OONI measurements show ongoing internet censorship in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is known to block access to independent news media websites – we previously reported on this in July 2021. At the time, we analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2020 to May 2021 and found that ISPs in Azerbaijan were blocking access to several independent news media and circumvention tool sites. We also found that amid the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, ISPs in Azerbaijan temporarily blocked access to social media services, and attempted to block access to Tor and Psiphon.

But how has Azerbaijan’s internet censorship landscape changed (if at all) over the last year?

We attempt to address this question as part of this report. Specifically, we analyzed OONI data collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023 with the goal of evaluating which tested services presented signs of blocking, and whether new blocks had emerged over the past year (in comparison to our previous report). 

Key Findings

As part of our analysis of OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023, we found:

  • Blocking of news media websites. Azerbaijan continues to block access to several independent news media websites. OONI data also suggests that some ISPs in Azerbaijan may have started blocking access to the Guardian on 25th December 2022.
  • Azerbaijan and Russia block each other’s news media. In early June 2022, Azerbaijan started blocking access to Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti media website. Since (at least) 7th June 2022, Russian ISPs have been blocking access to Azerbaijani news media websites (`haqqin.az`, `minval.az`, `oxu.az`, `ru.oxu.az`, `ru.baku.ws`). These blocks remain ongoing.
  • Temporary blocking of TikTok amid border clashes with Armenia. During the September 2022 border clashes, both Azerbaijan and Armenia blocked access to TikTok. While the TikTok block was lifted in Armenia by 21st September 2022 (only lasting about a week), the TikTok block remained in place in Azerbaijan until November 2022 (lasting about 2 months). 
  • Blocking of circumvention tool sites. Azerbaijan continues to block access to numerous circumvention tool websites, potentially limiting the ability to circumvent internet censorship in Azerbaijan. However, most OONI measurements suggest that tested circumvention tools (Tor and Psiphon) appear to be reachable.
  • Variance of censorship across networks. While most ISPs in Azerbaijan appear to adopt similar censorship techniques (as we continued to observe connection timeouts in most anomalous measurements across ASNs), different ISPs block access to different websites over time.

Methods

Since 2012, OONI has developed free and open source software, called OONI Probe, designed to measure various forms of internet censorship. OONI Probe is run by volunteers in around 160 countries every month, and their test results are automatically published by OONI as open data in real-time. More than a billion network measurements have been collected and published from 25 thousand networks in 241 countries and territories over the last decade.

To examine internet censorship in Azerbaijan, we analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023. The goal of our analysis was to identify which websites and apps presented signs of blocking (“anomalies”) in Azerbaijan during the analysis period, particularly in comparison to blocks previously identified as part of our past research.   

Specifically, we analyzed measurements collected from OONI’s Web Connectivity test, which is designed to measure the blocking of websites (these websites are publicly hosted on the Citizen Lab test list Github repository). This test measures the accessibility of websites by attempting to perform a DNS lookup, TCP/IP connection, and HTTP GET request from two vantage points: (1) the local vantage point of the user and (2) a control network (non-censored network). The results from both networks are automatically compared and if they match, the tested URL is annotated as “accessible” (if the testing succeeds from the control vantage point). If the results differ, the tested URL is annotated as “anomalous”, which may provide a signal of potential blocking.

Depending on why the anomaly emerges, the anomalous measurement is automatically annotated as a DNS, TCP/IP, HTTP diff, or HTTP failure anomaly. For example, if the DNS lookup resolves to an IP address which differs from that resolved from the control vantage point, the measurement is annotated as a “DNS anomaly”, which may be a sign of DNS tampering.

However, false positives can occur, which is why we look at anomalous measurements in aggregate in order to determine if a tested URL consistently presents a large volume of anomalous measurements (in comparison to successful measurements) on a tested network. If a tested URL presents a large volume of anomalies, it may provide a stronger signal of potential blocking. If the types of anomalies are consistent (for example, always presenting DNS anomalies on a tested network), they offer an even stronger signal of potential censorship (since they suggest the use of a specific censorship technique, such as DNS hijacking). But beyond aggregating anomalous measurements, we also analyze the raw data pertaining to anomalous measurements in order to identify the specific errors that occurred as part of the testing, offering insight into how a tested URL is potentially blocked.

Based on our current heuristics, we automatically confirm the blocking of websites when a block page is served and we have added the fingerprint of that blockpage to our database. We also automatically confirm the blocking of websites based on DNS answers containing IP addresses that are known to be associated with implementing internet censorship. For other forms of censorship, we analyze OONI data in order to aggregate anomalous measurements and identify why and how those anomalies occur, offering insight into additional cases of potential blocking.

Acknowledgement of limitations

The findings of this study present several limitations, including:

  • Date range of analysis. The findings are limited to OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023. As a result, findings from measurements collected in different date ranges are excluded from this study.
  • Type of measurements. As part of this study, we primarily focus on OONI Web Connectivity measurements which pertain to the testing of websites for censorship. This focus was selected due to known website censorship in the country, while aggregate views of OONI measurements from other OONI Probe experiments did not present an important volume of anomalies that would have warranted more dedicated analysis.
  • Tested websites. OONI Probe website testing in Azerbaijan is primarily limited to URLs included in 2 Citizen Lab test lists: the global list (including internationally-relevant URLs) and the Azerbaijan list (only including URLs relevant to Azerbaijan). As these lists are tested by OONI Probe users and there are bandwidth constraints, they are generally limited to around 1,000 URLs. As a result, the lists may exclude other websites which are blocked in Azerbaijan, and the findings are limited to the testing of the URLs included in these lists. Given that the lists are community-curated, we acknowledge the bias in terms of which URLs are added to the lists. 
  • Testing coverage of websites. Not all URLs included in test lists are measured equally across Azerbaijan over time. Whether OONI data is available for a particular website depends on whether, on which networks, and when an OONI Probe user in Azerbaijan tested it. As a result, tested websites received different testing coverage throughout the analysis period, which impacts the findings.  
  • Tested ASNs. The availability of OONI measurements depends on which networks OONI Probe users were connected to when performing tests. As a result, the measurement coverage varies across ASNs throughout the analysis period, impacting the findings. 
  • Measurement volume. OONI measurement coverage from Azerbaijan has been rather limited over the years (in comparison to other countries), limiting our findings and confidence in confirming censorship events. The availability of OONI data depends entirely on volunteers running OONI Probe locally in Azerbaijan, which can be challenging in light of the political environment, potential risks involved with running OONI Probe, and the relatively limited digital rights community engagement opportunities in Azerbaijan. That said, we observe an important spike in the overall measurement volume from 14th September 2022 onwards (which has subsequently remained relatively stable), increasing our ability to detect censorship events thereafter. This is visible through the following chart. 

Chart: OONI Probe Web Connectivity testing in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 23rd February 2023 (source: OONI data). 

Background

In its latest Freedom on the Net report by Freedom House, Azerbaijan was ranked “not free” among 70 countries assessed for the report. Internet freedoms have been on an overall decline in the country for a number of years, however, the situation escalated during the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since then, while blocking of social media platforms, and internet throttling have reduced, the state continues to implement various forms of digital surveillance combined with offline measures targeting civil society representatives on a regular basis. 

News websites critical of the authorities remain blocked, while the Law on Media enacted in February 2022 is yet another measure imposed by the state to restrict not only media freedom, and freedom of speech but also access to independent and opposition news. 

Journalists across the country remain concerned about the new law. Most recently they have joined in calls to abolish a new media registry introduced in the Media Law. 

Meanwhile, civic activists continue to face online targeting. Az-Net Watch in its December 2022 report, shared some of the findings of such attacks, identifying persistent trends of phishing attacks, questioning by the law-enforcement bodies over criticism voiced online, interference with personal data and devices, hacking attempts and installed spyware programs.

Findings

As part of our analysis of OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan (between January 2022 to February 2023), we found a number of independent news media websites and circumvention tool websites blocked throughout the analysis period. Many of these blocks have been in place since at least 2020. Amid border clashes in September 2022, access to TikTok was blocked in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. We share further details in the sections below.

Blocking of news media websites

Several news media websites (which have been blocked over the last few years) continue to be blocked in Azerbaijan, according to recent OONI data analysis. 

The domains that presented the largest volume of anomalies (and overall testing coverage), thereby presenting the strongest signals of blocking in our analysis period, include:

  1. `azerbaycansaati.tv`
  2. `www.24saat.org`
  3. `www.abzas.net` 
  4. `www.azadliq.info` 
  5. `www.azadliq.org`
  6. `www.meydan.tv`
  7. `www.rferl.org`
  8. `www.gununsesi.org`
  9. `ria.ru`
  10. `www.theguardian.com`

While most of the above domains have been blocked in Azerbaijan over the last few years, the testing of `www.theguardian.com` only started to present anomalies (on several networks) in late December 2022 onwards (we discuss this case in more detail in the next section of this report). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan reportedly started blocking access to RIA Novosti (Russian state-owned news media) in early June 2022 over the publication of slanderous materials against Azerbaijan. At the time, RIA Novosti’s website (`ria.ru`) was only included in other countries’ test lists; we therefore added it to the Global test list to ensure that it gets tested by OONI Probe users in Azerbaijan and around the world. This is why OONI measurement coverage of `ria.ru` in Azerbaijan only begins in June 2022.  

Independent Azerbaijani media websites (such as `azadliq.info` and `meydan.tv`) have reportedly been blocked since early 2017 for “posing a threat” to Azerbaijan’s national security. The state prosecutor reportedly accused these websites of sharing content that promotes violence, hatred, extremism, violates privacy and constitutes slander. However, the blocking of these media outlets may have been politically motivated. Azadliq, for example, reported on the business dealings of Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva’s private foundation, while the website of Gunun Sesi (which has reportedly been blocked since August 2018) is operated by Parviz Hashimli, a former political prisoner. The blocking of the RFE/RFL website (`www.rferl.org`) also reportedly began in 2017 following an Azerbaijani court order.

The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage (from 26 ASNs) for the news media domains that presented the strongest signals of blocking in Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023.

Chart: Blocked news media websites in Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023 (source: OONI data).

Most OONI measurements from the testing of these media websites (excluding `www.theguardian.com`, which is discussed in the next section) presented anomalies throughout the testing period, providing a signal of blocking. In contrast, most of the other URLs tested from the Citizen Lab test lists during this period were found accessible (on the same networks in Azerbaijan).

What is evident from the above chart is that the vast majority of anomalous measurements presented connection timeouts (for sites hosted on both HTTP and HTTPS). A consistent failure type can offer a strong signal of blocking, since it suggests the use of specific censorship techniques. In this case, the connection timeouts may indicate the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology for the implementation of blocks, given that the timeout only happens after the TLS ClientHello message. The fact that we observe the prevalence of connection timeouts across anomalous measurements aggregated across tested ASNs further suggests that most ISPs in Azerbaijan adopt similar censorship techniques.

This is further evident when viewing a per-ASN breakdown of the specific failures in the measurement of each of the blocked news media sites. The following chart, for example, presents the specific failures that occurred when `www.24saat.org` was tested on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan during our analysis period. 

Chart: Measurement results (`OK` and specific failures) from the testing of `www.24saat.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

From the above chart we can see that most failures (across most tested ASNs) involve timeout errors (annotated in red). But we also observe some successful measurements (annotated as `OK` in green) on some of those networks too. To understand why those measurements were successful, we provide a further breakdown by testing targets. The following chart only presents measurement results (including specific failures observed in anomalous measurements) for the testing of the HTTPS version of the site (`https://www.24saat.org/`) across networks.  

Chart: Measurement results (`OK` and specific failures) from the testing of `https://www.24saat.org/` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

As we can see, the testing of the HTTPS version of the site was entirely successful on some networks, and presented consistent signs of blocking (consistently presenting connection timeouts) on others. In contrast, the testing of the HTTP version of the site (shared in the next chart below) shows that it presented signs of blocking on all of these tested networks.

Chart: Measurement results (`OK` and specific failures) from the testing of `http://www.24saat.org/` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

The fact that we observe more prevalent blocking of the HTTP version of the site (even though it supports HTTPS) suggests that the block is not implemented properly on certain networks.

Similarly, we observe the prevalence of connection timeouts in the testing of many other news media websites across ASNs. The following chart provides a per-ASN breakdown of the measurement results from the testing of `azerbaycansaati.tv`, showing that none of the measurements were successful, and that most presented connection timeouts.

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `azerbaycansaati.tv` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

The fact that the testing of `azerbaycansaati.tv` was not successful on any of the networks which received the largest volume of testing coverage, and that it consistently presented connection timeouts on most networks, provides a strong signal of blocking. 

Similarly, we observe that the testing of `www.azadliq.org`, `www.meydan.tv`, and `www.rferl.org` mostly presented connection timeouts on tested networks, as illustrated through the following charts.   


Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.azadliq.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.meydan.tv` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data). 


Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.rferl.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data).

OONI data also suggests that the site (www.occrp.org) of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is blocked in Azerbaijan as well. The blocking of the OCCRP site reportedly began in September 2017, following the publication of a major investigation (“Azerbaijani Laundromat”) into corruption, bribery, and money laundering in which powerful figures were allegedly involved. The following chart provides a per-ASN breakdown of the measurement results from the testing of `www.occrp.org`, showing that (similarly to the aforementioned blocked media sites) it presented connection timeouts on most networks.

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from the testing of `www.occrp.org` on multiple ASNs in Azerbaijan (source: OONI data).

Overall, the prevalence of connection timeouts (observed for different websites measured on many different networks in Azerbaijan) provides a strong signal of blocking. These blocks appear to have been implemented several years ago, and remain ongoing. 

Blocking of the Guardian?

On 25th December 2022, the testing of `www.theguardian.com` started to present anomalies in Azerbaijan. The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage from the testing of `www.theguardian.com` on 10 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st October 2022 to 24th February 2023.

Chart: OONI Probe testing of the Guardian (`www.theguardian.com`) on 10 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st October 2022 to 24th February 2023 (source: OONI data). 

However, these anomalies were not observed on all tested networks in Azerbaijan. To better understand the anomalies, we provide a breakdown of the specific failures observed in anomalous measurements on networks that received the largest testing coverage (through the following chart).

Chart: Measurement results (including specific failures for anomalous measurements) from ASNs in Azerbaijan where the testing of `www.theguardian.com` presented anomalies between November 2022 to February 2023 (source: OONI data).

As is evident from the above chart, all anomalous measurements presented connection timeout errors (for both the HTTP and HTTPS versions of the site). The prevalence of connection timeouts, coupled with the fact that it is the same failure that we also observe in the blocking of other news media websites (discussed previously), provides a signal of blocking. 

While the data suggests that access to `www.theguardian.com` may be blocked on a few networks in Azerbaijan (particularly on AS29049 where we observe the largest volume of anomalies, which is consistent from 25th December 2022 onwards), it’s worth noting that it’s accessible on other networks (such as AS28787, where almost all measurements are successful). As we didn’t come across any news articles reporting the recent blocking of the Guardian in Azerbaijan (which could have helped corroborate the anomalous data), and the overall measurement volume is quite low, our confidence in confirming this potential block is rather limited.  

Azerbaijani news media websites blocked in Russia

Following the blocking of Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti media website in Azerbaijan in early June 2022, we were informed that certain Azerbaijani news media websites (`haqqin.az`, `minval.az`, `oxu.az`, `ru.oxu.az`, `ru.baku.ws`) were reportedly blocked in Russia. On 7th June 2022, we added these URLs to the Russian test list so that these websites could get tested by OONI Probe users in Russia. 

OONI data confirms that these Azerbaijani websites have been blocked in Russia since at least 7th June 2022, and that these blocks remain ongoing (as illustrated below).

Chart: OONI data on the blocking of Azerbaijani news media websites in Russia between 7th June 2022 to 24th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

The above chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage from numerous networks in Russia, showing that at least 5 Azerbaijani news media domains were blocked in Russia between June 2022 to February 2023. Throughout this period, we observe that almost all measurements are anomalous, suggesting that access to these Azerbaijani media sites is blocked on most tested networks in Russia. Russian ISPs adopt a variety of censorship techniques and, on some networks, we are able to automatically confirm the blocking of these Azerbaijani news websites based on fingerprints (as IPs known to be associated with censorship are returned as part of DNS resolution).

Temporary blocking of TikTok in Azerbaijan and Armenia amid border clashes

On 12th September 2022, fighting erupted between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops along their border. The next day (13th September 2022), both Azerbaijan and Armenia started blocking access to TikTok amid the border clashes. 

On 14th September 2022, Azerbaijan’s state security services announced the temporary suspension of TikTok. According to the statement, the content circulating on the social media platform was revealing military secrets and forming wrong opinions in society. As a result, the State Security Service decided to temporarily block access to the platform. Similarly, OONI data shows that the testing of TikTok also started to present signs of blocking in Armenia from 13th September 2022 onwards.

At the time, we published a report documenting the block in both countries based on OONI data. Specifically, we found that Azerbaijan blocked access to the main TikTok website (`www.tiktok.com`) and several endpoints essential to its functionality on at least 3 networks (AS29049, AS41997, AS31721). On all networks where we identified blocking, it seemed to be implemented by means of TLS level interference by dropping packets after noticing a disallowed server_name. We also observed some level of inconsistency, as ISPs in Azerbaijan blocked TikTok based on different lists of TikTok endpoint domains.

In Armenia, TikTok was blocked on at least two networks (AS44395, AS43733). Not all tested networks in Armenia implemented the TikTok block and censorship techniques varied from network to network. TikTok interference was observed at the DNS level by returning an NXDOMAIN error, an IP address associated with www.google.com, or a set of unrelated IP addresses which offer an invalid TLS certificate (it’s an expired certificate for `it.domain.name`). Several endpoints used by the TikTok app and website were also blocked on at least one network in Armenia.

By comparing aggregate OONI measurements from the testing of TikTok’s website (`www.tiktok.com`) in Azerbaijan and Armenia between 1st September 2022 to 24th February 2023, we can see that both countries started blocking access to TikTok amid the September 2022 border clashes, but that the block remained in place in Azerbaijan for much longer than in Armenia. 

Chart: OONI Probe testing of TikTok (`www.tiktok.com`) in Armenia and Azerbaijan between 1st September 2022 to 24th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

Specifically, we observe (through the above chart) that the TikTok block was lifted in Armenia by 21st September 2022 (only lasting about a week), while the TikTok block remained in place in Azerbaijan until November 2022 (lasting about 2 months).

Similarly to the testing of `www.tiktok.com`, OONI data suggests that Azerbaijan blocked numerous TikTok endpoints as well during the same period (between mid-September 2022 to mid-November 2022), as illustrated through the following two charts.  

Chart: OONI Probe testing of TikTok endpoints in Azerbaijan between 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022 (source: OONI data).Chart: OONI Probe testing of TikTok endpoints in Azerbaijan between 1st September 2022 to 30th November 2022 (source: OONI data).

The fact that TikTok’s website (`www.tiktok.com`) and numerous TikTok endpoints presented anomalies on multiple tested networks in Azerbaijan during the same period provides a strong signal of blocking. 

Between September to November 2022, the anomalous measurements from the testing of TikTok in Azerbaijan show that many of them time out when attempting to establish a TLS handshake to the target endpoint. While many such measurements are annotated (on OONI Explorer) as presenting DNS inconsistency, we were able to exclude that by validating that the returned IPs are able to complete a TLS handshake with a valid certificate for the target domain name. Moreover, when issuing an HTTP request with the appropriate headers, the response payload is consistent with the response from an endpoint served to a user in Europe. By inspecting the response header and server certificate, it seems to be an Akamai cache.  

Blocking of circumvention tool websites

Circumventing internet censorship in Azerbaijan can potentially be challenging, as numerous circumvention tool websites have been blocked in Azerbaijan over the past years. Our latest analysis shows that these blocks remain ongoing.

The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage for popular circumvention tool websites that presented a large volume of anomalies throughout the testing period in Azerbaijan.

Chart: Blocked circumvention tool websites in Azerbaijan between January 2022 to February 2023 (source: OONI data). 

Multiple circumvention tool websites (including `www.torproject.org`, `psiphon.ca`, and `www.tunnelbear.com`) continue to show signs of blocking on some networks in Azerbaijan, as illustrated through the above chart. Specifically, OONI data shows that when these sites were tested, we frequently observed the timing out of the session after the ClientHello during the TLS handshake. It’s worth noting though that these sites are not blocked on all networks in Azerbaijan, as some measurements were successful. 

While many popular circumvention tool sites appear to be blocked in Azerbaijan, it’s worth highlighting that certain circumvention tools may work in the country. OONI Probe also includes tests designed to measure the reachability of the Psiphon, Tor, and Tor Snowflake circumvention tools. 

Between January 2022 to February 2023, OONI Probe testing of Psiphon shows that it was reachable on tested networks in Azerbaijan, as illustrated below.

Chart: OONI Probe testing of Psiphon on 29 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 25th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

Most measurements (collected from 29 ASNs during the testing period) show that it was possible to bootstrap Psiphon and use it to fetch a webpage, suggesting that the circumvention tool worked on tested networks in Azerbaijan.

While the testing of Tor presented anomalies throughout the testing period, most measurements from September 2022 onwards (when we also observe a spike in the overall measurement volume) suggest that Tor was reachable on most tested networks in Azerbaijan. 

Chart: OONI Probe testing of Tor on 28 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 25th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

In Tor anomalous measurements, we see that attempted connections to Tor directory authorities failed on some networks. However, we also see that most connections to both Tor directory authorities and Tor bridges were successful (on many networks), indicating that it may have been possible to use Tor in Azerbaijan. 

Quite similarly, OONI data shows that it was possible to bootstrap Tor Snowflake on most networks in Azerbaijan throughout the testing period.

Chart: OONI Probe testing of Tor Snowflake on 20 ASNs in Azerbaijan between 1st January 2022 to 25th February 2023 (source: OONI data).

This suggests that while the Psiphon and Tor Project websites appear to be blocked on some networks in Azerbaijan (as discussed previously), their tools appear to work in the country (at least on tested networks). 

Conclusion

Azerbaijan continues to limit press freedom by blocking access to several independent news media websites – the blocking of which appears to be politically motivated. OONI data also suggests that some ISPs in Azerbaijan may have started blocking access to the Guardian on 25th December 2022, but the relatively limited measurement coverage and the seeming absence of news articles reporting the block limit our confidence in confirming this. 

In early June 2022, both Azerbaijan and Russia started blocking access to each other’s news media websites. In early June 2022, Azerbaijan started blocking access to Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti media website over the publication of slanderous materials against Azerbaijan. Since (at least) 7th June 2022, Russian ISPs have been blocking access to Azerbaijani news media websites (`haqqin.az`, `minval.az`, `oxu.az`, `ru.oxu.az`, `ru.baku.ws`). 

Amid the September 2022 border clashes, both Azerbaijan and Armenia started blocking access to TikTok. However, while the TikTok block was lifted in Armenia by 21st September 2022 (only lasting about a week), the TikTok block remained in place in Azerbaijan until November 2022 (lasting about 2 months). But this was not the first time that Azerbaijan blocked access to a social media platform during the conflict. Azerbaijan previously blocked access to social media platforms during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Both social media blocks during times of conflict and long-term news media blocks (as those seen in Azerbaijan) generally indicate government attempts to control political narratives. While numerous circumvention tool websites appear to be blocked in Azerbaijan (potentially limiting the ability to circumvent blocks), it’s worth noting that several circumvention tools (such as Tor and Psiphon) may work in the country. 

This study was carried out through the use of open methodologies, free and open source software, and open data, enabling independent third-party verification of our research findings. We encourage researchers to expand upon this study by running OONI Probe and analyzing OONI measurements from Azerbaijan.   

Acknowledgments

We thank OONI Probe users in Azerbaijan for contributing measurements, and supporting this study.

political activist arrested over social media post

Member of the opposition Popular Front party, Zaur Usubov, was arrested on February 21 and sentenced to 25 days in administrative detention according to reporting by Turan News Agency. The activist was officially charged with an all too common article – resisting police. 

Popular Front said, Usubov, was arrested over critical of the authorities’ social media posts, and that the charges leveled against the member are bogus. 

According to Turan News Agency, Usubov is the sixth party member arrested this year [2023] so far. Five of them, including Usubov, were handed administrative detention while another member is facing criminal charges while the investigation is ongoing. 

Police in Azerbaijan is accustomed to resorting to physical measures against civic activists who are critical of the authorities online. As documented by Az-Net Watch, there have been scores of similar examples in the past.  

religious activist claims his arrest was over his social media posts

Mahir Azimov, 40, is a member of the Muslim Union Movement. Azimov was arrested on drug possession charges according to reporting by Azadliq Radio, Azerbaijan Service for Radio Liberty. But activist claims the accusations are bogus, and that the real reason behind his arrest was his online activism – namely, critical posts on the state of war veterans in Azerbaijan.   

Azimov is just one of several movement members arrested in recent weeks. According to monitoring by Azerbaijan bulletin, another citizen of Azerbaijan, based in Turkey Imran Mammadli was detained and his deportation is expected. Mammadli too was critical of the Azerbaijani state on social media reports Azerbaijan bulletin. 

In his own statement, Azimov said, the day he was arrested and taken to the local police for questioning, he was questioned over his social media posts in which he criticized the authorities over their treatment of Karabakh war veterans. “They [police] showed me these posts. This is why I have been arrested,” said Azimov. 

As a result of the pressure faced during the questioning, Azimov signed a confession letter in which the religious activist claimed indeed he had drugs on him. However, in court, Azimov said the statement was signed under duress. 

police briefly detains a member of an opposition party over social media posts

Police in Baku detained a member of the opposition Popular Front party over social media posts according to reporting by Turan News Agency. Emin Akhundov was taken from his home on October 31 wrote Akhundov’s father on his Facebook. “Extraordinary things are happening in our country. Yesterday evening at around 19.30, two people from the Absheron district police department came to us, looking for my son (Emin Akhundov). I asked what was going on, and they said it was a minor issue, and that my son would be back home shortly.” Emin Akhundov was let go the next day according to members’ statements shared on Facebook. 

It was not immediately clear what post or posts were the cause for Akhundov’s arrest. In a Facebook post, Emin Akhudnov shared shortly after his release, the activist did not share any additional information only that he was released and that he will continue his activism. Other members of the Popular Front Party took Akhundov’s detention as continued pressure against the party, especially in light of the recently organized protest in the capital Baku. 

 

in Azerbaijan a reserve colonel gets jail time

On October 6, the Baku Military court, sentenced reserve Colonel Elnur Mammadov to six months in prison. The court found Mammadov guilty of slander. Mammadov voiced criticism of the Ministry of Defense on social networks accusing it of cronyism and nepotism. The accusations were also leveled against the Ministry of Defense, Zakir Hasanov. 

According to local media reports, the Ministry of Defense earlier responded to Mammadov’s criticism by refuting the colonel’s claims. 

Mammadov said his arrest and sentence were directly linked to his social media commentary. 

In one of his recent videos, Mammadov said despite his attempts to speak with the Ministry about ongoing nepotism and cronyism within the Army no one listened. Instead, he was dismissed. In its response, the MoD said Mammadov was discharged because of his illness. 

Facebook user questioned over a Facebook status post

Seymur Aghayev, a student, said police unlawfully took him to a police station where he was held for some two hours on September 27. The men who first asked Aghayev to confirm his identity were ununiformed explained Aghayev following his release. When Aghayev asked the reason for this inquiry his questions remained unanswered. The men put him in a car against his will and took him to the Baku Police Station. 

“I was standing outside a grocery store when two men approached me, asking if I was Seymur. I told them that was my name. They were plainclothed and only later at the police station did I learn that the two men were the officers at Criminal Search department at the Baku City Police Station. They left my questions unanswered as we drove [to the police station],” Aghayev wrote the following day on his Facebook profile.

At the station, Aghayev was told the reason he was brought in was a Facebook status Aghayev shared about police violence against citizens. 

In an interview with Toplum TV, Aghayev said, the status was referring to an old video of police using physical violence against a citizen. At the station, following the questioning (police officers also asked about his family members, their employment history, and any religious affiliation) Aghayev was forced to remove his Facebook status. 

In its response to media inquiries, the Ministry of the Interior said there was nothing unlawful in Aghayev’s visit to the police. “He was questioned upon an invite. This is not unlawful,” said the Ministry’s media spokesperson in an interview with Meydan TV. 

authorities in Azerbaijan are considering law on social media – critics say

A recent conference organized by the Prosecutor General’s office in Baku on the recent violations of media legislation has raised eyebrows among civil society. On August 10, an event, titled, “Freedom of the Media and Information Security of Society under the Increasing Influence of Social Networks,” was held at the General Prosecutor’s Office.  Among the guests were representatives of pro-government and government media, as well as GONGOs. According to reporting by Turan News Agency, representatives of independent media or independent media experts were not invited and those who did attempt to attend the event were kicked out, violating Articles 25 and 5o of the Constitution. 

During the event, Prosecutor General Kamran Aliyev said the Prosecutor’s Office was determined to continue taking measures against published content in the media as well as on social networks deemed harmful to national security, not corresponding to reality, and/or identified as violating the rights of citizens.

A number of citizens have received warnings over their social media posts in recent weeks. In a statement published on July 30, the General Prosecutor’s Office said it has warned seven other users over their public posts shared on social media. The Prosecutor’s Office in a statement said the users were warned after the Prosecutor’s Office identified a violation of the Law on Media. Specifically, the statement said, 

During monitoring, it was identified that during the publication of news in media, provisions of Article 14.1.11 of the Law on Media were not observed [Facts and events must be presented impartially and objectively, and one-sidedness must not be allowed]. 

In order to prevent cases of violation of socio-political stability, human and citizen rights and freedoms, a number of relevant persons were invited to the Prosecutor General’s Office and the prosecutor took measures. 

As such, Sakhavat Mammadov, Rovshan Mammadov, Zulfugar Alasgarov, Elgun Rahimov, Fuzuli Kahramani, Zeynal Bakhshiyev and Ruslan Izzetli received a warning based on Article 22 of the Law on Prosecutor – to avoid cimilar negative incidents from taking place again.

The General Prosecutor’s Office repeats, in its appeal to media and social network users, that dissemination of unverified information that lacks clarificaition from the state institutions is unacceptable and holds one accountable according to existing legislation. 

Among those in attendance, was the head of the Press Council, Aflatun Amashov, who proposed to set up a commission in partnership with the Prosecutor’s Office that would regulate the media. For what purpose remains unclear, especially when there is no legislation in Azerbaijan that gives the prosecutor’s office authority to engage on issues of media ethics, media professionalism, or content regulation. 

In May 2022, AIW published a legal analysis about content regulation in Azerbaijan. At the time, an uptick in cases in which social media users faced punitive measures by the Prosecutor’s General Office for their online activism indicated that the Office has taken on a temporary role of taking measures against activists, journalists, and media within the scope of laws on information and media. But continuing involvement of the Office in handing out fines and warnings may indicate that in addition to punitive measures, there is a plan to introduce legal measures on social media platforms. 

Khalid Aghaliyev, a media law expert, told Meydan TV in an interview that the most recent discussions are a sign that the state is mulling over creating a law to regulate social media platforms. Aghaliyev also criticized the proposal of the Press Council to set up a commission. Nowhere in the world, there are institutions set up to regulate media. “These issues are regulated by independent journalists’ unions and their recommendations. But in Azerbaijan, independent journalism and media are problematic. They must be free, in the first place to get used to regulating themselves,” explained Aghaliyev.

Similarly, the head of Azerbaijan Internet Forum, Osman Gunduz, in a Facebook post said, the event organized by the Prosecutor’s Office sets a dangerous precedent. “Such steps create risks for the freedom of the Internet, the development of social media, and freedom of expression in general,” wrote Gunduz. 

Another media law expert, Alasgar Mammadli, writing in a Facebook post, criticized both the Press Council and the newly created MEDIA agency for failing to speak up at the event. After all, each of these institutions is responsible for reforms in the media, wrote Mammadli, and yet they could not say, “Dear Prosecutor’s Office, the functions in this area have been entrusted to me by presidential decree, do not interfere,” wrote Mammadli. 

questioning over social media posts critical of government measures raise concern [updated August 3]

The questioning of political activist Ruslan Izzatli, on July 28 over his social media post renewed concerns over government oversight of social media platforms and its non-transparent approach to cherry-picking issues that it deems unfit for public discussion.

Izzatli was not the first person to receive a call from the Prosecutor General’s Office last month inviting him for a meeting. In an interview with one media platform, Izzatli explained that the prosecutor’s office refused to explain the reason for the meeting over the phone and asked that the political activist comes in person. 

During the meeting that took place on July 28, Izzatli was asked questions about a Facebook post in which the political activist shared some of the grievances of war veterans and servicemen since the second Karabakh war. He criticized the state for lack of measures in addressing these issues. “If Aliyev’s team can visit returned territories today it is because of the servicemen and war veterans. But their problems remain unaddressed,” wrote Izzatli in the said post.   

Izzatli was also asked whether he had evidence for the claims made in the post and why the political activist wrote the post in the first place. The political activist also said he received a verbal warning.

Separately, on July 30, the General Prosecutor’s Office said it has warned seven other users over their public posts shared on social media. The Prosecutor’s Office in a statement said the users were warned after the Prosecutor’s Office identified a violation of the Law on Media. Specifically the statement said, 

During monitoring, it was identified that during the publication of news in media, provisions of Article 14.1.11 of the Law on Media were not observed [Facts and events must be presented impartially and objectively, and one-sidedness must not be allowed]. 

In order to prevent cases of violation of socio-political stability, human and citizen rights and freedoms, a number of relevant persons were invited to the Prosecutor General’s Office and the prosecutor took measures. 

As such, Sakhavat Mammadov, Rovshan Mammadov, Zulfugar Alasgarov, Elgun Rahimov, Fuzuli Kahramani, Zeynal Bakhshiyev and Ruslan Izzetli received a warning based on Article 22 of the Law on Prosecutor – to avoid cimilar negative incidents from taking place again.

The General Prosecutor’s Office repeats, in its appeal to media and social network users, that dissemination of unverified information that lacks clarificaition from the state institutions is unacceptable and holds one accountable according to existing legislation. 

According to Alasgar Mammadli, a media law expert, Article 14 of the Law on Media, applies to journalists, newsrooms, and online news sites. But the majority of the men summoned to the Prosecutor’s Office this time were not journalists Alasgarli told Turan News Agency in an interview. The cited Article 14, cannot be used against individuals for expressing their thoughts. This is clearly an attempt to restrict freedom of expression said Mammadli. Journalist Sakhavat Mammadov who was among the group who received a warning agrees. Speaking with Turan News Agency on August 3, Mammadli said, that the warnings and questioning are meant to pressure activists and journalists and are clearly political orders. “Instead of calming people down, these incidents only raise tension and cause opposite effects. It shows there is an attempt to withhold information from the people, which only breeds rumors and disinformation.” 

AIW has analyzed the Law on Media and its implications on media freedom in Azerbaijan here. Among key findings were poorly worded definitions and excessive requirements and restrictions for online media content [see below Article 14 as an example]; challenging parameters of registration of journalists, especially those working for online media outlets and freelance journalists; and lack of oversight and checks and balances to monitor decisions taken within the scope of the new law. 

Article 14 of the Media Law requires that information published and (or) disseminated in the media (including online media) must meet at least 14 requirements. The law also requires that content published by media outlets should meet the requirements of the Law on Protection of Children from Harmful Information and the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information which provides an exhaustive list of requirements criticized for vagueness.

For instance, Article 14.1.6. of the law prohibiting media from using “immoral lexical (swearing) words and expressions, gestures” contradicts the requirements of the European Court of Human Rights standards as “prescribed by law” on the account that it lacks sufficient clarity and precision. The article also does not comply with a standard, “necessary in a democratic society,” “found in Articles 8-11 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides that the state may impose restrictions of these rights only if such restrictions are ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and proportional to the legitimate aims enumerated in each article.”  The text authorizes the authorities to consider any impugned statement or general criticism as an “immoral lexical (swearing) words of expressions”. With such a broad definition, this requirement has a chilling effect on journalists.

Article 14.1.11 of the law reads, “facts and events must be interpreted impartially and objectively, and one-sidedness must not be allowed.” A duty to impartial and accurate reporting and one-sidedness is likely to result in journalists refraining from exercising their right to freedom of expression without self-censorship. A failure of this requirement subjects the journalist to heavy sanctions. Furthermore, taking into account the existing political atmosphere in the country, such broadly defined restrictions can prevent journalists and other professionals working for online media from staying impartial without any interference.

Article 14.1.14  concerns published content according to which, “publication (dissemination) of information about the crime committed by a person in the absence of a court order that has entered into force should not be allowed.” Such a direct ban in general form could limit the freedom of expression, in particular, where certain cases are widely covered in the media on account of the seriousness of the facts and the individuals. The journalist also can be subject to disproportionate sanctions for publication or dissemination of information, which is already known to people, for instance in case of scandalous news about the corruption of officials. This clause heavily limits the primary duty of ensuring diversity and plurality of voices in the media.

Any imposed restrictions must meet the requirements as prescribed by law pursuant of legitimate aims (allowed by the international human rights law), necessary in a democratic society, such as proportionality, and non-discrimination.

In May, AIW looked into content regulation on the internet carried out by the Prosecutor’s office and how the measures in place, silence free speech often relying on the use of a restrictive law on Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information. This legal overview was prepared following an uptick of cases in which social media users faced punitive measures for their online activism by the Prosecutor’s Office. At the time, the analysis concluded that the Prosecutor General Office has taken on a temporary role of taking measures against activists, journalists, and media within the scope of laws on information and media and with the powers vested in the prosecutor’s office under the existing legislation on administrative offenses and the law of the prosecutor’s office. 

The day Ruslan Izzatli was questioned, Azerbaijan’s Press Council – nominally independent media regulation authority – held a press conference. Speaking at the briefing, the chairman of the Council Aflatun Amashov, expressed his concerns over circulating social media posts damaging the reputation of the Azerbaijani military. As such, the chairman said the council is ready to offer its recommendations on creating a legal framework to regulate social media platforms in Azerbaijan.

Speaking to Meydan TV, media law expert Khalid Aghaliyev said, the council’s proposal to regulate social media platforms is likely linked to the state’s intentions in having social media platforms open representatives in Azerbaijan and then use these representatives to further consolidate control mechanisms over social media platforms.   

two website editors, and three social media users questioned over “disseminating forbidden information on the internet” [updated August 8]

[UPDATE] By August 8, four more citizens were called in for questioning over their social media posts about the military operations in Azerbaijan reported Qaynarinfo.az. Rustam Ismayilbeyli, Farid Huseynov, Elmar Mammadov, Gulay Eyvazova were all invited to the Prosecutor’s Office where all four received a warning. Ismayilbeyli, who is a political activist, wrote on his Facebook, that he was questioned on August 4, specifically over a Facebook post in which he mentions a quote by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. “I was questioned because of the quote by Ataturk, in which he said, ‘so long as the nation’s freedom is not under threat, starting a war is a crime.’ The Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the quote was a threat to national security,” wrote Ismayilbeyli. In a separate case, journalist Sakha

On July 27, according to Turan News Agency reporting, editors of two news sites, Fikret Ibishbeyli (Faramazoglu) and Agil Alishov were questioned by the General Prosecutor’s office. Ibishbeyli is the founder of jamaz.info and Alishov manages the website miq.az. In addition, according to the agency’s reporting, three social media users were also questioned. One of them, a man named Tofig Shakhmuradov, known as a blogger covering military news was sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention for “posting of information prohibited from dissemination on the telecommunication network, as well as failure to prevent the posting of such information” on Facebook.

Ibishbeyli, was most recently fined in January of this year, on the same charges, “disseminating forbidden information on the internet.” The journalist was fined a total amount of AZN500 [USD295] following a court decision. At the time, the Prosecutor General alleged that an article published on the jamaz.info website caused confusion and fear. 

In May, AIW published a legal analysis on who regulates content on the Internet in Azerbaijan. Based on that analysis, AIW specifically looked at how the Prosecutor’s Office was involved in this process and on what grounds. Currently, two laws regulate what constitutes prohibited information on the internet and the liability for violating these requirements. These are the Law on Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information, which defines the requirements and responsibilities for individuals; and the Law on Media, which defines the (almost) similar and additional requirements and responsibilities for journalists and media.

In addition, the presidential decree dated February 22, 2022, instructed the Ministry of Justice to prepare and submit a draft law on measures for violating information and media legislation on the internet to the government within a month. The law is yet to be adopted and concerns over its text and procedural implementation give ground to worry for a new restrictive law to be adopted not to mention its implications to further stifle free speech online.

Until then, an uptick in recent months, of cases in which social media users have faced punitive measures for their online activism indicates that the Prosecutor General Office has taken on a temporary role of taking measures against activists, journalists and media within the scope of laws on information and media. The prosecutor’s office argues that the official warnings issued by the institution are a precautionary measure for violating existing laws. However as it has been pointed out by the local human rights lawyers and experts, while the prosecutor’s office may be relying on existing bills on Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information as well as the Media, their measures can also be defined within the scope of additional articles of the Criminal Code. Therefore, say experts, the legality of these acts is questionable.

It is still not clear what constitutes “prohibited information”

According to the Law on Information, and Media, while there are general parameters of what prohibited information is, the definitions are rather broad and as such open to interpretation. 

In the case of two editors who received a warning on July 27, the prosecutor’s office claims both websites, published articles that cast a shadow on the country’s Armed Forces. Which articles specifically, however, is not clear. In the case of the social media users, there is no information on what posts specifically were the cause for questioning and subsequent detention of one of the users. In AIW’s legal analysis published in May, we reviewed a number of reported examples where social media users and journalists were warned or received administrative detention over publishing content. In neither of them, there was sufficient evidence to claim violations of the law did indeed occur.

In a Facebook post, media law expert, Alasgar Ahmedoglu wrote if Shahmuradov was sentenced on the grounds of spreading information prohibited by law then the information law enforcement found in violation of the law must be clearly shared as well. “If the prosecutor’s office has found a legal basis for restricting an individual’s freedom of information, it must clearly indicate the date on which the person disseminated that information, what the prohibited information in that disseminated information, and by which specific law the dissemination of that information is prohibited […] A person’s constitutional right cannot be so grossly restricted by merely stating in general terms “prohibited by law,” wrote Ahmedoglu. The expert pointed out, that while applying provisions of existing laws as punitive measures, the General Prosecutor’s Office must also take into account Articles 47 (freedom of thought and speech), and 50 (freedom to lawfully seek, obtain, transmit and disseminate information) of the Constitution of Azerbaijan.   

 

political activist and blogger detained

On June 23, Elchin Ibrahimli, a member of an opposition party was detained according to local news reports. He was sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention the following day, said members of the party. According  to reports, the activist allegedly resisted police and as a result was sentenced on charges of resisting the police according to the Code of Administrative Offenses, Article 535. 

In a statement issued by the Ministry of the Interior, the blogger is said to have failed to show up in person at the police station despite numerous invitations. 

According to Azadliq Radio, Azerbaijan Service for Radio Liberty, Ibrahimli was arrested from his home. Speaking to the radio, Faig Jafarzade, the party regional head, said Ibrahimli is an active social media user and that his arrest is rooted in his political activism.