in Azerbaijan SMS notification system grants permission to leave homes [updated]

As of April 5, residents across Azerbaijan can only leave their apartments having informed local law enforcement via SMS, a phone call or if in possession of a special certificate of employment.

Azerbaijan remains among countries, which haven’t declared a “state of emergency”. Instead, they are referring to new restrictions as part of the “strict quarantine regime”.

How SMS notification system works

Permission to go outside is granted for the following reasons:

  • receiving medical treatment;
  • buying medication or groceries;
  • visiting a bank or a post office;
  • attending a funeral of a close relative

Before leaving, SMS is sent out with a national ID number indicating the reason for going outside. The sender then gets an SMS in response with a code, which can then be used when stopped by the police officers.

There is no further information about the tracking mechanism, its transparency, and whether authorities have developed or relying on a special tracking application to monitor its citizens.

So far, the new restriction has proven to serve the financial interests of the authorities.

Hebib Muntezir, Azerbaijan journalist wrote,


Translation: Yesterday (April 6), a total of 456thousand SMS was sent from 223thousand phone numbers. Of these 284thousand SMS (approximately 62%) were of irrelevant nature. Some received responses immediately, others in half hour, and some in an hour. 6 nationals who have violated the quarantine regime were arrested, 3800 were fined. If we take AZN100 per person that makes AZN380,000 [of collected fines] in just one day. #stayhome

The new fines were introduced on April 3. The fines range from AZN100-200 (USD60-USD120) and include up to a one month administrative arrest.

To understand the potential surveillance implications of this new restriction, AIW spoke to legal expert Emin Abbasov.

“Based on what we know so far, the goal is reportedly to limit freedom of the movement via permission regime relaying users’ requests via mobile devices. However, without knowing whether an SMS can be used to start tracking a mobile device (current assessment indicates that the mechanism in place isn’t used in tracking mobile devices) the notifications are only used to limit freedom of the movement. It is not an application. It is more like an information resource or a system. But the collection of information here is done on compulsory basis, not voluntarily. As a result, this should fall under special legal regime. That is, the issue is very complicated and still unclear. What is clear, however is that when there are limitations on rights and freedoms these limitations fall within the scope of the law on rights and freedoms. What becomes important under these circumstances, is that the emergency decrees issued by the executive authorities that interfere with the rights and freedoms envisaged in the Constitution or International treaties, are required to have a constitutional basis. Another issue is that there are noclear assurances as to whether the information resource (currently in use by the law enforcement) will be destroyed when there is no further need for it. We are yet to see these assurances. And overall, all of the currently adopted decisions are seemingly taken outside of the constitution.

It is indisputable that restrictive measures aimed at combating COVID19 pandemic have a legitimate purpose such as protection of health. However, respect for the rule of law and democratic principles in times of emergency requires that states respect the principle of legality even in an emergency situation. Compliance with the rule of law and democratic principles determines that the restriction of rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution and international treaties may be limited either by laws (adopted by parliament) or by emergency decisions issued as a result of the extraordinary powers vested in the executive branch by the parliament. However, it is not clear that power of the Cabinet of Ministers in Azerbaijan to issue an emergency decrees that are restricting rights and freedoms are carried out in accordance with those principles.”

So far authorities have warned of further restrictive measures taken if the number of infected cases keeps growing and citizens do not follow through with imposed restrictions.
[Updated] On April 9, Azadliq Radio featured a story where political activist Izzatli Ruslan and investigative reporter Khadija Ismayilova said, requesting permission to leave via SMS, is against the national constitution, article 28 and that together with other representatives of civil society, they intend to take the matter to domestic courts. The right may only be limited in case of the state of emergency, which was not declared in Azerbaijan during the fight against C19.
Izzatli himself was fined in a total amount of 100AZN on the grounds of violating quarantine regimes when he did not provide the permission upon police request. Izzatli was headed to donate blood.
As of May 18, the compulsory requirement has been lifted as Azerbaijan joins the list of countries, slowly opening up.

social media users questioned over coronavirus posts [Last update June 26]

May 22, member of D18 political movement and administrator of a Facebook page “Say no to corruption”, Jalil Zabitov was arrested and sentenced to five months on hooliganism charges. 

April 22, member of opposition Popular Front party, Arif Babayev was sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention on charges of placing prohibited information online under Article 388.1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offenses.

April 13,  journalist Ibrahim Vazirov with an online video news channel Kanal24 was arrested after police demanded he removes his online posts about the social and economic impact of COVID-19. Vazirov was sentenced to 25 days in administrative detention allegedly for disobeying police.

Several other journalists were detained while reporting on C19. 

April 11, activist Nariman Abdulla sentenced to ten days in administrative detention on the grounds of violating the anti-epidemic, sanitary-hygienic and quarantine regime according to Azadliq Radio. Abdulla was taken by the police, from his house on April 10 in the city of Lankaran. His family members claim his detention is the result of his posts and comments on social media. Abdulla criticized the Minister of Labor and Social Protection over a lack of assistance for the poor families during the quarantine regime.

April 6, political activist Shakir Mammadov questioned over Facebook post then arrested on charges of hooliganism and sentenced to 15 days in administrative detention according to AzadliqRadio report.

Mammadov described his arrest as unlawful. Mammadov said he had informed local police he was going to the pharmacy after having texted a specified number. As soon as he left the apartment, he was apprehended by the local police in the city of Sumgayit and taken to the police station.

There he was asked to remove a Facebook post, where he wrote that during quarantine, people are unable to work, and therefore, have trouble providing for their families. Therefore the authorities should help. When he refused to remove the status, police charged him with hooliganism (according to police protocol Mammadov was stopped on the street for swearing. When the police approached him, they asked him why he was outside without a protective mask and gloves. When Mammadov disobeyed their questions, he was arrested).

April 4, journalist, Tezekhan Mirelemli was questioned over a Facebook post according to local media reports.


Translation: “Friends, today, I was called with an official letter to the Baku City Main Police Department. They wanted to speak with me about a Facebook status I shared after an incident that occurred near Hazi Aslanov metro stop. I gave my explanation and was let go. I would like to say, there was no violence used against me. Some friends, have shared news that I was beaten. I am telling you it is not true. As for the Facebook status – I deleted it. I knew it would be misinterpreted. I wanted to delete the status as soon as I shared it. I did not delete it in the evening because there was some troll activity. I would like to say I had no intention when sharing that Facebook status. I shared it because I wanted to prevent cases of abuse from happening again. I then deleted it because I did not want it to be misunderstood.”

The journalist’s post was about a police officer, according to Azadliq Radio reports but no further details are given.

Mirelemli was convicted on June 19, on hooliganism charges and sentenced to wear an electronic bracelet. The conviction also calls for the journalist’s confinement to his home, between 11pm and 7am every day for the next 12 months. 

***

March 25, police in Azerbaijan, closely monitor discussions on the popular social media platform, Facebook. Some users reportedly are invited for questioning.

The national parliament adopted changes to the law on Information, Informatisation, and Protection of Information, ten days ago, and already, several social media users have been questioned by the police over their posts.

Local authorities are relying on the new article “Violating sanitary hygiene, quarantine and pandemic regimes” when questioning social media users.

On March 21, AIW reported of Ilgar Atayev, who was called in for questioning and charged with article 388.1 of the code of administrative offenses – sharing of prohibited information on the Internet or internet – telecommunication networks. Authorities claim, Atayev, shared information on COVID without quoting official sources and that the information provided was false.

Since then, at least two more cases have been reported.

In another case, Anar Malikov, an opposition activist,  was sentenced to ten days of administrative detention for violating the pandemic regime on March 21. The court decision said Malikov violated the quarantine regime with his social media posts. No such legal liability is specified in Article 211 of the Code of Administrative Offenses.

legislative and regulatory framework concerning Freedom of Expression (FoE) in Azerbaijan

Below, are the excerpts from various reports that underline, legislative and regulatory framework concerning Freedom of Expression (FoE) in Azerbaijan in particular to internet freedom.

ANALYSIS OF AZERBAIJANI LEGISLATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION [Partnership for good governance]

Trends

  • […] there is an increasing criminal liability for defamation, in particular, following the introduction of heavy penalties for anonymous defamation;
  • broad categories of information are removed from the media and public discussions as confidential or classified;
  • broadly formulated prohibitions on calls to violent, and vaguely defined extremist activities, and general prohibition of religious literature;
  • the application of these provisions, as evidenced in the exemplary decisions of ECtHR, is nothing but arbitrary.

Internet regulation

Internet is considered a “mass media” according to Azerbaijani law and general regulations and rules therefore also applies to information available on the Internet.


According to the Council of Europe standards with regard to freedom of expression on the internet, “any measure taken by State authorities or private-sector actors to block, filter or remove Internet content or any request by State authorities to carry out such actions must comply with the requirements set by Article 10 of the Convention. They must, in particular, be prescribed by a law that is accessible, clear, unambiguous and sufficiently precise to enable individuals to regulate their conduct. They must at the same time be necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”


In Azerbaijan, from March 2017 amendments to laws “on telecommunication” and “on information, informatization, and protection of information” were adopted that provides for extensive powers of executive authorities and far-reaching regulation of the internet in Azerbaijan.

Most significant amendments are the new provisions in the law ‘on information’ that target the internet directly. This law provides for the regulation of “internet information resources” that are defined as “an information resource created on the internet, which is used in order to disseminate information, and which can be addressed by a domain name or other signification determined by its owner”.

Telecommunication operators are defined as:


“a legal entity or an individual engaged in entrepreneurial activity that provides telecommunications services on a legal basis through a telecommunications network owned by it”, and provider as “a legal entity or an individual engaged in entrepreneurial activity that provides telecommunications services using the network of a telecommunications operator”.


Telecommunication is defined as:


“remote transmission and reception of any signals, sounds and images using electrical or electromagnetic means of communication (cable, optical, radio communication, etc.)”, and


telecommunication network as “a set of various kinds of facilities and devices, united in a single technical and technological system for providing telecommunications”.

The state regulates following areas of telecommunications activities:

  • organization of the use of the numbering resource;
  • licensing of telecommunications;
  • certification in the field of telecommunications;
  • application of tariffs for telecommunications services and the use of radio frequencies;
  • securing a healthy competitive environment and antitrust measures in the telecommunications sector;
  • organization of the use of radio frequencies;
  • reciprocal interconnection between operators;
  • registration of telecommunication operators and providers;

New Article 13-1 of the law “on telecommunication” requires registration of internet operators and providers in Azerbaijan with the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies (MTCHT). Providers and operators must register within 15 days since the start of the provision of services and must inform MTCHT about any changes to the registered information within 10 days after the change takes place.

Rules for registration are to be established by the MTCHT, and operators and providers will have 2 months to apply for registration.

Providers and operators are not responsible for the content of messages transmitted over telecommunications networks unless otherwise provided for by law.

Law on information establishes personal responsibility for “owners” (defined as “persons that have ownership or usage rights to an internet information resource, freely determining usage of and rules for placement of information on such resource”) of internet information resources (hereinafter ‘IIR’) with regard to the content of such resources. If the owner of an IIR or a domain name is a legal entity, the website should provide “in a readable format and place its name, organizational-legal form, email address” and if the owner is an individual, then “first name, last name, father’s name, and email address”.

Owners of IIR or domain names must not allow distribution on the IIR of the following information:

  • propaganda and financing of terrorism, as well as methods and means of terrorism, information about training for the purpose of terrorism, as well as open calls for terrorism;
  • information on the propaganda of violence and religious extremism, open calls directed to the evocation of national, racial or religious enmity, violent change of the constitutional order, territorial disintegration, violent seizure or maintenance of power, organization of mass riots;
  • state secrets;
  • instructions or methods for producing firearms, their component parts, ammunition, and explosive substances;
  • information on preparation and usage of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and their precursors, about locations of their unlawful acquisition, as well as information on the location of and methods of cultivation of plants containing narcotic substances;
  • pornography, including information related to child pornography;
  • information on the organization of and incitement to gambling and other unlawful betting games;
  • information disseminated with a purpose to promote suicide as a method of solving problems justifies suicide, provides the basis for or incites to suicide, describes the methods of committing suicide, and organizes commission of suicide by several individuals or organized group;
  • defamatory and insulting information, as well as information breaching inviolability of private life;
  • information breaching intellectual property rights;
  • other information prohibited by the laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

If the owner of IIR or of its domain name discovers such information or receives an appeal that such information is provided on the IIR, she or he must ensure that such information is removed from the resource. Furthermore, if a hosting provider is in such a situation, it must take measures to ensure the removal of such information by the owner.


MTCHT can issue a written warning to the owner of IIR, owner of its domain name, and to the hosting provider. If the information is not removed within 8 hours after such a written warning, MTCHT can appeal to a court to restrict access to the IIR. If there is an “urgent situation of danger to the interests of the state and society protected by law or real threat to life and health of individuals”, access to the IIR can be restricted by a decision of MTCHT.


If MTCHT takes such a decision, it at the same time must apply to a court, and the access restriction remains in force until a court decision is made. A court must consider MTCHT appeal and make a decision within 5 days, while an appeal of such a decision does not postpone its execution.


The law provides for the establishment of a “List of Information Resources that contain information prohibited for distribution”. Information resources are placed on that list by MTCHT if there is a decision by MTCHT or a court about restricting access to an IIR. Rules concerning the contents of this list, its composition, supervision of its enforcement, and arranging for reciprocal contacts between host and internet providers are to be determined by the MTCHT.


MTCHT can add an IIR to this list based on an individual request if the IIR owner does not ensure the removal of prohibited information, and there is a court decision prohibiting the distribution of such information. Once an IIR is listed, the internet and host providers must immediately restrict access to it, and notify the owner of the IIR in this regard. The law provides that IIR owners, domain name owners, host providers, and internet providers may be held responsible for violations of these provisions.


Besides the Constitution, various laws, presidential decrees, decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers, as well as regulations of various central executive bodies regulate the issues relevant to various aspects of the freedom of expression.

Incitements to violence

Azerbaijani criminal code provides punishments for various types of ‘calls’ (çağırış) to violent actions. It is characteristic that the criminal code does not take into account the probability or imminence of the harmful outcome to which the “call” is made. Neither does it account for the context in which the ‘call’ is made in evaluating whether an utterance deserves criminal punishment. Usually, the punishment is higher when a ‘call’ is disseminated publicly through media. Thus article 101 of the Criminal Code establishes criminal responsibility for “public calls to unleash an aggressive war”, which when made through the mass media or by an official, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 2 to 5 years, with or without deprivation of the right to engage in certain activities for a period of up to 3 years.

There are three more provisions in the Criminal Code that deal with incitements to violence of various kinds. Most prominently, Article 214-2 provides for imprisonment of up to 5 years for “public calls or dissemination of materials with contents that make a public call” for a substantial category of actions, including (attacks on internationally protected persons and organizations; terrorism; terrorist training; hostage-taking; hijacking air or water transportation ships or railway trains; sea piracy; illegal handling of radioactive materials; plundering of extorting radioactive materials; attempts on the life of a statesman or a public figure; creation of armed groups or associations not provided for in law; sabotage).

Under Article 220.2 of the Criminal Code, calls for “active disobedience to legitimate demands of government officials and to riots, as well as calls for violence against citizens” are punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years. Another important provision on sedition is contained in Article 281 of the Criminal Code that criminalizes “open calls for the forcible seizure of power, violent holding of power or violent change of the constitutional order or violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as distribution of materials of this content” with imprisonment of up to 5 years, and imprisonment from 5 to 8 years if committed repeatedly or by a group of persons. If these actions are “committed on the instructions of foreign organizations or their representatives”, then imprisonment ranges from 7 to 12 years.

Defamation

The legislation of Azerbaijan provides for both civil action and criminal prosecution of defamation. Venice Commission in its 2012 opinion on defamation legislation in Azerbaijan noted that the criminalization of defamation on the internet in Azerbaijan “goes against the most recent trends in the field of defamation” and is “extremely worrying and disappointing”. Moreover, it noted that “the mere threat of punishment for defamation with the possibility of a criminal penalty such as imprisonment is sufficient to cause a “chill effect” suitable for restraining freedom of speech”.

According to Article 23 of the Civil Code (“Protection of honor, dignity and business reputation”), individuals can pursue legal action in courts for information “discrediting one’s honor, dignity or business reputation, violating the secret of one’s personal and family life, or personal and family inviolability”. Furthermore, the protection of honor and dignity of individuals is allowed even after the death of the individual. Legal entities can pursue action for information discrediting their business reputation.


If it is impossible to identify the person that disseminated the discrediting information, such information shall be deemed untrue. The law does not differentiate factual information from opinions.


As of March 2017, there are four articles in the Criminal Code that provide criminal liability for defamation.


Article 147 penalizes “slander” which is defined as “dissemination of deliberately false information discrediting the honor and dignity of another person or undermining his reputation which is done in a public speech, publicly displayed work, in mass media, or publicly disseminated in an internet information resource” and is punishable with a fine from 100 to 500 AZN, or by public works from 240 to 480 hours, or correctional labor for up to one year, or imprisonment for up to 6 months.

The second part of this article holds that when slander is “combined with the accusation of a person in committing a grave or especially grave crime” then it is punishable by correctional labor for up to 2 years, or by imprisonment for up to 3 years.


Article 148 establishes criminal liability for “insult“, which is defined as “a humiliation of the honor and dignity of another person, expressed in an indecent manner in a public speech, a publicly displayed work in mass media, or publicly disseminated in an internet information resource“. Insult is punishable by a fine from 300 to 1000 AZN, or by public works from 240 to 480 hours, or by correctional labor for up to 1 year, or by imprisonment for up to 6 months.

On 29 November 2016, new Article 148-1 was added to the Criminal Code that establishes criminal liability for defamation or insults on the internet done anonymously or by using “fake name”. The exact formulation of the crime is “slander or insult committed with using a fake user name, profile or account at an internet information resource” and it is punishable with a fine from 1000 to 5000 AZN, by 360 to 480 hours of public works, or correctional labor of up to 2 years, or imprisonment of up to 1 year.

The article clarifies in a note that “fake user name, profile or account” actually covers “names, profiles or accounts at internet information resources, that do not allow identification of user’s person, including user names, profiles or accounts hiding or providing false information relating to name, surname, patronymic, or providing information about another person obtained without her/his consent at social networks”. Thus, anonymous or satirical, and perhaps even genuine artistic pseudonyms and pen-names may fall under the scope of this provision.


Article 323 that criminalizes defamation of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan was extended to include defamation on the internet and especially done through “fake names” and anonymously. The current state of Article 323 holds that “smearing or humiliation of honor and dignity of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan in a public speech, publicly displayed work, in mass media, or publicly disseminated on an internet information resource” is punishable by a fine from 500 to 1000 AZN, or correctional labor of up to 2 years, or imprisonment of up to 2 years.

Moreover, when such smearing or humiliation is “committed publicly on an internet information resource by using a fake user name, profile or account” then they are punishable by a fine from 1000 AZN to 1500 AZN or imprisonment up to 3 years30. The punishment increases if such “smearing or humiliation” is “combined with the accusation of committing a grave or especially grave crime”, and becomes imprisonment ranging from 3 to 5 years. Note to Article 323 makes a disclaimer that it does not apply to “public statements containing criticism of the activities of the head of the Azerbaijani state – the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the policies carried out under his or her leadership”. Nevertheless, there is a significant scope for utterances that do not constitute “criticism”, but may include, for example, discussions of legality of President’s actions, corruption allegations, or simply opinionated statements that may be perceived as hostile and partial, that could lead to 5-year imprisonment.

Classified information

According to the law “on state secret”, list of information classified as state secrets is determined by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.


While there are some broad categories of information that cannot be classified as state secrets, there are equally extensive and broad categories of information subject to classification. The main issue is of course that the decisions to classify and declassify information are not amenable to judicial scrutiny, and therefore the relevance of classified information is ostensibly opaque.


At the same time, criminal code provides for serious penalties for the dissemination of state secrets and spying, that unfortunately have been applied to journalists in Azerbaijan. These include separate provisions for state treason (Article 274), disclosure of state secrets that do not amount to treason (Article 284) and unlawfully obtaining state secrets (284-1), and espionage committed by foreign citizens or individuals without citizenship (Article 276). Heaviest sentences are possible for treason, which can only be committed by a citizen of Azerbaijan and includes “crossing over to the enemy side, espionage, transfer of state secret to a foreign state, assistance to a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives in conducting hostile activities against the Republic of Azerbaijan to the detriment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, state security or defense capability of the Republic of Azerbaijan” and is punishable with imprisonment from 10 to 15 years or life imprisonment.

Private, confidential and secret information

Restrictions on information deemed as private are constantly increasing, and 2016 amendments to the Constitution reflect this trend and provide a basis for further extension of privacy at the expense of the freedom of expression. Article 32 of the Constitution (Right to Personal Inviolability) provides in section 3 that as a rule “no one can be subjected to surveillance, video, photographic and voice recording, and other similar actions without one’s knowledge and notwithstanding one’s objections”.

The prohibition of recording and taking photos of individuals without their consent is reflected in the law “on obtaining information”, which provides that “surveillance, video, photographic, and sound recording, and other similar actions by representatives of the mass media and other persons, performed against a person without his knowledge or contrary to his consent” outside of law enforcement activities are subject to liability in law.

Criminal Code provides in Article 156 (“Infringement of inviolability of private life”) that “illegal collection, dissemination of information about the private life of a person that constitutes his personal or family secret, as well as the sale or transfer to another person of documents, video and photo materials, sound recordings with such information” is a criminal offense, punishable by a fine (100-500 AZN), public works (240-480 hours), or correctional labor (up to 1 year); and if committed by an official using his official position, then by imprisonment for up to 2 years (with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to 3 years).

Moreover, “unlawful dissemination” in the mass media of recordings (video, voice or photographic) taken “in the course of proceedings concerning administrative offenses” without the consent of both the person subjected to administrative responsibility and the victim, is punishable with a fine from 1000 to 1500 AZN on officials.

New provisions in Article 32 of the Constitution, introduced by the 2016 amendments (paragraphs 6, 7, and 8) provide that “it is prohibited to access electronic or paper information resources to gain information about third persons, except in cases provided in law”. Moreover “information technology cannot be used to disclose information on private life, including the belief, religion, and ethnicity of individuals without their express consent” with the exception of anonymous and non-discriminatory statistical publications.

The very breadth of protected information, as well as heavy criminal sentences, may be problematic for journalistic freedom, considering that in the current circumstances mere discussion of ownership of any companies is effectively banned. This would seriously inhibit, and at times make it impossible, to discuss allegations of conflict of interest or corruption involving ownership or shareholding of any commercial legal entity.

amendments to the legislation raise alarm in Azerbaijan

March 18, members of Azerbaijan’s National Parliament approved proposed amendments to the law on Information, Informatisation and protection of Information during the first reading.

A special clause “information-telecommunication network”  and “information-telecommunication network users” were added to article 13.2. of the law. While there are is no definition of what the “information-telecommunication network [and its users]” clause actually means, some media experts and journalists suggested this referred to social media platforms and the users. In Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies already holds broad powers to block websites, without a court order. If these recent suggestions to the law are approved in the final reading, it would further deteriorate freedom of speech online as social media users, posting content the Ministry may deem as misinformation may be arrested and face charges. 

One parliament member, Ganira Pashayeva, even suggested setting up a special unit that would monitor social media platforms, and hold those spreading rumors accountable. 

On March 21, Ilgar Atayev was called in for questioning and charged with article 388.1 of the code of administrative offenses – sharing of prohibited information on the Internet or Internet – telecommunication networks. According to Meydan TV, an independent online news platform, although Atayev was informed that the charges were sent to court, he does not know what he is facing.

Authorities claim, Atayev, shared information on COVID without quoting official sources and that shared information was false.

The Law on Information, Informatisation, and Protection of Information

This law was first adopted in 1998. On March 10, 2017, a series of restrictive amendments were added to the law, converting the law from a technical regulation into content regulation:

  •  article 13.1.3. create conditions for the regulation of the domain names not with participation of the parties of the internet community, but by relevant Ministry, which contradicts international norms, including ICANN recommendations in this regard;
  • article 13.2.3, all legal and ethical issues previously existing in various laws have been listed as prohibited information and it has been stressed that their dissemination is prohibited;
  • article 13.2.4, when the owner of the Internet information resource and its domain name posts the information, dissemination of which is prohibited or receives an application about that piece of shared information, it guarantees the removal of such information from the information resource;
  • article 13.2.5, when a hosting provider reveals in its information systems some information, dissemination of which in internet information resources is prohibited or receives information about it, it should undertake immediate measures for its removal by the owner of the information resource;
  • article 13.3.3, in cases of existence of real threat for the lawful interests of the state and society or in urgent cases when there is a risk for life or health of people, the access to internet information resource is temporarily restricted directly by the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies [restriction is applied without a court order. Although an application is made to the court, the decision to close down the online information source remains in force until the court handles the case or the decision is annulled.]
  • article 13.3.6, describes the List of information resources that are “blocked” which is curated and maintained by the Ministry [to this day, no such resource exists however, AIW has a list of online resources that are regularly monitored relying on OONI for blocking]. Independent legal experts believe, this kind of authority is restrictive in nature. Especially as it forces all host and Internet providers are imposed an obligation to prevent access to these resources.

According to the law, the Ministry of Transport, Hich Technologies and Communication is the executive authority deciding on the type of information that is relevant, which websites get blocked and what information must be removed and so on.

coordinated digital attacks against Feminist movement members and LGBT rights activists

In Azerbaijan, a group of activists was targeted online following a non-violent march organized to mark International Women’s Day. The protest was violently dispersed by the police. Those detained were released after questioning. Last year, a similar attempt was quashed by the police. In October 2019, in an attempt to call on the authorities to take measures to combat drastic growth in the numbers of victims of domestic violence, the protesters were once again violently detained, sustaining physical injuries.

The digital attacks began already on March 8, when women’s rights activist and head of the Feminist Movement of Azerbaijan Gulnara Mehdiyeva and one of the main organizers of the march, realized, someone was trying to break into her Telegram account. Then her Gmail was hacked and much of her archive including photographs and documents were “downloaded” by the attacker. In less than 48 hours Mehdiyeva’s personal Facebook account was hacked. She was removed from several Facebook groups that focus on LGBTQI and women’s rights in Azerbaijan, where she was an “admin”. Then, these groups were compromised, suspended and one was deactivated. Both groups lost thousands of subscribers and content that were shared via the Facebook group page. Next in line was Mehdiyeva’s Protonmail.

Two of the Facebook groups targeted are Minority Magazine [Azerbaijan’s first digital magazine focusing on LGBT rights and issues] and Nefes LGBT Alliance Group.

The groups lost three years’ worth of content as a result of hacking.

Several other LGBTQI activists reported attempts to hack into their social media profiles and emails in correspondence with AIW. One of the activists Javid Nabiyev, shared via his Facebook profile his frustration with the platform itself. In an attempt to get Facebook to verify his account he was given the following response “We reviewed your account, and unfortunately, it is not eligible to be verified”.

This is not the first time, activists are targeted online in Azerbaijan. Sometimes more sophisticated technology is used as well. Facebook remains a popular online platform where journalists, independent and opposition news platforms, activists, dissidents, analysts, and observers share their opinions, publish research, and also organize. As a result, it is closely observed by the authorities. Or as one veteran analyst, Altay Goyushov said in an interview once, “Social networks are the only place where the government checks the public mood”. Not surprisingly, in February 2019, a Social Research Center was set up that “monitors public opinion” and delivers the results to the ruling government. AIW is too closely monitoring – the situation.

As for the LGBTQI community in Azerbaijan, its history is stained with systemic harassment, abuse, torture, arrests, and even death. Some of the community members have fled the country in an attempt to start a new life elsewhere.

several Facebook pages compromised

On March 2, several Facebook pages affiliated with an online news website anews.az were hacked. According to the editor of anews.az Naila Balayeva the hacking came shortly after anews.az published two different stories, on February 27 and then on March 5.  The editor was able to identify the identity of the hacker, who explicitly threatened to do worst things [to the journalist and her colleagues’] unless Balayeva complies with his demands, which were, to fire several of her colleagues. According to Balayeva the man attempted to take over the editor’s personal Facebook profile too however failed, given she had two-step-verification set up.

The man, since then, has removed [deleted] messages and comments he has left on the personal profile of Balayeva and in the correspondence with other staff members.

And although the pages were successfully returned to the original administrators, and the access to Balayeva’s Facebook profile has also restored the man behind the attack, remains active online.

editor’s sentence reduced

February 25, the sentence of Anar Mammadov, editor of an online news site criminal.az was reduced from 5 years and 6 months to 5 years and 3 months. The decision was made by the Supreme Court.

Speaking in court, the editor, said allegations against him are bogus. “If you think I have committed a crime, then issue an arrest warrant. If you think writing about what is happening is a crime, then I commit this crime every day”, said Mammadov in court during the hearing.

Speaking to Azadliq Radio, Azerbaijan Service for Radio Free Europe, Mammadov said, he will be appealing to the European Court of Human Rights.

the “man” behind the phishing attacks

On January 14, Azerbaijan Internet Watch reported a mass phishing attack that lasted for about a week. At the time of the report, it was possible to identify that the attacks were coming from an IP registered to the Ministry of the Interior. Almost a month later, the Qurium media foundation continues its investigation into the identity of the perpetrator.

The user @man474019 is active on hacking forums anti chat and rdot, as well as on nulled – forum used by cybercriminals to trade and purchase leaked or hacked information.

The last time our man was on antichat was February 17, 2020, likely deleting some of the remaining posts and information.

There are only four entries left on antichat that are visible – can you spot the difference between his current profile and what was there before?

Our man has also removed his avatar. In an earlier report, the man in the photo was identified as Alibay Mammadov. Unfortunately attempts to reach out to Mammadov for a comment failed.

Man must have noticed the reports. And although he may have been busy removing traces, they have already been well documented.

The search for the man and his likes continues.

graphic designer questioned over a Facebook post

February 18, graphic designer Rasul Hasan, taken for questioning over a Facebook post. Hasan’s Facebook post that resulted in his detention was a GIF image of riot police performing traditional Yalli dance outside the Central Election Commission building. During his questioning, Hasan was forced to remove the GIF.

Speaking to local media, Hasan’s father, explained, his son, was apprehended in broad daylight, on his way to work. Police approached Hasan, as he got out of the taxi, and demanded that he follows them to the police station.

“At the police, he was questioned about his opposition views and was asked about the family members. They forced him to remove the video. In addition, Rasul was threatened that if his detention was made public, then “more stringent measures” would be taken against him. This is a kidnapping and violation of all human rights,” said, Hasan’s father Elshan Hasanov in an interview with Turan News Agency.

AIW spoke to Rasul Hasan following his release. He confirmed the reason for questioning but said, he was doing fine.

Background

On February 9, Azerbaijan held a snap parliament election. The results were contested by opposition groups and other independent parliament candidates, who claimed based on the documented evidence the vote was rigged. Over the following days, defeated parliament candidates, political activists, and other civic activists gathered outside the Central Election Commission, demanding election to be canceled based on the collected evidence of voter fraud.

It was during one of these protest actions, that riot police were sent to cordon off the building. Forming a line, police stood holding hands. This is how the GIF was created.

online news platform editor’s sentence dropped

On February 11, a suspended sentence against Aziz Orucov, editor of an online news platform, was dropped by the Baku Court of Appeal.

Orucov was arrested during the criminal investigations against non-governmental organizations in Azerbaijan. He was arrested in 2017, but released in 2018 on a suspended sentence. The sentence was until February 2021.

Orucov took over the managing of the platform after his brother Anar Orucov fled the country in 2014 amid threats of persecution.

Background

Aziz Orucov was detained by the police and sentenced to 30days of administrative detention on charges of resisting police. When Orucov’s administrative detention sentence was to conclude he was sentenced to an additional four months in pretrial detention on new charges “illegal entrepreneurship” and “abuse of power”. These charges are commonly used in cases of political prisoners and have been widely used during the crackdown that began in 2013 against representatives of civil society in Azerbaijan. 

In 2014, Kanal 13 was subject to government launched investigation that was targeting all independent, international and opposition civil society organizations, including organizations as IREX and Kanal 13. At the time, the manager and founder of the channel Anar Orucov (brother of Aziz Orucov) was in charge of the office and the channel.

As part of the country-wide crackdown, Kanal 13 office was searched, documents confiscated. Fearing persecution, Anar Orucov fled the country with his family with the support of an international organization while Aziz Orucov stayed behind to continue managing the channel and the projects.

Kanal 13 has also been subject to online attacks. In March of 2017, a report released by Amnesty International, “False Friends- how fake accounts and crude malware targeted dissidents in Azerbaijan” detailed how Kanal 13 was among those targeted when its internal communications were accessed for over a week.

Two months later, the channel’s director Aziz Orucov was detained and later rearrested while the office of the channel was searched and equipment was confiscated.