Social media activist known for his vocal criticism of the Azerbaijani government, detained and placed in pre-trial custody

Dayanat Chalabilyev was detained on December 22. Two days later, the Khatai District Court ordered his arrest. In a controversial procedural move, the trial was presided over by Judge Rafael Sadikhov, whose official judicial powers had reportedly expired just days prior to the hearing.

Chalabilyev, an English language teacher by profession, faces charges of intentionally causing serious harm to health. If convicted, he faces a prison sentence ranging from 6 to 11 years.

Chalabilyev has pleaded not guilty, maintaining that the charges are a direct retaliation for his online activism. Only 24 hours before his arrest, he posted a scathing critique of the administration on Facebook, stating:

“The Aliyev family rule has not strengthened the country; it has weakened it. The state has been personalized, the people marginalized, and the future has been mortgaged.”

This arrest follows a pattern of digital repression in Azerbaijan, where social media posts often serve as the catalyst for criminal prosecution under unrelated penal codes.

A Pattern of Harassment

Chalabilyev previously served a 30-day administrative sentence on charges of “hooliganism” and “disobeying police orders”—common charges often leveled against civil rights defenders and digital activists in Azerbaijan to silence dissent.

In Azerbaijan, authorities often resort to the “Defamation” Trap: While Azerbaijan has moved toward decriminalizing libel in some spheres, authorities frequently use “hooliganism” or “drug possession” charges to arrest individuals whose primary “offense” is a viral Facebook post or a critical YouTube comment.

how copyright violation requests to platforms are silencing Azerbaijani voices

For years, the promise of the digital town square was built on a simple premise: technology would democratize the truth, allowing the voices of the marginalized to bypass the gatekeepers of state-controlled media. Yet, for independent journalists and activists in Azerbaijan or based abroad, this promise has been inverted. Instead of a megaphone, platforms like YouTube and Facebook have increasingly functioned as automated guillotines, where legitimate dissent is silenced not by a state decree but by a “copyright strike.”

This act of censorship is rarely carried out directly by the state. Instead, it is outsourced to a murky ecosystem of pro-government entities and shadowy third-party agencies. These actors exploit the Notice-and-Takedown systems—mechanisms designed for Silicon Valley legal compliance—to flag critical reports as intellectual property violations. Whether it is political commentary or footage of a protest, takedown requests are considered, and content disappears without any checks or balances on the platforms themselves.

The platforms’ complicity lies in their institutional blindness. Driven by a desire for global scale and automated efficiency, tech giants have retreated behind “black box” algorithms that lack any understanding of national nuances. In the eyes of a YouTube content ID system, a claim from a Baku-based media company looks like a standard commercial dispute; in reality, it is often a state-sponsored attempt to wipe an investigative archive off the map. By failing to invest in regional expertise or recognize the specific patterns of “copyright trolling” used by the Aliyev regime, platforms have effectively handed authoritarian states a “delete” button for the truth.

In Azerbaijan, where independent outlets like Abzas Media and Meydan TV already face the physical threat of imprisonment and exile, the loss of a digital platform is more than a technical hurdle—it is a total erasure of the public record. 

Below are just some of the most recent examples that show platforms’ complicity and their lack of understanding of nuances. 

Meydan TV

On December 16, Meydan TV’s Facebook and Instagram pages received a copyright violation by member of parliament Ulvi Guliyev. Despite the team’s submission of counter-strike evidence that the reported content violated no copyright rules, Meta did not change its original decision. Meydan TV’s Instagram page suffered too. The account, which has almost 1 million followers, was suspended over a similar claim. 

Azad Soz

The online channel had several of its videos removed, and it is facing closure with over 800k subscribers. The targeting is based on bogus court orders submitted to YouTube, which the platform has taken into account without considering that the country’s judiciary lacks independence and fails to guarantee a fair trial. 

The channel’s TikTok accounts are also blocked in the country. 

Afgan Mukhtarli

Exiled journalist reported back in October that his TikTok channel was blocked in Azerbaijan. The process was gradual. The journalist said he noticed a drop in views. After research, Mukhtarli learned that his page was blocked in the country. Before this, his TikTok account was closed by the platform itself in September. He appealed, and the account was reinstated. 

Hamam Times

HamamTimes, an online media outlet, has also faced digital targeting. In the last year alone, its pages on Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok were subjected to fabricated copyright violation reports, resulting in posts being deleted and pages temporarily shut down.

In April, their Instagram account was suspended for 16 days, while on Facebook, several posts were deleted without any notification.

META explained the reason as a “breach of intellectual property rights.” But failed to provide any further evidence. Only with the intervention of third parties was the platform able to restore access to its account and content. The platform believes it was its coverage of Kapital Bank – one of the biggest banks in Azerbaijan, which belongs to the ruling family – and a serious security breach in the bank’s digital systems, which led thousands of bank customers to fall into the hands of scammers and lose vast sums of funds.

Similarly, META deleted Hamam Times’ posts about Kapital Bank without giving any notification.

All of these experiences have led users of social media platforms to believe there is an on-going working relationship between the authorities and the platforms. 

in absentia arrest warrants and trials

In March of this year, criminal cases were opened against several bloggers living in exile, and the targeting of Azerbaijanis abroad has intensified since then. In November 2025, among those named in a new wave of investigations were Ganimat Zahid, the exiled editor-in-chief of the now-defunct Azadliq newspaper; historian Altay Goyushov; political analyst Arastun Orujlu; Beydulla Manafov and Abid Gafarov; and journalist Sevinc Osmanqizi. 

Zahid’s trial began on December 9.

He as well as other named individuals, is charged under Article 281.2 of the Criminal Code – public calls directed against the state, when committed repeatedly or by a group of persons. 

Oruclu, Osmangizi, and Gafarov are also accused of Article 220.2 – calls for mass unrest and violence against citizens. Manafov is facing an additional charge under Article 283.1 – actions aimed at inciting national, racial, social, or religious hatred and hostility.

Osmangizi has a YouTube channel Osmangizi TV. Gafarov is an employee of an online television KIM. Manafov was a frequent guest on Turan TV, an online television channel where he often criticized the authorities.

judges seek arrest of a citizen after his criticism on social media

In Azerbaijan, five judges jointly sought the arrest of a citizen over statements he made about them. The 63-year-old Hikmat Shukurov was also ordered to pay compensation of 10,000 manats to each judge.

The chair of the Shirvan Court of Appeal, Vali Abdullayev, and judge of the same court, Elchin Khasmammadov; the chair of the Masalli District Court, Firdovsi Aliyev, and judge of that court, Elshan Huseynov; as well as Judge Jeyhun Mustafayev of the Shirvan City Court, jointly filed a private prosecution claim. They alleged that H. Shukurov, a resident of Masalli, insulted them and slandered them by accusing them of taking bribes in comments he posted on social media.

Relying on Articles 147.2 (defamation by accusing a person of committing a serious crime) and 148 (insult) of the Criminal Code, the judges sought Shukurov’s punishment. They demanded compensation of 50,000 manats each, totaling 250,000 manats.

In a recent ruling by the Binagadi District Court, the judges’ complaint led to a two-year prison sentence for Shukurov. The civil claim was partially upheld, and he was ordered to pay 50,000 manats in compensation to the judges.

Shukurov, however, does not consider himself guilty.

further restrictions discussed on dissemination of forbidden information

On November 24, a joint online meeting of the Milli Majlis Committees on Legal Policy and State Building and on Human Rights was held.

According to the Parliament’s Press and Public Relations Department, the chair of the Committee on Legal Policy and State Building, Ali Huseynli, stated that the agenda included a single item: a draft law on amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses and to the Law “On Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information.”

It was noted that the main purpose of the draft law is to protect public morality, in particular to shield adolescents and young people from harmful and unethical information disseminated on social networks, as well as to improve existing legislation by clarifying accountability mechanisms in the online environment.

At the end of the meeting, the draft law was recommended for consideration at the Milli Majlis plenary session in its first reading.

According to the draft, it would be prohibited to post information in publicly accessible information resources that involves actions demonstrating blatant disrespect toward society, the use of obscene expressions, or the display of parts of the human body in a manner contrary to moral norms and national and spiritual values.

It was reported that corresponding amendments would also be made to the Code of Administrative Offenses, imposing relevant penalties.

Independent experts believe that adopting this draft would further tighten the law in question. In their view, in many cases, the cited provisions could be used to curtail freedom of expression artificially.

Previously, a number of amendments were made in Azerbaijan to the Law “On Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information.” Amendments adopted in 2017 granted executive authorities the power to block electronic resources without a court decision. In the same year, the websites of Radio Azadliq (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Azerbaijani service), Meydan TV, and the Azadliq newspaper were blocked by court order. This was justified by claims that certain materials published on these sites posed a “threat to interests protected by the law of the state and society.” However, during court proceedings, representatives of the outlets stated that the allegations were unfounded.

In subsequent years, this practice continued.

motion to place journalist under house arrest rejected

On November 20, the Sabail District Court considered a motion to place Hurriyyet TV’s detained editor-in-chief, Vugar Mammadov (Tofigoglu), under house arrest due to health concerns. The motion was denied despite Mammadov’s health condition.

Mammadov was arrested on October 30, 2025, and sentenced to 3 months and 13 days of detention on extortion charges on October 31.

According to Radio Liberty Azerbaijan Service, the State Security Service (SSS) conducted an operation at the editorial office on October 29. As a result, devices and documents were seized. Other employees were also briefly detained but later released. 

Mammadov’s home was also searched. 

on a mission to spread propaganda

The blocking of 3,932 YouTube channels linked to Azerbaijan-backed influence operations by Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) in the first two quarters of 2025 indicates a persistent and significant effort to spread propaganda. These channels were specifically noted for “sharing content in Azerbaijani, supportive of Azerbaijan, and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijani government.”

This sustained activity points to:

  • Systematic Information Warfare: The large number of channels suggests a well-organized and extensive campaign, likely state-sponsored or state-aligned, aimed at shaping public opinion both domestically and internationally.
  • Targeted Narratives: The content’s focus on supporting Azerbaijan while criticizing Armenia and domestic critics indicates a clear agenda to control narratives related to geopolitical conflicts and internal dissent. This aligns with the broader context of the Azerbaijani government’s tightening control over information, as evidenced by recent legislative changes impacting NGOs and media.
  • Use of Digital Platforms for Influence: YouTube, as a widely accessible platform, is being leveraged to disseminate these narratives, highlighting the importance of social media in modern propaganda efforts.
  • Google TAG’s Role in Countering Disinformation: Google TAG’s consistent identification and blocking of these channels underscore the ongoing battle between state-backed influence operations and platform efforts to maintain integrity and prevent the spread of harmful or manipulative content. The continuous blocking action suggests an arms race where propagandists attempt to create new channels as old ones are shut down.

In the context of the legislative changes, which aim to restrict independent media and NGOs, the aggressive online propaganda campaigns further demonstrate the Azerbaijani government’s comprehensive approach to controlling information and stifling dissenting voices. The blocking of these channels by Google TAG effectively highlights the digital front of this broader struggle for information control.

Here is a breakdown: 

  • Q1 2025: 1,562 (January) + 787 (February) + 542 (March) = 2,891 channels
  • Q2 2025: 356 (April) + 457 (May) + 228 (June) = 1,041 channels
  • Total Azerbaijan-linked channels blocked in Q1 and Q2 2025: 3,932 channels.

Last year, Google TAG identified and took down over 14,000 YouTube channels serving a similar purpose.

government consolidates control over media

On July 14, the parliament of Azerbaijan adopted amendments to the already restrictive Law on Media, tightening state control over information and extending censorship capabilities to digital platforms. One of the most significant changes is the expansion of the term “Media Entity” to include the local offices and representative branches of foreign media organizations. These entities are now required to register both with the State Tax Service and with a newly empowered Media Register. Any operation conducted without both forms of registration is explicitly classified as illegal. The registration process is not merely bureaucratic—it forms the legal basis for the state to shut down foreign media operations at will.

In addition to registration requirements, the amended law introduces naming restrictions for media outlets. The names of media entities and their editorial offices must not be identical or similar to those of other outlets, must not mislead users, and must not contain expressions deemed contrary to public order, morality, or ethics. These vague criteria offer the authorities broad discretion to deny registration or shut down operations on subjective grounds.

Perhaps most troubling is the provision banning the publication and dissemination of “false information.” The law does not define what constitutes “false,” giving the authorities the power to interpret and enforce this standard arbitrarily. In Azerbaijan’s legal environment, where courts often side with the state and media freedom is already tightly constrained, this creates enormous risks for journalists, especially those engaged in critical reporting. Content that challenges official narratives can now be punished not because it is untrue, but because it is unwelcome.

Moreover, the law places significant and arguably unattainable demands on news agencies. In order to qualify for legal operation, agencies must have formal agreements with at least twenty other media outlets and employ journalists accredited in a minimum of five foreign countries. These requirements appear less intended to encourage professionalism than to impose exclusionary thresholds that many independent or critical outlets simply cannot meet.

The Media Development Agency, an entity under close government control, has been granted expansive new powers under the amended legal framework. It now has the authority to take measures against content it deems prohibited, including on online platforms. This effectively formalizes internet censorship. The agency can also request the State Tax Service to dissolve foreign media offices that fail to comply with registration requirements or that are found to be operating without an applicable international agreement. Most notably, this process can now be conducted without following the standard legal procedures for dissolving entities laid out in Articles 59 through 61 of the Civil Code. A similar change has been made to the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal Entities, which now explicitly states that failure to appear in the Media Register—or removal from it—is a valid ground for dissolution.

Key changes include:

  • Expansion of “Media Entity” definition: Now explicitly includes branches and representative offices of foreign media organizations operating in Azerbaijan.

  • Registration requirements: Such entities must first register with the State Tax Service (STS) and then apply for inclusion in the Media Register. Operating without both registrations is explicitly prohibited.

  • Illegal operation penalties:

    • Media activity without Media Register inclusion is now defined as illegal.

    • Administrative penalties are introduced for the publication or dissemination of print media by entities not listed in the Register.

  • Naming regulations: Media outlet names must not:

    • Resemble or imitate existing media names;

    • Contain expressions that contradict public order, morality, or ethics;

    • Mislead users.

  • Prohibition on “false information”: The law prohibits the publication and dissemination of false information, but provides no clear definition of what constitutes “falsehood.” This vagueness opens the door to arbitrary enforcement and censorship.

“Critical reporting could be punished not because it’s false — but because it’s inconvenient,” noted one media analyst.

  • Operational burdens on news agencies:

    • Must maintain agreements with at least 20 media entities;

    • Employ journalists accredited in at least five foreign countries;

    • Meet minimum content production thresholds.

Critics argue these criteria are unrealistic for most independent or local outlets, and function as gatekeeping tools to limit access to legal operation.


Unprecedented Powers for the Media Development Agency

The Media Development Agency, an entity under close government control, now wields broad new powers:

  • Can take measures against materials it deems “prohibited”, including online publications;

  • Has authority to request that the State Tax Service dissolve foreign media branches and representative offices, without following the dissolution procedures outlined in Articles 59–61 of the Civil Code;

  • Can enforce removal from the State Register of Legal Entities for non-compliant foreign media entities.

Additionally, amendments to the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal Entities make removal from the Media Register or operation outside of international agreements grounds for forced dissolution.


What These Changes Mean

  • Media freedom under siege: Foreign and local media are subject to restrictive registration, vague censorship provisions, and harsh penalties. Independent journalism, particularly if critical of the government, faces heightened risk.

  • Government agencies have unchecked power: The Media Development Agency now acts as a censorship body with legal tools to dismantle non-compliant entities — without judicial oversight.

  • Azerbaijan drifts further from international norms: These laws contravene constitutional protections and international obligations under the ECHR and undermine any remaining democratic space.


Exiled blogger sentenced to seven years in absentia

On July 28, Imameddin Alimanov, a blogger living abroad and the founder of the YouTube channel called “Xalq TV,” was sentenced to 7 years on charges of making public calls against the state. In May 2021, a search warrant was issued for the blogger. In March of this year, several other bloggers living abroad were summoned, all suspects under various crimes, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan alleged they committed. Several have already been sentenced to prison in absentia.

On May 31, 2025, a court in Baku issued arrest warrants against exiled bloggers Tural Sadigli, Ordukhan Temirkhan (Babirov), and a government critic, former rector of Azerbaijan International University Elshad Abdullayev.

Sadigli was charged with Article 178.3.1 (fraud by an organized group), Article 220.2 (incitement to mass unrest), and Article 320 (forgery of documents). Temirkhan (a Dutch citizen) was charged under Article 220.2 and Article 281.2 (open provocation against the state). Elshad Abdullayev (a former university rector living in France) was charged under Article 311.1 (bribery), Article 213.1 (tax evasion), and Article 130.1 (illegal organ trafficking).

The arrest warrants follow an investigation launched in March 2025 against several exiled bloggers, including Rafael Piriyev, Ilgar Hajiyev, Mahammad Mirzali, Gurban Mammadov, Elshad Mammadov, Gabil Mammadov, and Tural Sadigli.

arrest warrants issued for exiled bloggers and critics

On May 31, 2025, a court in Baku issued arrest warrants against exiled bloggers Tural Sadigli, Ordukhan Temirkhan (Babirov), and a government critic, former rector of Azerbaijan International University Elshad Abdullayev.

Sadigli was charged with Article 178.3.1 (fraud by an organized group), Article 220.2 (incitement to mass unrest), and Article 320 (forgery of documents). Temirkhan (a Dutch citizen) was charged under Article 220.2 and Article 281.2 (open provocation against the state). Elshad Abdullayev (a former university rector living in France) was charged under Article 311.1 (bribery), Article 213.1 (tax evasion), and Article 130.1 (illegal organ trafficking).

The arrest warrants follow an investigation launched in March 2025 against several exiled bloggers, including Rafael Piriyev, Ilgar Hajiyev, Mahammad Mirzali, Gurban Mammadov, Elshad Mammadov, Gabil Mammadov, and Tural Sadigli.