TikTok Formally Blocked in Schools Following Months of Unannounced Enforcement

Deputy Minister of Science and Education Firudin Gurbanov publicly confirmed on October 21 that TikTok is blocked within Azerbaijani school networks. He said the restriction had been in place since at least June 2026, when the deputy minister first announced it—meaning enforcement preceded any public legal announcement by months. More than 200 categories of content (crime, drugs, violence, and “other dangerous topics”) are also restricted across school networks. He urged families to extend similar monitoring into the home.

The blocking is implemented through school network infrastructure controls rather than the extrajudicial blocking mechanism used for websites under the Law on Information (documented in earlier AzNetWatch entries). It does not appear to be based on a court order or formal administrative decision published for public review. A social media age restriction law adopted on June 30, 2026 — requiring platforms to verify users are at least 16, with parental consent for 16–18-year-olds — does not come into force until August 2027 and is separate from this school-level block.

The school-level TikTok block follows the broader documented pattern in Azerbaijan’s internet censorship architecture: the July 2026 amendments enabling extrajudicial blocking of websites based on undefined categories (“false information,” “insult,” “defamation”); the blocking of OC Media’s website in June 2026; and the disruption of Instagram and TikTok for Azerbaijani users on October 12 during the hijab ban protests. The school block is distinct in that it targets a specific platform in a specific institutional context rather than applying a blanket national block — but its implementation without a publicly announced legal basis, and the fact that enforcement preceded public announcement by months, is consistent with the pattern of opaque, extrajudicial content control documented throughout 2026. It also occurs in the context of TikTok being the primary platform through which hijab-ban protest videos were distributed, and where Gudrat Abdullayev was sentenced to 25 days of administrative detention (October 7, 2026) for posting content about the ban.

Social Media Arrests and Platform Disruption: October 2026

In October 2026, at least four individuals were administratively detained specifically for social media posts about Azerbaijan’s school hijab regulations, and two major platforms — Instagram and TikTok — were disrupted for Azerbaijani users on the day of the largest protest. The cases illustrate the direct application of Azerbaijan’s January 2026 social media “immorality” legislation — and the existing provisions on “prohibited information” — to the documentation and criticism of a government policy affecting religious expression.

The Legal Framework

The detentions use two overlapping provisions:

Article 388-1.1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offenses: Posting “information prohibited from dissemination on internet information resources” — carries a fine of 500–1,000 manats or up to one month of administrative detention.

The Law on Information, Informatization and Information Protection: Prohibits “insulting or defamatory” content online; cited in the WhatsApp/Erdoğan sentence (9 July 2026) and, per case reports, in some hijab-related detentions.

In none of the documented cases did courts specify which words or content triggered the charge. This aligns with the pattern identified by lawyer Fariz Namazlı in his commentary on the July 2026 internet-blocking legislation: without precise definitions, users cannot foresee what will be treated as a violation.

Documented Cases

1. Gudrat Abdullayev (Nakhchivan) — TikTok post about hijab ban
Detained 7 October 2026. Sentenced to 25 days of administrative detention. Charge: posting information prohibited from dissemination on internet resources (Article 388-1.1.1). The family was told the post concerned the hijab ban. The sentence did not identify the specific content. His mother was not provided with the court decision or informed of the legal basis. The family did not know his location after one brief call. 

2. Mahammad Seyidov and Elvin Abbasov (Nakhchivan) — WhatsApp video about children denied school entry
Detained 13 October 2026. Both men filmed a video of their children being refused entry to school for wearing hijab and distributed the video via WhatsApp. They were detained after the video circulated. No official statement, no article cited, and no confirmation of whether administrative or criminal charges were filed. 

3. Two brothers, Sherur district, Nakhchivan — detained after WhatsApp protest
Seymur Mammadov and Samur Məmmədov were detained after protesting at school about their children’s exclusion; family members indicated the video was shared on WhatsApp. Each was given 25 days of administrative detention. No legal basis communicated. 

4. İlkin Huseynov (Baku) — first reported missing, then sent to administrative detention for a month; linked to “Let Leyla Go to School” Instagram initiative
Unidentified individuals took him from his home on approximately 14 October 2026. Connected to the “qoy_mektebe_getsin” Instagram page, which helped hijab-wearing students access tutoring after being excluded from school. His Facebook account was reportedly accessed by a third party shortly after his disappearance. According to news reports, the initiative’s social media accounts were also inaccessible. 

Platform Disruption — 12 October 2026

On the morning of 12 October 2026—the same day the Ministry of Interior announced 37 arrests and the same evening that over 200 people were reported detained near “28 May” metro station—Azerbaijani users reported that Instagram and TikTok became inaccessible without a VPN. Monitoring services recorded large volumes of Azerbaijani complaints for both platforms without recording a global outage. Access was restored via VPN. No official explanation was provided. Neither Meta nor TikTok issued a statement. The disruption coincided with the mass circulation of protest-related videos on both platforms.

Pattern Note

The October 2026 cases follow the documented pattern: the WhatsApp status/Erdoğan case (9 July 2026, 15 days for a critical post about the Turkish president); the TikToker “Çevik” arrest (September 2026, criminal charge for religious commentary); the January 2026 Movsum Mammadov case (30 days for Facebook posts criticizing local authorities). The October hijab cases add a new dimension: social media documentation of a specific government policy — the exclusion of children from school — is being treated as prohibited information. In two of the cases, the content was shared on WhatsApp rather than a public platform, extending the reach of the “prohibited information” provisions into private messaging.

Karabakh War Veteran Given Eight Days’ Administrative Detention for TikTok Comment Critical of Police

The Guba District Court sentenced a veteran of the Second Karabakh War — a resident of the village of Jack, Quba district — to eight days’ administrative detention under Article 510.2 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (insulting a law enforcement official). Judge Ibrahim Gazibeyov issued the ruling on 23 September.

A police officer testified that the defendant had posted offensive language directed at a police officer from his TikTok account. Police took him to the Guba District Police Department, where they drew up an administrative offense report. He was initially held, then released, then re-detained and brought before the court.

In court, the defendant confirmed that the account and comments were his. He told the court that he had participated in the 2020 Karabakh War, was wounded twice by gunfire, suffered a concussion, and received six military medals. He said that after returning from service, police repeatedly stopped and held him for extended periods despite his proper electronic clearances, and that he wrote the comment out of frustration. He asked the court not to impose a penalty.

The court treated his combat record, military awards, admission of the act, and expression of remorse as mitigating factors, but concluded that a fine alone would be insufficient. It imposed eight days’ administrative detention.

IPI and NEMO Condemn Coordinated Copyright Attacks on Azerbaijani Exile Media’s Social Accounts

The International Press Institute (IPI) and the Network of Exiled Media Organizations (NEMO) have condemned a coordinated wave of fake copyright complaints targeting the social media accounts of Azerbaijani independent media outlets in exile, calling on Meta to investigate and restore blocked accounts.

IPI described the campaign as “a coordinated wave of fake copyright complaints” against independent Azerbaijani media, including Abzas Media and Meydan TV, IPI-IMS Free Media Pioneer award recipients. It noted that all targeted outlets are exile-based and have faced sustained state pressure — including the arrest of their journalists, the criminalization of their work, and the blocking of their websites.

NEMO highlighted that social media platforms have become the primary means by which exile-based media reach audiences inside Azerbaijan. Blocking accounts therefore directly limits citizens’ access to independent news. The network also noted that Meta and YouTube have documented similar coordinated campaigns against other exile media networks.

Both organizations called on Meta to treat the complaints collectively rather than as separate technical cases; to investigate the identity of complainants, including repeated use of the same names and email addresses; to verify whether complainants actually hold copyright over the materials they targeted; and to restore suspended accounts.

“Digital platforms must recognize that their systems can be weaponized by authoritarian governments to suppress critical voices,” NEMO’s statement reads. “Independent journalism plays a vital role in providing access to diverse viewpoints for people living in restricted information environments.”

Shirvan Resident Sentenced to Three Years on Drug Charges He Says Were Planted After Social Media Post on Police Violence

The Lankaran Court of Serious Crimes sentenced a Shirvan resident, born in 1997, to three years in prison on charges of illegal possession of psychotropic substances (Article 234.1-1 of the Criminal Code). Judge Javanshir Nabiyev delivered the verdict on September 18.

The defendant told the court he did not possess the drugs and that a substance was placed in his pocket by police officers, who also pressured him into making a coerced confession. He linked his detention to two factors: a video he had shared via private message on social media showing police violence against a civilian, and his religious beliefs — something he said he was informed of while held in pre-trial detention.

According to the defendant’s account, plainclothes individuals approached and forced him into a vehicle. Officers then showed him the video and told him he had shared it publicly; he maintained he had sent it privately to a contact several months earlier. Officers then allegedly placed a package in his jacket pocket and demanded he state the substance was his. When he refused, he says he was subjected to physical violence and further coercion at the Main Department for Combating Organized Crime.

A medical examination noted an abrasion on his nose and bruising on his chest, though experts assessed the injuries as likely predating his arrest by five to seven days. The General Prosecutor’s Office dismissed a complaint of police abuse without opening a criminal case.

The court rejected the prosecution’s more serious charge – possession with intent to supply – finding no evidence of scales, buyer communications, orders, test purchases, or sales proceeds. It reclassified the offense to simple possession and imposed a three-year sentence, finding no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

copyright complaints take down Instagram pages of exiled Azerbaijani media – eight outlets call it a coordinated attack

This entry draws on reporting by Meydan TV and a joint statement issued by eight Azerbaijani media outlets on August 28.

In the last week of August, Meta blocked access to the Instagram pages of Abzas Media and Toplum TV, two independent outlets now operating in exile, after a series of copyright-infringement complaints. Days earlier, Facebook and Instagram blocked the opposition newspaper Azadlıq’s pages and the Instagram page of Azərbaycan Saatı on the same grounds. Meydan TV and HamamTimes have faced similar complaints at various points over the past year.

On August 28, eight outlets – Abzas Media, Meydan TV, Toplum TV, Azadlıq, HamamTimes, Azərbaycan Saatı, Qəzetçi and Mikroskop Media – issued a joint statement describing the complaints as part of a wider campaign to silence independent journalism, rather than a series of unrelated technical disputes.

What happened

Abzas Media’s acting director Gunel Safarova told Meydan TV that the outlet received four copyright complaints between August 22 and 25. The flagged posts were:

  • a video originally produced by the Azadlıq newspaper;
  • a video built on an interview first published by Musavat.com;
  • a video distributed by HamamTimes;
  • a short clip of the 2022 Göyçay flooding taken from social media.

In each case, Safarova said Abzas Media credited the original source. None of the complaints came from those sources. HamamTimes – which describes Abzas Media as a close partner – told Meydan TV it filed no complaint with Meta and condemned the takedown.

Toplum TV’s editor Parvana Gurbanli described a similar pattern: the outlet was reported over a video of the August 3 landslide in Baku’s Xətai district that buried several cars. The footage came from the official YouTube channel of the state-funded public broadcaster İctimai TV, with attribution. The complainant claimed it came from his personal profile.

The signature of a coordinated campaign

What distinguishes this episode from the routine misuse of takedown tools is the paper trail. According to Abzas Media, although the complaints were submitted under different names, several used the same email address registered to one individual, “Farid Guliyev.” The “original content” links supplied by the complainants did not point to their own accounts but to the actual publishers – Azadlıq, Musavat.com and HamamTimes – none of which had complained. The joint statement adds that other complaints filed under different names repeated the same details, wording and structure.

The outlets have not been able to establish independently who organized the complaints. But the reuse of a single email address across multiple identities, complaints against unrelated content published at different times, and the near-simultaneous targeting of at least six outlets point to a single origin rather than a series of coincidences. Meta’s automated systems accepted the complaints, removed the posts, and – once enough strikes accumulated – deactivated entire accounts. The outlets say Meta requested no evidence of ownership at any stage.

Why this matters more for exiled media

For outlets that can no longer operate inside Azerbaijan, Meta’s platforms are not a supplementary distribution channel; they are the primary way to reach an audience at home. Their websites have been blocked in the country for years – Meydan TV, Azadlıq, Azərbaycan Saatı and Turan TV since 2017, Abzas Media and Toplum TV since the crackdown that began in November 2023. Their Baku-based staff are in prison: Abzas Media’s team received seven- to nine-year sentences in June 2025, upheld on appeal in April; the Toplum TV defendants received 11 to 15 years on July 27; and the Meydan TV case has ensnared eleven journalists. More than 25 journalists are currently behind bars.

As Safarova told Meydan TV, with no staff left in the country and the websites blocked, the only remaining lever against these outlets is to get their social media accounts shut down.

Not a new tactic – a refined one

Azerbaijan Internet Watch has documented the abuse of platform takedown mechanisms against critics for years. The pattern that emerged in August is a more industrialized version of what we have seen before:

  • 2020 – opposition Musavat party accounts in January; arqument.az’s Facebook page in June (11,000 likes, 12,000 followers and months of posts deleted); bastainfo.com in September (5,000 followers and content back to 2017 wiped). In June 2020, someone holding activist Rustam Ismayilbeyli’s national ID card requested a password reset on his Facebook account – a reminder that the state, not the user, holds the documents platforms use to verify identity.
  • March 2021 – Sancaq TV. Unable to hack Mehman Huseynov’s Facebook page, perpetrators created several fake “Sancaq TV” pages and used them to report the genuine page as the impostor. His Instagram account had already been taken via spoofed Instagram SMS messages.
  • April 2022 – Humans of Azerbaijan. After Huseynov recovered the hijacked “Humans of Azerbaijan” page, the perpetrators submitted his own ID to Facebook to prove they were the “real” owner, then filed identical complaints against every page he administered. Facebook responded by blocking all of Huseynov’s accounts, including his personal profile.
  • 2021–2022 – Toplum TV, three times over. Its Facebook page was hijacked in September 2021 (16,000 followers lost), November 2021 (via SMS interception of a founder’s 2FA code – a technique that requires a mobile operator’s cooperation), and September 2022 (26,000 followers and two weeks of content deleted). In the same period, HamamTimes’ website was hacked and its archive wiped.
  • 2022 – Azad Söz. Videos investigating the state oil company and a relative of its former president were removed from YouTube on the basis of NetzDG complaints and restored only after third-party intervention; the outlet then reported trolls combing its archive for old images to mass-report as community-standards violations, and its TikTok account was shut down in May. During the September 2022 border clashes, mass fake reporting got the Facebook profiles of activist Giyas Ibrahim (six days) and Azad Söz founder Tural Sadiqli suspended.
  • March 2023 – RLC. The Facebook page of the online outlet RLC was hijacked and a year’s content deleted. As AIW noted then, Facebook has never – in any Azerbaijani case we know of – helped recover deleted content.
  • September 2023 – Hürriyyət. A Baku court ordered the YouTube channel of the online outlet blocked at the Prosecutor General’s request, after a guest criticized the Defense Ministry – the overt, legal route to the same end.
  • March 2024 – Toplum TV. Hours after police raided the outlet’s Baku office and detained its staff, its social media accounts were compromised and all 3,600 videos on its YouTube channel deleted.
  • 2025 As AIW documented in December, HamamTimes’ Instagram account was suspended for 16 days in April 2025 over an unsubstantiated “breach of intellectual property rights” after it covered a data breach at Kapital Bank; Azad Söz lost YouTube videos to bogus court orders; Mukhtarli’s TikTok was closed by the platform, then blocked inside the country; and on December 16 Meydan TV’s Instagram page, with close to a million followers, was suspended over a copyright complaint filed by a sitting member of parliament, Ülvi Quliyev. Meta rejected the counter-notice.

The 2019- 2020 attacks targeted one activist at a time with amateurish, traceable complainants, largely hacks and hijacks. From there onwards, the emphasis shifted to weaponizing the platforms’ own trust-and-safety tools: impersonation reports, identity-verification disputes, community-standards mass reporting, NetzDG complaints, and finally, copyright strikes, which carry the heaviest automatic penalties and the weakest verification. Read together, what is happening in Azerbaijan is a sign of a deliberate campaign targeting exiled media at once.

The bigger picture

The account takedowns land in the middle of a legislative and institutional overhaul that has made the state’s own censorship tools far more powerful:

Domestically, the state no longer needs a court to block a website. What it cannot do unilaterally is remove content hosted on foreign platforms – and that is precisely the gap that mass copyright complaints fill. The complaints outsource censorship to Meta’s automated enforcement, bypassing the platform’s human review and the need for any legal process.

What the outlets are asking for

The joint statement asks Meta and other platforms to treat the complaints as a possible coordinated attack rather than a stack of individual notices: to investigate the source of the complaints, the reuse of identities and email addresses, whether complainants actually own the material they claim, and whether the reporting mechanism is being deliberately abused. It asks Meta to urgently review and restore the deactivated accounts and build safeguards so automated moderation cannot be turned into a censorship tool through coordinated reporting. It also urges platforms to consider reports from international press-freedom and human rights organizations on Azerbaijan when weighing complaints that originate there.

From the Azerbaijani government, the outlets demand an end to the campaign against independent media – the arrests, prosecutions, website blocks and now the digital attacks – and the release of imprisoned journalists.

Eight Azerbaijani Media Outlets Report Coordinated Fake Copyright Campaign Against Social Media Accounts

Eight Azerbaijani independent media organizations operating in exile have issued a joint statement condemning a coordinated wave of fake copyright complaints targeting their social media accounts on Meta platforms.

Meta blocked the Instagram accounts of Abzas Media and Toplum TV following the complaints. The Facebook and Instagram pages of Azadliq Gazeti and the Instagram page of Azerbaijan Saati had previously been suspended in the same manner. Meydan TV and HamamTimes also faced similar complaints at different points.

The organizations describe the campaign as part of a broader crackdown on independent Azerbaijani journalism that began in 2023. Journalists from the listed outlets have been arrested, their websites blocked inside Azerbaijan, and editorial teams forced into exile. More than 25 journalists from these organizations are currently imprisoned in Azerbaijan.

The joint statement found that some complaints were submitted by the same individual using the same email addresses under different names, while others replicated the same patterns, contact details, and methods — indicating coordinated rather than independent action. No complainant provided evidence that they actually owned the material they claimed.

The outlets called on Meta to investigate the complaints as a coordinated campaign rather than isolated incidents, review and restore unlawfully blocked accounts, and create stronger safeguards against the abuse of copyright mechanisms to suppress journalism.

“After arresting journalists, blocking websites, and forcing editorial teams into exile, the same silencing effort is now being extended to social media platforms,” the statement reads. “Copyright law is being used not as a legal mechanism but as a tool to cut off independent media from its audience.”

Signatories: Abzas Media, Meydan TV, Toplum TV, Azadliq Gazeti, HamamTimes, Azerbaijan Saati, Qazetci, Mikroskop Media.

Popular Front activist jailed over social media posts

On July 31, Elmar Piriyev, an activist with the Tovuz district branch of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXCP), was placed under administrative detention for ten days. According to information the party provided to Meydan TV, the detention followed critical posts he made on social media.

Piriyev had been out of contact since July 27. The party’s organizational department head, Sagif Gurbanov, said Piriyev had reported being summoned to the Tovuz district police station that afternoon; his detention only became known afterward. He has reportedly been subjected to administrative detention in Tovuz previously for his political activity.

Why this matters for online speech

The case is a routine but instructive example of how criticism published online is punished offline. Administrative detention, imposed in a same-day hearing, without the evidentiary standards or appeal timelines of criminal proceedings, has become the low-cost instrument of choice against activists whose visibility is primarily digital. The formal charge in such cases is typically disobedience to police rather than anything speech-related, which keeps the online origin of the case out of the court record entirely. Piriyev is not an isolated instance: activist Anar Huseynov received 30 days in June, and Kanan Ismayil 30 days on July 22.

The multi-day period during which family and colleagues could not locate Piriyev is itself a recurring feature, and one that directly suppresses the online response an arrest would otherwise generate.

More than 20 AXCP members and activists are currently jailed, including party chairman Ali Karimli. The Union for the Freedom of Political Prisoners of Azerbaijan lists 328 political prisoners in its most recent count. Azerbaijani authorities reject the characterization, maintaining that those detained face liability for specific criminal acts rather than their political views.

Azerbaijan expands extrajudicial website blocking authority – parliament amends information law

On 10 July 2026, Azerbaijan’s parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization and Information Protection, significantly broadening the executive’s power to block internet resources without prior judicial authorization.

What changed

Before these amendments, extrajudicial (warrantless) blocking was restricted to genuine emergencies – defined as situations in which state or public interests were under threat or lives were in immediate danger. The amended law now permits extrajudicial blocking of websites that allegedly contain: defamation or insult of individuals; invasion of private or family life; promotion of illegal drugs; pornographic material; promotion of gambling; content encouraging suicide; films or games lacking age-rating disclosure; or “false information that could endanger public safety” – a deliberately vague category with no statutory definition. The blocking authority remains the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport.

How we got here

The law was originally adopted in 1998, when internet blocking required a court order. A 2017 amendment introduced Article 13-3, permitting temporary extrajudicial blocking in urgent cases with mandatory court notification within five days. Shortly after 2017, Meydan TV (meydan.tv), Azadlıq Radio (azadliq.org), Azadlıq newspaper (azadliq.info), Turan TV, and Azərbaycan Saatı were blocked under this provision. Further expansions in 2020–21 added “false information of public significance” as a blocking ground during the pandemic and the Second Karabakh War. The July 2026 amendments represent the broadest expansion to date, removing the “emergency” limitation entirely for the newly added categories.

Expert assessment

Lawyer Ruslan Əliyev identified the core risk: under the previous framework, even formal judicial proceedings provided some documentary record and a basis for appeal. Under the new framework, a single official can block content in seconds. “First, the blocking happens, then you become the foot soldier chasing to get it unblocked.” He noted that the new grounds – defamation, insult, false information – lack precise legal definitions, making it impossible to distinguish between legitimate content removal and the suppression of critical journalism. 

Parallel social media regulation

The same legislative period also produced new rules requiring social media platforms serving Azerbaijani users to verify user ages (minimum 16), establish local registration or representation in Azerbaijan, and respond to government data requests. These measures follow a pattern across the South Caucasus and Central Asia of requiring platform localization as a precondition for lawful operation, enabling domestic legal pressure on otherwise internationally domiciled companies.

Relevance for internet freedom monitoring

The July 2026 amendments consolidate Azerbaijan’s extrajudicial blocking architecture and make it applicable to a wider set of content categories without any statutory definition of what qualifies. The vagueness of “false information endangering public safety” and “insult” creates categorical overlap with content that Azerbaijan’s independent press regularly produces – investigative reporting into officials, criticism of government policy, and human rights documentation. Combined with the existing blocking of major independent outlets since 2017, and the practice of blocking government websites from abroad (documented by Meydan TV in May 2026), the amendments represent a significant further restriction on both domestic and diaspora access to independent information.

Meta, TikTok, and other social media platforms to face mandatory registration and local presence requirements in Azerbaijan [Updated Aug 13]

[Update August 2026] Parliament passed the amendments as Law No. 431-VIIQD on June 30, 2026, and on August 5, 2026, President Ilham Aliyev signed an implementing decree in Baku assigning enforcement powers, setting institutional deadlines, and bringing the accompanying sanctions in the Code of Administrative Offenses into effect.

The package, first tabled in early June, requires global social media platforms, for the first time, to register in the country or establish a local representative office, verify users’ ages, and enforce a higher minimum age.

Under the adopted law:

  • Persons under 16 are barred from opening social media accounts.
  • Platforms must verify users’ ages.
  • Platforms must establish a representative office or register in Azerbaijan.
  • Platforms must respond to requests from state bodies within five working days.
  • Non-compliant platforms face fines, an advertising ban, and phased throttling of their internet traffic.

The advertising ban and traffic-throttling mechanisms are notable additions relative to what was publicly described during the drafting stage, when discussion centered on fines and outright blocking.

Oversight of the social media platforms subject to age restrictions falls primarily to the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport.

On specific questions the ministry acts jointly with, or in the capacity of, security bodies:

  • Powers under Article 13-4.4 of the Law on Information are exercised jointly by the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport and the State Security Service (DTX).
  • Powers under Articles 13-4.10 and 13-4.14, and under Article 388-4.3.5 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, are exercised by the ministry acting as the National Cybersecurity Agency — the agency is not a separate legal entity here but a capacity in which the ministry acts.
  • Awareness and education measures under Article 13-4.14 also involve the Ministry of Science and Education and the State Committee for Family, Women and Children Affairs.
  • The Media and Broadcasting Council is “recommended” to conduct regular public awareness activities on the compliant use of age-restricted platforms once the law enters into force.

The decree also amends the list of officials empowered to draw up administrative-offense protocols, adding Article 388-4 cases and assigning those under Articles 388-4.3.4 and 388-4.3.5 to officials acting on behalf of the ministry in its capacity as the National Cybersecurity Agency.

The direct involvement of the State Security Service in administering a regime publicly justified on child-protection grounds is the single most significant institutional detail in the decree, worth noting and keeping in mind, given the country’s overall information-controls environment.

The sanctions adopted in the Code of Administrative Offenses are considerably lower than the 100,000–300,000 AZN range reported while the package was still in draft:

Violation Officials Legal entities
Failure to submit information to the authorized body, missing deadlines, or submitting false information 6,000–7,000 AZN 15,000–20,000 AZN
Platform providers failing to answer official requests within five working days, or distorting information 7,000–8,000 AZN 25,000–30,000 AZN
Violation of the rules on safe use of platforms 8,000–9,000 AZN 35,000–40,000 AZN
Repeat violation within one year 9,000–10,000 AZN 45,000–50,000 AZN

For companies the size of Meta, Google, or TikTok, these sums are immaterial. The operative leverage in the regime is not the fine but the escalation ladder behind it: advertising bans, phased traffic reduction, and blocking.

Alongside the platform provisions, the latest amendments to the Law on Information expand the list of circumstances in which internet resources can be temporarily blocked without a court decision. The grounds now include insult and defamation, information that violates privacy, promotion of narcotics, disinformation that poses a threat to public safety, and other categories of content.

This is the change with the broadest implications for online speech generally, and it travels in the same legislative vehicle as the child-safety provisions. Insult and defamation in particular have long been the charges of choice against critical online voices in Azerbaijan; making them a basis for administrative blocking without judicial review removes what limited procedural check previously existed.

The law prohibits the creation of social media accounts for children under 16, above the minimum age of 13 that most platforms currently apply. Existing accounts will be reviewed after the law takes effect, and accounts for which the holders’ ages cannot be verified will be deleted. Users aged 16–18 are subject to parental consent and oversight, special safety measures, content and advertising restrictions, and geolocation limits.

Parts of this entry are based on reporting published by Qəzetçi. Below is a translated, edited, and expanded version of the original.

Azerbaijan’s parliament (Milli Majlis) is debating a package of amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information and the Law on the Protection of Children from Harmful Information that would, for the first time, formally require global social media platforms to register in the country, open local representative offices, and enforce a higher minimum age for users.

Under the draft, platforms that fail to comply face financial sanctions of 100,000 to 300,000 AZN, as well as the possibility of being blocked in the country. According to Farid Pardashunas, a board member of the Press Council, platforms will be given 12 months to comply once the law enters into force, and companies such as Meta, Google, and TikTok would be expected to open offices in Baku and set up Azerbaijani-language support services — a model he compared to neighboring Turkey.

Age restrictions raised from 13 to 16

The amendments, under discussion since early June, would prohibit the creation of social media accounts for children under 16, above the minimum age of 13 that most platforms currently apply. Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, X, Snapchat, and other networks would reportedly fall within the law’s scope. Existing accounts would be reviewed after the law takes effect, and accounts whose holders’ ages cannot be verified would be deleted. Users aged 16–18 would be subject to parental consent and oversight, special safety measures, content and advertising restrictions, and geolocation limits.

Age verification, according to Havva Huseynli, head of the cooperation and communication sector at the Electronic Security Service, would rely on cross-checking bank card data (via temporary blocking of funds), email, and mobile phone numbers. Huseynli said personal data would be used solely for age verification and would be deleted immediately if a match is not confirmed. The proposed changes were also discussed at a June 10 meeting between the Presidential Administration and NGO representatives.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Science and Education has already moved ahead with its own restrictions. Deputy Minister Firudin Gurbanov said on June 8 that access to TikTok has been blocked in schools, that internet filtering is applied to schoolchildren’s access more broadly, and that videos on more than 200 “dangerous topics” have been restricted.

Tax registration as a parallel track

Separately, starting September 2026, foreign digital service providers operating in Azerbaijan’s e-commerce market with an annual turnover exceeding 10,000 USD will be required to register electronically with the tax authorities. The State Tax Service announced on May 10 that ten foreign digital service providers — including Apple, Adobe, Sony Interactive Entertainment, Epic Games, and Chess.com — have already registered. Notably, Meta’s platforms (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp), which provide e-commerce services in Azerbaijan, are absent from the published list.

Experts warn of vague criteria, privacy risks, and potential for abuse

Internet technology expert Osman Gunduz noted that Azerbaijan has 17-year-olds building AI businesses, coding, launching startups, and competing in international olympiads and hackathons — often with digital skills exceeding those of their parents. Gunduz also warned that the proposed verification methods (mobile number, email, bank card) can be circumvented — a child can simply use a parent’s phone or card — while leaving verification to the platforms themselves creates the risk of transferring identity data of millions of users to foreign companies.

Lawyer Yalchin Imanov told Qəzetçi that protecting minors online is a normal legislative practice, pointing to Australia’s law, in force since December of last year, as the first of its kind. But he stressed that such changes must go through public consultation first — something absent in Azerbaijan, where restrictions on information sources and social networks surface either only during parliamentary debates or after adoption. “That is the dangerous side of the matter,” he said. Imanov also noted the ambiguity of what the “200+ dangerous topics” restricted in schools actually cover, at a time when access to pornographic and other content remains freely available in the country. Given the authorities’ track record of intolerance toward freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, he said, the possibility that minors’ access to such sources will be restricted cannot be ruled out.

According to available figures, Azerbaijan has 7.6 million social media users — 1.65 million on Facebook, 4.73 million on Instagram, and over 6 million on TikTok, with WhatsApp the most active messaging app. The state’s interest in platforms is not limited to regulation: as Qazqazinfo reported back in 2024, the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ) has invested 179 million USD in Meta.

Background: previous attempts to monitor and control social media platforms

The current draft is the most concrete step yet in a longer trajectory of state efforts to bring social media under regulatory control, which Azerbaijan Internet Watch has documented over the years:

  • The 2017 amendments to the Law on Information. First adopted in 1998 as a technical regulation, the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information was converted into a content-regulation instrument through restrictive amendments introduced on March 10, 2017 — the same law now being amended to cover platform registration. Together with the Code of Administrative Offenses (Articles 388 and 388-1), it has served as the primary legal basis for blocking websites and prosecuting online speech, see AIW’s coverage of the legal framework.
  • Prosecutor General’s Office as a de facto content regulator. AIW’s May 2022 legal analysis, “Who regulates content online in Azerbaijan”, documented the pattern of the Prosecutor’s Office issuing warnings and administrative charges against social media users, bloggers, and website editors for “disseminating prohibited information” — a practice that intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, when one MP even proposed a special unit to monitor social media platforms and hold users spreading “rumors” accountable.
  • Press Council proposals and the local-representation agenda. As early as 2020–2022, the Press Council proposed establishing a commission with the Prosecutor’s Office to regulate the media and floated regulating social media platforms. Media law expert Khalid Aghaliyev assessed at the time that these proposals were linked to the state’s intention to have platforms open representative offices in Azerbaijan and then use those offices to consolidate control over the platforms — precisely the mechanism now written into the draft amendments.
  • The 2022 Media Law. Adopted by parliament in December 2021 and signed in February 2022 despite widespread domestic and international criticism, the Law on Media extended restrictive registration and licensing requirements to online media and journalists. AIW’s legal opinion “New Media Law: implications for online media/journalism in Azerbaijan” detailed its adverse implications, and the mandatory media registry it created has since been used to deny registration to independent outlets.
  • The March 2026 presidential decree. The current amendments follow directly from a decree signed by President Ilham Aliyev on March 1, 2026, focused on children’s online safety, which introduced age restrictions on registering for social platforms and instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to draft implementing legislation within three months — a timeline consistent with the amendments now before parliament.
  • Expanding regulatory ambitions. The move also comes amid a broader push to regulate the digital sphere, including the government’s recent initiative to regulate AI-generated content and the creation of a new Digital Development Council in February 2026.

Viewed against this background, the framing of the current amendments around child safety mirrors earlier legislative moves in which protective language accompanied provisions that expanded the state’s leverage over online platforms and speech. The combination of mandatory local representation, steep fines, and blocking powers replicates the model adopted in Turkey and Russia — a model that in both countries has been used to pressure platforms into removing content and handing over user data.