrajudicial blocking architecture and make it applicable to a wider set of content categories without any statutory definition of what qualifies. The vagueness of “false information endangering public safety” and “insult” creates categorical overlap with content that Azerbaijan’s independent press regularly produces – investigative reporting into officials, criticism of government policy, and human rights documentation. Combined with the existing blocking of major independent outlets since 2017, and the practice of blocking government websites from abroad (documented by Meydan TV in May 2026), the amendments represent a significant further restriction on both domestic and diaspora access to independent information.

Meta, TikTok, and other social media platforms to face mandatory registration and local presence requirements in Azerbaijan

Parts of this entry are based on reporting published by Qəzetçi. Below is a translated, edited, and expanded version of the original.

Azerbaijan’s parliament (Milli Majlis) is debating a package of amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information and the Law on the Protection of Children from Harmful Information that would, for the first time, formally require global social media platforms to register in the country, open local representative offices, and enforce a higher minimum age for users.

Under the draft, platforms that fail to comply face financial sanctions of 100,000 to 300,000 AZN, as well as the possibility of being blocked in the country. According to Farid Pardashunas, a board member of the Press Council, platforms will be given 12 months to comply once the law enters into force, and companies such as Meta, Google, and TikTok would be expected to open offices in Baku and set up Azerbaijani-language support services — a model he compared to neighboring Turkey.

Age restrictions raised from 13 to 16

The amendments, under discussion since early June, would prohibit the creation of social media accounts for children under 16, above the minimum age of 13 that most platforms currently apply. Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, X, Snapchat, and other networks would reportedly fall within the law’s scope. Existing accounts would be reviewed after the law takes effect, and accounts whose holders’ ages cannot be verified would be deleted. Users aged 16–18 would be subject to parental consent and oversight, special safety measures, content and advertising restrictions, and geolocation limits.

Age verification, according to Havva Huseynli, head of the cooperation and communication sector at the Electronic Security Service, would rely on cross-checking bank card data (via temporary blocking of funds), email, and mobile phone numbers. Huseynli said personal data would be used solely for age verification and would be deleted immediately if a match is not confirmed. The proposed changes were also discussed at a June 10 meeting between the Presidential Administration and NGO representatives.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Science and Education has already moved ahead with its own restrictions. Deputy Minister Firudin Gurbanov said on June 8 that access to TikTok has been blocked in schools, that internet filtering is applied to schoolchildren’s access more broadly, and that videos on more than 200 “dangerous topics” have been restricted.

Tax registration as a parallel track

Separately, starting September 2026, foreign digital service providers operating in Azerbaijan’s e-commerce market with an annual turnover exceeding 10,000 USD will be required to register electronically with the tax authorities. The State Tax Service announced on May 10 that ten foreign digital service providers — including Apple, Adobe, Sony Interactive Entertainment, Epic Games, and Chess.com — have already registered. Notably, Meta’s platforms (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp), which provide e-commerce services in Azerbaijan, are absent from the published list.

Experts warn of vague criteria, privacy risks, and potential for abuse

Internet technology expert Osman Gunduz noted that Azerbaijan has 17-year-olds building AI businesses, coding, launching startups, and competing in international olympiads and hackathons — often with digital skills exceeding those of their parents. Gunduz also warned that the proposed verification methods (mobile number, email, bank card) can be circumvented — a child can simply use a parent’s phone or card — while leaving verification to the platforms themselves creates the risk of transferring identity data of millions of users to foreign companies.

Lawyer Yalchin Imanov told Qəzetçi that protecting minors online is a normal legislative practice, pointing to Australia’s law, in force since December of last year, as the first of its kind. But he stressed that such changes must go through public consultation first — something absent in Azerbaijan, where restrictions on information sources and social networks surface either only during parliamentary debates or after adoption. “That is the dangerous side of the matter,” he said. Imanov also noted the ambiguity of what the “200+ dangerous topics” restricted in schools actually cover, at a time when access to pornographic and other content remains freely available in the country. Given the authorities’ track record of intolerance toward freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, he said, the possibility that minors’ access to such sources will be restricted cannot be ruled out.

According to available figures, Azerbaijan has 7.6 million social media users — 1.65 million on Facebook, 4.73 million on Instagram, and over 6 million on TikTok, with WhatsApp the most active messaging app. The state’s interest in platforms is not limited to regulation: as Qazqazinfo reported back in 2024, the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ) has invested 179 million USD in Meta.

Background: previous attempts to monitor and control social media platforms

The current draft is the most concrete step yet in a longer trajectory of state efforts to bring social media under regulatory control, which Azerbaijan Internet Watch has documented over the years:

  • The 2017 amendments to the Law on Information. First adopted in 1998 as a technical regulation, the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information was converted into a content-regulation instrument through restrictive amendments introduced on March 10, 2017 — the same law now being amended to cover platform registration. Together with the Code of Administrative Offenses (Articles 388 and 388-1), it has served as the primary legal basis for blocking websites and prosecuting online speech, see AIW’s coverage of the legal framework.
  • Prosecutor General’s Office as a de facto content regulator. AIW’s May 2022 legal analysis, “Who regulates content online in Azerbaijan”, documented the pattern of the Prosecutor’s Office issuing warnings and administrative charges against social media users, bloggers, and website editors for “disseminating prohibited information” — a practice that intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, when one MP even proposed a special unit to monitor social media platforms and hold users spreading “rumors” accountable.
  • Press Council proposals and the local-representation agenda. As early as 2020–2022, the Press Council proposed establishing a commission with the Prosecutor’s Office to regulate the media and floated regulating social media platforms. Media law expert Khalid Aghaliyev assessed at the time that these proposals were linked to the state’s intention to have platforms open representative offices in Azerbaijan and then use those offices to consolidate control over the platforms — precisely the mechanism now written into the draft amendments.
  • The 2022 Media Law. Adopted by parliament in December 2021 and signed in February 2022 despite widespread domestic and international criticism, the Law on Media extended restrictive registration and licensing requirements to online media and journalists. AIW’s legal opinion “New Media Law: implications for online media/journalism in Azerbaijan” detailed its adverse implications, and the mandatory media registry it created has since been used to deny registration to independent outlets.
  • The March 2026 presidential decree. The current amendments follow directly from a decree signed by President Ilham Aliyev on March 1, 2026, focused on children’s online safety, which introduced age restrictions on registering for social platforms and instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to draft implementing legislation within three months — a timeline consistent with the amendments now before parliament.
  • Expanding regulatory ambitions. The move also comes amid a broader push to regulate the digital sphere, including the government’s recent initiative to regulate AI-generated content and the creation of a new Digital Development Council in February 2026.

Viewed against this background, the framing of the current amendments around child safety mirrors earlier legislative moves in which protective language accompanied provisions that expanded the state’s leverage over online platforms and speech. The combination of mandatory local representation, steep fines, and blocking powers replicates the model adopted in Turkey and Russia — a model that in both countries has been used to pressure platforms into removing content and handing over user data.

OC Media blocked in Azerbaijan as new National Cybersecurity Agency takes over internet controls

This entry draws on reporting by OC Media and Qəzetçi.

Access to OC Media, an independent online news outlet covering the South Caucasus, has been blocked in Azerbaijan. The outlet reported that readers first alerted it in early June that the website could no longer be reached from inside the country, and that traffic from Azerbaijan dropped sharply around the same time. Attempts to load the site from multiple regions of the country have since failed unless a VPN is used. Despite this, the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport claimed that no restrictions had been imposed and that there was no problem accessing the site. Azerbaijan’s Presidential Administration did not respond to the outlet’s inquiries.

If confirmed through technical measurement, OC Media joins a long list of independent and opposition news websites blocked in Azerbaijan. The websites of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Azerbaijan service, Meydan TV, Azadliq, Azerbaycan Saati, Turan TV, and OCCRP were blocked between 2017 and 2019 following amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information in 2017, which authorized extrajudicial blocking of online resources. More recently, the websites of Abzas Media and Toplum TV were blocked amid the sweeping crackdown on independent media that began in November 2023, in which around 30 journalists have been placed in pre-trial detention or convicted, most commonly on smuggling and tax-related charges. Meydan TV has said its mirror websites are also periodically blocked, and that its social media pages have been repeatedly attacked.

A new “single engine” for online control

The timing of the block is significant. On June 2, 2026, the presidential website published two decrees that attracted little attention amid the routine flow of official announcements. The first abolished the Electronic Security Service (ESS), the roughly 30-person technical body created in 2013 under the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport. The second established its successor, the National Cybersecurity Agency (NCA), and approved its 50-clause charter.

The NCA is set up as a “public legal entity” – a legal form the government increasingly favors, as it places the body outside standard ministerial constraints while allowing it to generate its own revenue, with its authorized capital drawn from budget funds previously allocated to the ESS. On paper, the reorganization reads as administrative housekeeping aimed at “improving management.” In practice, as OC Media’s analysis of the charter shows, the decrees consolidate functions that were previously dispersed across ministries, courts, and the prosecutor’s office — website blocking, traffic filtering, personal data oversight, protection of broadcasting, even blocking of foreign gambling sites – inside a single well-resourced agency answerable to the minister and, ultimately, the president.

Two aspects deserve particular attention from an internet freedom perspective:

Choke-point control over traffic: The charter assigns the agency network-defense functions, such as filtering malicious traffic. While this is standard language for a cybersecurity body, the same infrastructure that absorbs DDoS attacks can throttle or degrade specific services. Azerbaijan has a documented record of exactly this: nationwide throttling during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, and localized mobile internet disruptions during protests, including the 2019 protest outside the Baku City Administration building, where journalists and demonstrators reported mobile internet failures on site. The decree institutionalizes a permanent, presidentially supervised hand on that choke-point.

Surveillance and data oversight: The charter embeds surveillance-adjacent capabilities into the agency’s mandate and transfers oversight of personal data to it – a concerning combination in a country where Pegasus spyware was used against journalists, activists, and lawyers, and where no independent data protection authority exists.

Human rights lawyer Yalchin Imanov noted that the government has been restricting access to independent media websites since at least 2017, and that the new institutional setup arrives amid the harshest assault on the Azerbaijani press in more than a decade: Abzas Media shuttered and its journalists sentenced to seven to nine years in June 2025 (together with RFE/RL economist Farid Mehralizada); Toplum TV raided; Meydan TV’s Baku-based staff arrested; the BBC’s Baku bureau closed; the Turan news agency suspended; and the accreditations of Voice of America and Bloomberg correspondents revoked.

Why this matters

Until now, internet controls in Azerbaijan operated through a patchwork: the Ministry issued blocking orders (often without court decisions), the Prosecutor General’s Office pursued users and editors over online content, and the ESS handled technical security. The NCA gathers these levers into one institution at precisely the moment parliament is debating amendments that would require social media platforms to register locally, open offices in Baku, and enforce new age restrictions – with fines of 100,000–300,000 AZN and blocking as penalties for non-compliance. A single agency with blocking, filtering, and data oversight powers is the natural enforcement arm for that regime.

It is also worth noting an institutional irony: the ESS – whose officials were publicly explaining how age verification under the new social media rules would work as recently as June – has itself been dissolved, its functions absorbed into a body with a far broader censorship mandate and fewer checks.

Activist Ahmad Mammadli Sentenced to 6 Years

On March 16, the Baku Serious Crimes Court held a hearing in the case of public activist and founder of Yoldash Media, Ahmad Mammadli.

The state prosecutor had requested a 9-year prison sentence.

Following deliberations, the court sentenced Mammadli to 6 years in prison.

Mammadli was detained on May 6, 2025, and formally remanded in custody on May 8. He is accused of inflicting serious knife injuries to an individual identified as Vugar Dunyamaliyev.

He was charged under:

  • Article 126.2.4 (intentional infliction of serious bodily harm)

  • Article 221.3 (hooliganism involving the use of a weapon)

Mammadli denies the charges, stating that his arrest is linked to his journalistic activities.

Azerbaijan Moves to Regulate AI-Generated Content

Azerbaijan’s parliament is debating two draft laws that would establish the country’s first legal framework for AI-generated content. One bill would criminalise the creation of AI-generated sexually explicit content featuring real individuals without their consent, carrying a prison sentence of up to seven years. A second bill would require all AI-generated content to be clearly labelled as such, with fines of ₼80–₼150 (roughly $50–$90) for unlabelled material.

Parliamentary committees reviewed both bills in March. Human rights lawyer Yalchin Imanov welcomed the initiative as a legal first for Azerbaijan, but cautioned that its practical application remains unclear, noting that the country has a history of applying laws selectively to protect figures in power. ICT expert Osman Gunduz acknowledged the global urgency of regulating deepfakes and AI-generated sexual abuse material, but raised implementation concerns — particularly around how authenticity will be verified, what level of disclosure will be required, and whether vague enforcement mechanisms might create new legal risks for journalists and news organisations. He warned that without clear enforcement frameworks, bureaucratic obstacles could undermine the laws’ effectiveness and stifle a media and creative sector that will increasingly rely on AI tools to remain competitive.

Opposition Figure Given 25 Days Administrative Detention

Jeyhun Novruzov, head of the Sabail district branch of the Popular Front Party (AXCP), has been sentenced to 25 days of administrative detention.

According to the party, he was found guilty under:

  • Article 510 (petty hooliganism)

  • Article 535.1 (failure to obey police orders)

The AXCP states that Novruzov had criticized traffic police on Facebook four days prior, accusing them of unlawfully fining pedestrians. Novruzov was previously sentenced to 10 days in detention in December 2024 under similar charges, which he denied.

Novruzov is not the first activist to receive penalties for online criticism. Recent months have seen continued cases in Azerbaijan where individuals—particularly opposition activists—have been detained after posting criticism of authorities on Facebook. According to recent reporting by independent Meydan TV, numerous individuals who liked and commented on social media posts critical of the authorities have also faced penalties and charges.

Among them is Movsum Mammadov, who was sentenced to 30 days in prison after posting criticism of local authorities on social media; civic activist Konul Ahmadova, who was sentenced to 10 days in administrative detention; and Mushfig Abbasov, who was sentenced to 15 days in administrative detention. 

Analysis of anonymized court decisions published on Azerbaijan’s electronic court portal shows that social media activity—particularly Facebook posts—is frequently referenced in administrative cases. Courts typically describe such activity using generalized phrases such as “sharing content on social networks” or “publishing information online,” while avoiding full quotation of the posts themselves. The content is legally framed as violating public order, often characterized as insulting, immoral, or disruptive. Evidence commonly includes screenshots and data extracted from mobile devices. Rather than prosecuting speech directly, courts tend to apply public-order provisions such as petty hooliganism, effectively translating online expression into administrative offenses.

Blogger Manaf Jalilzade Sentenced to 8 Years in Absentia

The story was originally published on Meydan TV. This is a translated and edited version. 

The Baku Court for Serious Crimes has sentenced Azerbaijani blogger Manaf Jalilzade — who lives abroad — to 8 years in prison. The verdict was delivered in absentia.

Jalilzade, currently residing in Switzerland, was charged with “calls against the state” under two articles of the Criminal Code: incitement to mass disorder and calls against the constitutional order. Prosecutors alleged he shared footage from a 2019 protest near the UN building in Geneva on YouTube, and between 2023 and 2025, published videos inciting violence against the government.

Switzerland’s Federal Ministry of Justice had previously rejected Azerbaijan’s extradition request, citing risks of torture and denial of a fair trial if he were returned. Jalilzade denies all charges, calling them baseless.

Broader Context

His case is part of a wider pattern. On December 26, 2025, a Baku court sentenced another group of diaspora bloggers in absentia: Gurban Mammadov and Tural Sadiqli each received 14 years, while five others received 9-year sentences. Most of the defendants reject the charges as politically motivated.

In recent years, Azerbaijan has opened criminal cases against numerous bloggers and activists living abroad, with charges typically including incitement to mass unrest, calls to armed uprising, terrorism, and fraud.

President signs a decree on age restrictions for social media use in Azerbaijan

The original article was published by Meydan TV. Below is a translated and edited version of the original.

Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, has signed a decree to improve children’s safety on social media.

The decree introduces age restrictions on children registering on social platforms and mandates the development and enforcement of rules governing the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices in schools.

Educational programs will now include digital literacy, cybersecurity, and responsible online behavior. Awareness initiatives will be organized for parents, teachers, and students, and scientific research on children’s digital well-being will be conducted.

The Cabinet of Ministers has been instructed to draft the necessary legal regulations in cooperation with government agencies, experts, and civil society, and submit them to the President within three months. The Cabinet will also oversee the implementation of digital safety measures in schools and curricula and ensure the advancement of related research.

Azerbaijan Creates New Digital Development Council

The original story was published by Meydan TV. This is a translated and edited version.

President Ilham Aliyev has signed a decree establishing the Digital Development Council, a new body tasked with overseeing digitalization, e-government, artificial intelligence, and innovation policy in Azerbaijan.

The Council is mandated to coordinate state digital policy, supervise related programs and projects, propose improvements to regulatory documents, and align the activities of government agencies. It will report to the President annually and will have the authority to bring in local and foreign experts and form working groups. The Ministry of Digital Development and Transport will serve as the Council’s secretariat.

First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva will chair the body. Its membership includes presidential aides, key economic ministers, the Central Bank governor, and the executive director of the State Oil Fund.

Background: The February 11 Meeting

The decree comes 16 days after a presidential advisory meeting on February 11 dedicated to a unified action plan called “Azerbaijan’s New Digital Architecture.” At that meeting, Aliyev laid out a sweeping vision and a list of competitive advantages he believes position Azerbaijan well for the digital era: its geography as a bridge between Asia and Europe, a stable investment climate that has attracted over $350 billion in foreign investment over 20 years, at least 2,000 megawatts of unused power generation capacity (a prerequisite for data centers), and strategic partnership agreements with the US, EU member states, and China.

Aliyev announced several concrete directives at the meeting: all government services are to be consolidated under the single “mygov” platform; each ministry is to designate a dedicated deputy minister for digitalization and cybersecurity; and a fiber-optic cable project linking Azerbaijan to the eastern Caspian shore is expected to be completed this year.

Digital Development Minister Rashad Nabiyev reported at the same meeting that the ICT sector grew 8.5% last year, internet speeds have risen from 12 to 90 Mbps nationally since the “Online Azerbaijan” project launched, and 270 state institutions now use the government cloud. He also flagged that IT exports remain stuck at around $100 million — well below potential — and set a target of scaling that figure to $1 billion through a combination of startup financing reform, attracting foreign tech firms, and expanding the innovation ecosystem.

Aliyev also noted that Azerbaijan suffered a “very organized and aggressive cyberattack” last year, underscoring the urgency of cybersecurity investment alongside the digitalization push.

Skepticism Remains

Despite the ambitious framing, some experts caution that Azerbaijan announced economic diversification goals roughly a decade ago and the country remains heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues. They are skeptical that targets around transitioning to an innovation-driven economy will materialize without deeper structural reforms — not just new institutions and action plans.

Azerbaijan Uses Vague ‘Immorality’ Law to Imprison Critics

Azerbaijan is now actively imprisoning civic activists and government critics under new administrative legislation signed into law by President Ilham Aliyev on 26 January 2026. The amendments, approved by parliament on 15 January, classify ‘immoral activity on social media directed against society and national morality’ as petty hooliganism — a shift from criminal to administrative liability that allows authorities to detain individuals immediately, without a criminal conviction.

On 5 February, activist Movsum Mammadov from the Kurdamir district was sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention for Facebook posts documenting poor living conditions in his community and criticising local authorities’ inaction. Friends reported that his critical posts were deleted from his account shortly after his arrest, and he became unreachable.

Under the new framework, ‘disrespectful actions’ on social media carry fines ranging from ₼50 ($30) to ₼2,000 ($1,200) depending on the circumstances and whether it is a repeat offence, and administrative arrest of up to 30 days, or up to two months for repeat offences.

Human rights lawyers have condemned the legislation as deliberately vague. Yalchin Imanov told OC Media that the broad language violates the principle of legal certainty — a foundational principle of law requiring that rules be clear, unambiguous, and have predictable consequences. He characterised the law as enabling total state control and driving widespread self-censorship. Fariz Namazli added that, unlike the previous criminal framework — which required a guilty verdict and was thus harder to apply swiftly — administrative liability can be imposed immediately, giving the state a far more powerful and instant tool to silence dissent. He noted that the previous law linked petty hooliganism to a breach of public order; the new law replaces this with the undefined concept of ‘manifest contempt for society’.

Movsum was not the only social media user. Also in February, Zeinab Zeinalli, a 25-year-old content creator known online as ‘Koti’ with approximately 300,000 followers, was remanded in custody for eight days after being charged with publishing obscene statements and openly disrespecting society. The Prosecutor General’s Office confirmed the charges. Pro-government outlet Okhu.az reported that Zeinalli’s prior offence — a ₼600 ($350) fine for promoting illegal gambling on Instagram in November 2025 — was a factor in the court’s decision to detain rather than fine her. She admitted in court to having insulted users who criticised her online, expressed remorse, and pledged to change her behaviour.

However, the crackdown on TikTokers predates the new law. According to OC Media reporting, Azerbaijan’s Interior Ministry had detained or summoned over 60 TikTok users in the first three months of 2024 alone for content deemed contrary to moral values, particularly during live broadcasts. At the time, the ministry’s spokesperson could not specify which articles of the administrative code the TikTokers were charged under, reflecting the legal ambiguity that preceded the January amendments.

Among those recently arrested for online content are also TikTokers Sardar Majnunov (Serdar Inanki) and Rena Jafarova (Renka), who were detained on 17 February for allegedly publishing content with ‘obscene expressions or gestures’. Majnunov was sentenced to 20 days in jail, while Jafarova was fined ₼750 ($440), with the court granting her leniency due to having an underage child. In early February, queer TikToker Salman Mammadov, who used his page Velizarofficial primarily to fundraise for sick people and children, was arrested and sentenced to 30 days of detention for ‘promoting immorality’.

Human rights lawyer Fariz Namazli told OC Media that the legislation remains deeply flawed: there are no precise criteria defining what constitutes offensive, immoral, or morality-violating expression, and courts have consistently failed to justify why specific posts are deemed contrary to national values.