On January 31, 2020, several Musavat party social media accounts were targeted.
According to the reports, the attack began 12.00 UTC time while most of the key party affiliates including page admins were attending commemoration ceremony, celebrating the birthday of the founder of Azerbaijan Republic, Mammad Amin Rasulzade.
According to preliminary reports five Facebook pages, one Facebook group, and one website were targeted.
Arif Hajili’s public page – Hajili, is the acting leader of the Musavat party. The page was taken over, it’s original admins removed, and out of 10,000 “likes” 744 remain;
BastaInfo – a Facebook page dedicated to an online news site operated by Musavat party. Its ownership was changed. The “likes” dropped from 106,540 to 73,779;
The official Facebook page of Musavat party – despite admins’ attempt to keep this page protected, they were unable to secure the page. The page was taken over by MusavatParty business account, which Musavat party used in the past, for advertisement purposes however at the time of the attack, no longer had access to this page. The name of the page was also changed;
Musavat Youth Branch Facebook page [A] – number of followers dropped from 8000 to 5655; all admins of the age were changed to moderators and the ownership was given to the same Bastainfo.com Facebook business company profile that took over BastaInfo page;
Musavat Youth Branch Facebook page [B] – followers here also dropped from 24942 to 194 people. The page’s name was also changed by a user named Suleyman Suleymanli whose profile no longer seems available;
Basta! Group – the group’s admins were deleted, some 60,000 members removed from the group and the group was archived;
basta2.com website is no longer accessible.
Recently the country’s oldest opposition party have found itself in hot waters over a fraudulent asylum scheme. As a result its been facing much scrutiny in Azerbaijan. The names of two pages were changed into: “Musavat Youth Organisation, fake documents on sale” and “Musavat Party fake residency for 3000EUR”.
The party’s press secretary Mustafa Hajibeyli told Turan News Agency the targeting was related to the upcoming early parliamentary election in Azerbaijan [scheduled on February 9, 2020] and the news of the pre-election violations.
Previosly the party was opearting bastainfo.com that was blocked by the auhtorities and its editor Mustafa Hajibeyli was handed a five year suspended sentence in February 2019.
On 10 March 2017, a bill of amendments to the laws on “Information, Informatisation and Protection of Information” and “Telecommunications” was put up for discussion at a plenary meeting of Milli Meclis (Parliament) and was unanimously adopted.
Here is a breakdown of what these new amendments mean:
New Article 13-1 of the law “on telecommunication” requires registration of internet operators and providers in Azerbaijan with the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies (MTCHT). Providers and operators must register within 15 days since the start of the provision of services and must inform MTCHT about any changes to the registered information within 10 days after the change takes place.
Rules for registration are to be established by the MTCHT, and operators and providers will have 2 months to apply for registration.
Providers and operators are not responsible for the content of messages transmitted over telecommunications networks unless otherwise provided for by law.
Law on information establishes personal responsibility for “owners” (defined as “persons that have ownership or usage rights to an internet information resource, freely determining usage of and rules for placement of information on such resource”) of internet information resources (hereinafter ‘IIR’) with regard to the content of such resources. If the owner of an IIR or a domain name is a legal entity, the website should provide “in a readable format and place its name, organizational-legal form, email address” and if the owner is an individual, then “first name, last name, father’s name, and email address”.
Owners of IIR or domain names must not allow distribution on the IIR of the following information:
propaganda and financing of terrorism, as well as methods and means of terrorism, information about training for the purpose of terrorism, as well as open calls for terrorism;
information on the propaganda of violence and religious extremism, open calls directed to the evocation of national, racial or religious enmity, violent change of the constitutional order, territorial disintegration, violent seizure or maintenance of power, organization of mass riots;
state secrets;
instructions or methods for producing firearms, their component parts, ammunition, and explosive substances;
information on preparation and usage of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and their precursors, about locations of their unlawful acquisition, as well as information on the location of and methods of cultivation of plants containing narcotic substances;
pornography, including information related to child pornography;
information on the organization of and incitement to gambling and other unlawful betting games;
information disseminated with a purpose to promote suicide as a method of solving problems justifies suicide, provides the basis for or incites to suicide, describes the methods of committing suicide, and organizes commission of suicide by several individuals or organized group;
defamatory and insulting information, as well as information breaching inviolability of private life;
information breaching intellectual property rights;
other information prohibited by the laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
If the owner of IIR or of its domain name discovers such information or receives an appeal that such information is provided on the IIR, she or he must ensure that such information is removed from the resource. Furthermore, if a hosting provider is in such a situation, it must take measures to ensure the removal of such information by the owner.
MTCHT can issue a written warning to the owner of IIR, owner of its domain name, and to the hosting provider. If the information is not removed within 8 hours after such a written warning, MTCHT can appeal to a court to restrict access to the IIR. If there is an “urgent situation of danger to the interests of the state and society protected by law or real threat to life and health of individuals”, access to the IIR can be restricted by a decision of MTCHT.
If MTCHT takes such a decision, it at the same time must apply to a court, and the access restriction remains in force until a court decision is made. A court must consider MTCHT appeal and make a decision within 5 days, while an appeal of such a decision does not postpone its execution.
The law provides for the establishment of a “List of Information Resources that contain information prohibited for distribution”. Information resources are placed on that list by MTCHT if there is a decision by MTCHT or a court about restricting access to an IIR. Rules concerning the contents of this list, its composition, supervision of its enforcement, and arranging for reciprocal contacts between host and internet providers are to be determined by the MTCHT.
MTCHT can add an IIR to this list based on an individual request if the IIR owner does not ensure the removal of prohibited information, and there is a court decision prohibiting the distribution of such information. Once an IIR is listed, the internet and host providers must immediately restrict access to it, and notify the owner of the IIR in this regard. The law provides that IIR owners, domain name owners, host providers, and internet providers may be held responsible for violations of these provisions.
While the MTCHT has been swift with putting its new powers into practice by blocking scores of independent, opposition websites, it has so far, failed to create a repository of websites it has blocked.
Together with OONI, AIW has prepared a list of websites to test in Azerbaijan. According to preliminary tests collected since January 2020 (based on OONI measurements, https://explorer.ooni.org/country/AZ), here is what we managed to identify so far:
Chart: Websites potentially blocked in Azerbaijan between January 2020 to March 2020 based on OONI measurements, https://explorer.ooni.org/country/AZ
The type of network anomaly we see is HTTP-failure. This means that we are able to successfully resolve via DNS the IP address of the target domain name and also successfully establish a TCP connection to the resolved IP, but when we attempt to retrieve the website content, the connection fails.
This may be an indication that the blocking is happening by means of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), but further and more in-depth testing is required in order to establish if this is indeed the case.
In the charts below, we also present the findings with a per domain and per network breakdown.
Chart: Comparison of potential blocking of websites across networks in Azerbaijan, https://explorer.ooni.org/country/AZChart: Comparison of potential blocking of websites across networks in Azerbaijan, https://explorer.ooni.org/country/AZ
Through the above charts, we can see that the blocking appears to consistently be implemented across all tested ISPs in Azerbaijan.
AIW and OONI will continue monitoring blocked websites in Azerbaijan to provide a more comprehensive analysis. For now, you can also help us test. A more detailed post about testing is available here.
On January 26, Azerbaijani politician, Gultekin Hajibeyli reported of two separate accounts impersonating her online. An Instagram profile claimed Hajibeyli was an escort woman, while a page on Facebook insinuated Hajibeyli was the mistress of other male politicians. Hajibeyli’s personal phone number was placed under the Instagram page which led to her receiving countless calls from unknown men requesting her services.
This is not the first time, Hajibeyli was targeted. In October, AIW reported Hajibeyli’s Facebook page was hacked. The page contained news, updates, and other entries from the politician’s activities.
Also in October, a phone conversation she had over her personal mobile number, with a US diplomat was leaked in a television show RealTV. The anchor, Mirshahin Aghayev, leaked another conversation Hajibeyli had, this time, recorded during a business lunch meeting with an EU diplomat. While both leaks were later taken down by the same television channel, the incident provided sufficient evidence of wiretapping and surveillance, and violation of Hajibeyli’s privacy.
After discovering that the reason behind numerous phone calls, was the Instagram page, Hajibeyli appealed repeatedly to the Ministry of Interior emergency hotline however, Hajibeyli was informed that identifying the perpetrators was beyond their scope of work.
“This is a state-backed moral terror campaign against me, an opposition figure, one of the leaders of the National Council […] This is revenge against my quitting the pro-government political views in 2010 and for joining the National Council in 2013”, wrote Hajibeyli in a personal statement following the most recent incidents.
Since parting her ways with the official authorities in 2010, Hajibeyli has been subject to various forms of political pressure. Her family members were fired from their government jobs. In 2013, Hajibeyli resigned from her position as an associate professor at the Caucasus University in Baku due to on-going pressure. Hajibeyli was prosecuted over the following two years on a fabricated defamation case.
At present, Hajibeyli’s private home is “under arrest”, her car was confiscated without a court order, and her son is barred from leaving the country.
“I know, to be a woman in politics is challenging everywhere. But it is twice as hard, if not more, to be a woman politician in such harsh autocracy like Azerbaijan where not only you but even your child is suffering from reprisal. Where you have no right to private life, and under permanent surveillance”, wrote Hajibeyli in her statement.
Responding to recent harassment against Hajibeyli, investigative journalist Khadija Ismayil tweeted she too has faced similar harassment:
Gultekin Hajibeyli -opposition politician and her mother get hundreds of phone calls every day because their phone numbers were placed with sex ads. I faced the same in 2016. No doubt it was done by government – according to my sources, in Ministry of Interiors cyber unit.
The list of gender harassment against her is unbelievable – every year she goes through a major attack. Being opposition woman in Azerbaijan. Promotion of First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva to executive leadership in country and harassment of Gultekin seems like a movie topic
And then there was a fake Tinder page impersonating journalist Arzu Geybulla, using her personal photograph as the profile picture. While the said profile has been removed by Tinder since reporting it is worth mentioning that the profile was prepared by someone who lives in Baku.
On January 6, veteran human rights lawyer Intigam Aliyev received an email from another human rights lawyer Rasul Jafarov. Aliyev, spotted something was not right and forwarded the email he received to Javarov’s real email. This is not the first time, Jafarov is targeted. In 2017, the case was captured in detail by Amnesty International. Unlike Jafarov’s first experience, this time, the email was sent only to a handful of people (at least from what Jafarov was able to collect).
Based on the contents of the phishing email, together with Qurium , it was possible to identify the following information:
malware inside the WeTransfer link is written in python and compiled for windows;
the malware has been built using a software called technowlogger (more here);
The malware records keystrokes, passwords and sends them to a Gmail account after deactivating the antivirus program on your device;
In their forensic investigation, Qurium team was able to identify the email address: man474019 [ @ ] gmail.com. This user, has expressed interest in pen-testing tools, penetration testing and other forms of attacks in hacking forums. Including one attack against criminal.az (website currently blocked and it’s editor facing criminal prosecution).
The picture in the avatar displayed belongs to Alibay Mammadov. Together with Qurium, Azerbaijan Internet Watch suspects the attacker has stolen the identity of Mammadov.
According to this TEDx bio, Alibay Mammadov is based in Japan. He is the head of the Azerbaijan Japan Collaboration Association founded in Tokyo in 2016. The association aims to promote bilateral business relations between Japan and Azerbaijan. He is also the President of Azepro Co., Ltd. Azerbaijan Internet Watch has reached out to Mammadov, warning him of the situation however received no response in return.
The attacker seems to continue his research, as his most recent appearance in the forum was on January 14, 2020:
This, however, was not the last phishing attack.
On January 10, an independent online news platform HamamTimes was targeted with a similar phishing attack. The email came through a Gmail account that belongs to journalist Aziz Karimov.
A similar phishing attack was carried out against Azadliq Radio, Azerbaijan Service for Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty team.
On January 11, a larger group of civil society representatives received another WeTransfer link from Roberto Fasino. Fasino is the Head of the Secretariat, PACE Committee on Culture, Science, Education, and Media.
WeTransfer does not verify emails for validity when inserted in the sender or recipient box – you can insert anyone’s email. As a result, any email can be used, including that of Roberto Fasino in the sender box [see below].
According to Qurium forensics, the virus sent to HamamTimes and from Roberto Fasino is “powershell” exploit that can gain full access to a windows machine. It connects to an intermediary server where the attacker can connect to control the victim’s device. This is how the attack looks when broken down into steps:
The attacker prepared the “powershell” attack;
Obfuscate the code using HTML Guardian (HTA file);
Upload the file to We-transfer and mail to several victims [how the contact list has been obtained is still unclear – one scenario is that the sender’s email, in this case, roberto.fasino@coe.int was compromised;
Once the victim’s device is infected the attacker then continues to perform the attack performing “Reflective DLL” injection into the infected device and uploads the “merterpreter” code;
The final step, allows the attacker to have full access to a victim’s device, running commands remotely;
The forensics report also identified that the attacker has set up an account in ngrok.com service to hide his computer.
Once the virus is inside the infected device, it connects to the ngrok.com address 3.17.202.129 and port number 16885.
So far, attempts to reach ngrok.com founder Alan Shreve for a comment and assistance yield no results:
On January 14, new evidence showed the attacker was also using Facebook messenger to infect devices. The new evidence, as well as further investigations of the IP address of the attacker, revealed man474019 to be connected to the government of Azerbaijan and that this was the same location from where DDoS attacks against several independent and opposition websites were coordinated in 2017. The new report also shows that this network includes several ministries, as well as the presence of several firewalls with digital certificates signed by the national cert (cert.az)
Orkhan Shabanov, whose name and email appear in Hacking Team leaks indicated in Qurium’s report, is an employee at the Ministry of the Interior. In his capacity, Shabanov was among participants at the Open-ended intergovernmental expert group meeting to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime that took place in Vienna in March 2019.
What is phishing:
It is when you receive an email from someone who pretends to be someone you know, and phishes for your private information by asking you to download the attachment, or click on a link that would take you to a different page where you are prompted to enter some of your personal sensitive information, including passwords.
In 2019, Amnesty Tech released a detailed report on common phishing attacks used against journalists and rights defenders in MENA. Many of these conclusions apply to other countries as well.
The report describes the following most common types of phishing attempts:
“Reset your password” email – attacker impersonating Google alerts the owner of the account of an alleged unsuccessful login attempt. It then offers to secure the account. Once clicked on the provided link, it redirects you to a page that may look like your Gmail login page, but in fact, it is a fake;
“OAuth Phishing” – is a Web standard used to allow authentication over third-party services without the need of sharing passwords. It is used by companies like Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. According to Amnesty report, this type of phishing allows “attackers use the same architecture but in order to create malicious third-party applications and attempt to lure the targets into granting the applications access to their accounts (such as emails)”;
Google phishing abusing legitimate third-party applications – using the method, attackers abuse the authentication procedure employed by legitimate and verified third-party applications;
This post is based on the research of Azerbaijan Internet Watch and Qurium Media Foundation. A full forensic report by Quriu is available here.
Since the release of this and Qurium’s forensic report, man474019 seem to have removed some of the information from https://forum.antichat.ru/
You can see the difference from how the user profile looks now and from Wayback machine capture (July 2019). The picture is gone too.
How profile looks now.How profile looked July 2019
Anar Mammadov is editor of criminal.az – website that was blocked by the authorities in Azerbaijan in 2018. Mammadov was sentenced to 5.5 years of imprisonment with a two-year probation period on charges of anti-state appeals, abuse of power and official forgery in March 2019. The official cause of the criminal prosecution was the publication of news about the assassination attempt on the former head of the city of Ganja Elmar Veliyev.
On January 6, Mammadov was pressed with a set of new allegations facing arrest. The accusation comes from a woman, named Malahat Gurbanova. Mammadov wrote about Gurbanova’s legal battle with former Minister of Social Services earlier on. Gurbanova now, alleges Mammadov’s language used to describe Gurbanova in his coverage was slanderous and insulting. Mammadov refutes these claims in his defense adding, if anything, it is he who feels insulted.
Criminal.az is an independent website covering predominantly crime-related stories. The website was blocked by the authorities in 2017, along with a number of other critical and independent news websites. It later began operating under the criminalaz.com domain, which was also blocked shortly after.
*Criminalaz.com, Fia.az, bastainfo.az and topxeber.az were blocked in Azerbaijan after the prosecutor’s office claimed these news websites misinformed their audiences and shared news of provocative nature that were untrue. [Turan News Agency]
**Since May 2017, over 20 websites have been blocked in Azerbaijan, among them: Azadliq Radio (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Azerbaijan Service) and its international service, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Azadliq Newspaper (independent of the Azadliq radio), Meydan TV, Turan TV and Azerbaijan Saadi (Azerbaijan Hour), OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Unit), abzas.net, obyektiv.tv, and others on the ground these outlets promoted violence, hatred, extremism, violated privacy or constituted slander.
***Websites blocked since then are blocked for slander and spreading misinformation. At some point, an editor of the blocked az24saat.org was asked to remove four articles that mentioned Ali Hasanov, now a former aide to President Ilham Aliyev. Monitortv.info, which was among the blocked websites, also received a note requesting the removal of articles mentioning Ali Hasanov on the grounds these stories contained slander and lies. [Open Democracy]
At the time of the verdict against the journalist Mammadov, several international journalism organizations, and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media criticized the court’s decision.
The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists called on the Azerbaijani authorities to drop charges against Mammadov and pointing to the unfounded prosecution.
“Informing the general public about important events is what journalists do, and the authorities should support this work, and not punish reporters,” said Gulnoza Said, CPJ Program Coordinator for Europe and Central Asia.
In June 2019, the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the conviction of Anar Mammadov.
Timeline
15 May 2019 – Mammadov summoned to the prosecutor’s office. This time the journalist was questioned over a story about the state oil company – SOCAR.
Meydan TV, an independent online news website covering Azerbaijan was also targeted. Although the website of Meydan.tv was blocked already in 2017, following the publication of stories about SOCAR, the website was heavily DDoSed.
9 July 2018 – Mammadov, questioned by the police. The journalist’s home was searched and his personal devices, including his laptop and phone, were seized by the police.
Mammadov was questioned after publishing reports on an attempt on the life of the mayor of Ganja, Elmar Valiyev, on 3 July.
24 July 2018 – Mammadov was summoned to the prosecutor’s office. The journalist was questioned about the publication of reports on the assassination attempt and was warned not to spread “investigative secrets”.
In a report on Broadband speed released by cable.co.uk Azerbaijan was ranked 141 out of 207 countries. The average speed in Azerbaijan remains around 3-4 Mbps.
Experts say this is a result of multiple factors, such as monopoly over internet providers, high costs and poor quality of internet connectivity across the country.
Worldwide broadband speed league 2019
cable.co.uk
In an interview with Azadliq Radio, Azerbaijan Service for Radio Free Europe, the head of Azerbaijan Internet Forum Osman Gunduz said the issue is a monopoly. “65% of the internet market in Azerbaijan is in the hands of the government providers. The price is regulated not by the market but by the government providers. And when private companies offer lower rates they get pressured in return”, explained Gunduz in an interview.
Media law expert Alasgar Mammadli believes the issue is not just monopoly but the lack of infrastructure and supply. The majority of internet service providers are based in the capital Baku. This has a significant impact on regional supply chains. But even in the capital, there is a lack of good internet speed and connection.
Despite numerous government plans and investments to improve overall ICT infrastructure in Azerbaijan, the country’s internet connection quality is only ahead of its neighboring post-Soviet countries – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
May 2020 bring us all across the world censorship-free internet and for everyone documenting, reporting, monitoring, advocating, and fighting for it, here is to a year full of progress and solidarity in standing together for the good cause.
And with just a few hours (depending on what part of the world you are in) left to mark the new year, here are a few highlights from Azerbaijan as documented by AIW in the last three months:
* The authorities in Azerbaijan continued to deploy information controls against its civil society;
* Countless social media activists were targeted for facebook posts;
* More than 50 independent, and opposition news websites remain blocked;
* Political activists remained under surveillance, as their phone conversations were leaked to pro-government media outlets;
* In one case, the television anchor who leaked the conversation later deleted the whole segment, as the leaked phone call took place between two international diplomats speaking with the political activist;
* One journalist’s conversation on facebook messenger was intercepted and leaked to a news outlet;
* While its size is unknown, the Azerbaijani troll army continued reporting to social media platforms alleged content abusing platforms’ copyright violation rules. in none of the cases that were examined, the reported content was an actual violation;
* An article that was published on OpenDemocracy examined closely how some of this content was taken down;
* Azerbaijan was ranked “not free” by freedom house in its annual freedom on net report for 2019;
“The already poor state of internet freedom in Azerbaijan continued to deteriorate during the coverage period. Access is inhibited by infrastructural challenges—illustrated by a major power outage in July 2018—and by state control over the information and communication technology (ICT) industry. The government manipulates the online information landscape, blocking websites that host unfavorable news coverage and using automated “bot” accounts to spread propaganda. Digital rights are not respected, and those who voice dissent online can expect prosecution if they reside in the country or various forms of intimidation if they live abroad.”
“Power in Azerbaijan’s authoritarian government remains heavily concentrated in the hands of Ilham Aliyev, who has served as president since 2003. Corruption is rampant, and after years of persecution, formal political opposition groups are weak. The regime has overseen an extensive crackdown on civil liberties in recent years, leaving little room for independent expression or activism.”
* In October, during one opposition rally, Azerbaijani citizens reported wide internet connectivity issues; most of the businesses in downtown Baku said the Internet was down throughout the day, which affected the local businesses;
* The national parliament picked up on the earlier discussions on introducing new measures to monitor the Internet in the country but now new developments have taken place since;
AIW will continue monitoring and documenting, internet censorship in Azerbaijan in 2020. Stay tuned and thank you for following!
On December 24, 2019, the administrative-economic court in Baku rejected the claim by arqument.az against Transportation, Communication and High Technologies ministry. Arqument.az took the ministry to court following its decision to block arqument.az inside the country.
The website’s editor Shamshad Agayev intends to appeal the decision.
Arqument.az was blocked on August 8, 2018, following a decision issued by Sabail District Court. A few days later, Baku Court of Appeal annulled district court’s decision.
But arqument.az was blocked once again in April 2019 after publishing coverage of protests in Jalilabad district. The website was also subject to cyber attacks after being blocked.
One of the goals of Azerbaijan Internet Watch is to provide accurate and up-to-date information about website blocks in Azerbaijan. Together with OONI (Open Observatory of Network Interference), AIW updated a list of websites for testing in Azerbaijan.
OONI also added the Azerbaijan button on its website that allows potential testers in Azerbaijan, run tests inside the country.
You can help us run more tests in the country. All it takes is an OONI Probe app downloaded on your phone. If you are in Azerbaijan and open this link in your browser on your phone, and already have the app installed, then the link will automatically launch your app. You can then choose the kind of tests you would like to run.
Help us measure the blocking of websites in Azerbaijan!
Azerbaijan Internet Watch layihəsi Azərbaycanda internet senzurasını izləyir və pozuntuları sənədləşdirən layihədir. Bu barədə burada məlumat əldə edə bilərsiniz.
Layihənin vacib cəhətlərindən biri ölkədə bloklanan veb səhifələri izləmək ve bu bloklamaların necə baş verdiyini araşdırmaqdır. Bu barədə burada və burada məlumat əldə edə bilərsiniz.
Gördüyünüz kimi, bu testleri aparmaq üçün OONİ ilə əməkdaşlıq edirəm.
OONİ dünyada internet senzurasının şəffaflığını artırmağı hədəfləyən layihədir.
Bunu necə edir?
*İnternet senzurasının müxtəlif formalarını aşkar etmək üçün OONI Probe Applər qurur. Bu barədə daha ətraflı burada
*Dünyanın hər yerindən toplanmış senzura ölçmələrini burada yayımlayır.
*Dünyada senzura hadisələrini sənədləşdirən tədqiqat hesabatları dərc edir.
Azərbaycan da bu ölkələr arasında yer alır. Aşağıda verilən addımlar əsasında araşdırmanın aparılmasında kömək edə bilərsiniz.
2. OONI Azerbaycan testini etmek ucun ayrıca “düymə” hazirlayib. Bu sehifenin https://ooni.org/get-involved/run/ en altında düyməni görəbilərsiniz. OONI Probe elavəsini telefona yüklədiktən sonra bu link avtomatik olaraq, əlavədə açılacaq.
3. Əlavəni yükləyib açanda qarşınıza 4 fərgli test görəcəksiniz. Bizə ən çox maraqlandıran ilk iki testlərdir. Hal hazırda Azərbaycanda 57 internet səhifəsi test olunur ama bunu genişləndirmək üçün əlavənin parametrələrine daxil olun (settings), test variantlari (test options) nişanını seçin, və veb səhifələri (websites) yazan nişanı seçin və “test müddətini məhdudlaşdır” (Limit test duration) funksiyasını deaktiv edin.
VACİB məqam 1 – test etməyə başlamadan WiFi-yə qoşulun əks halda mobil datanızdan xeyli gedəcək.
VACİB məqam 2 – bu testləri edəndə VPN-ə bağlı olmadığınızı yoxlamağı unudmayın.
4. Daha ətraflı testlər aparmaq üçün siz eyni zamanda OONİ PROBE Desktop‘dan istifadə edə bilərsiniz. Bu versiyaan istifadə edəndə parametrələrdə heç nəyi dəyiştirməyə ehtiyac yoxdur.
In its newly released report, Committee to Protect Journalists says the number of imprisoned journalists is a record high.
In total 250 journalists remain behind bars according to a newly updated database. 6 of these journalists are from Azerbaijan.
Other findings from CPJ’s annual census include:
Ninety-eight percent of journalists jailed worldwide are locals covering their own country. Three of the four journalists with foreign citizenship are imprisoned in Saudi Arabia, and the fourth in China.
Twenty of the jailed journalists, or 8%, are female, compared with 13% last year.
Politics was the beat most likely to land journalists in jail, followed by human rights and corruption.
More than half of those imprisoned were reporters publishing online.
![how websites are blocked in Azerbaijan [updated May 15]](https://www.az-netwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/StockSnap_GSMR4SXX37-600x400.jpg)
![mass phishing attack against Azerbaijan civil society [updated]](https://www.az-netwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/computer-security-or-safety-concept-laptop-PQ7RZZ5-533x400.jpg)
