Restrictive new bills sweep freedoms under the carpet [part 1]

This is part one in a series of detailed reports and analysis on existing legal amendments and new legislation affecting freedom of expression, media, and online rights in Azerbaijan and their compliance with international standards for freedom of expression.  

In March of last year, AIW shared an update about amendments to an existing bill on Information provisions, Informatization, and Protection of Information and Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Now, let’s take a closer look at these amendments and what they entail. 

Amendments to the Information Law

Amendments to an existing bill on Information provisions, Informatization, and Protection of Information extended the subjects – to users – of responsibilities for placement of prohibited information, including the “false information” on information-telecommunication networks.

This means that amendments establish the liability over the information-telecommunication network users to place prohibited content on the information-telecommunication networks; 

The amendments also added an item to the list of prohibited content, forbidding the  placement of false information: thus, prohibited information was considered “false information [yalan məlumatlar] in case it posed a threat to harm human life and health, cause significant property damage, mass violation of public safety, disrupt life support facilities, financial, transport, communications, industrial, energy and social infrastructure facilities or other socially dangerous consequences.”

In other words, if users placed content on the internet that might be considered false information capable to disrupt the functioning of state bodies or their activities it can be considered on the grounds of violating the existing law.

Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences

During the same plenary meeting on March 17, 2020, an amendment to article 388-1 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO) of Law No. 27-VIQD was also approved.

Article 388-1 of the CAO was aggravated with the penalty of up to one-month administrative detention with other sanctions against real or legal person owners of internet information resources and associated domain names as well as on users of information-telecommunication networks for the placement, or the violation of provisions of the Information Law aiming at preventing the placement, of prohibited information on such internet information resources.

With the amendments introduced to laws, users of the information-telecommunication network, owners of internet information resources, and domain names might be punished under Article 388-1 of the CAO. The penalty for the offense is a fine between 500 and 1000 manats (about US$294–$588) for real persons and 1000 to 1500 manats for officials, with an option of up to one month of administrative detention for both classes of persons depending on the circumstances and the identity of the offender.

Implementation of the Amendments (abuse of application)

Shortly after the amendments, police applied these provisions frequently against individuals, including political activists and journalists despite the call from the United Nations, Council of Europe, and OSCE expert bodies urging the authorities to address the disinformation in the first instance by relevant government institutions, providing reliable information and resorting to other restrictive measures, only where they met the standards of necessity and proportionality. This did not prevent authorities from targeting a number of activists and journalists in the following days.

On April 16, 2020, Human Rights Watch documented how Azerbaijani authorities abused quarantine restrictions allegedly to fight with disinformation while arresting opposition activists and silencing the government critics. HRW documented at least six activists and opposition journalists’ sentenced to detentions ranging from 10 to 30 days.

March 21, 2020, Ilgar Atayev was called in for questioning and charged with article 388.1 of the code of administrative offenses – sharing prohibited information on the Internet or Internet – telecommunication networks. According to Meydan TV, an independent online news platform, although Atayev informed that the charges against him were sent to court, he was not aware of the exact accusation. Authorities claimed at the time, Atayev, shared information on COVID without quoting official sources and that the shared information was false.

March 23, 2020, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ press service, three people were administratively arrested for allegedly spreading misinformation about the coronavirus infection.

March 27, 2020, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ press service, between March 26 and 27, 15 people were identified and summoned to the local police on the grounds of allegedly spreading misinformation about the coronavirus infection on social networks and WhatsApp instant messaging application. After the relevant investigations, police warned seven people, fined five, and sentenced three to administrative detention.

April 4, 2020, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ press service, during the control measures carried out between April 1-2, one person was administratively arrested, and five people were fined for allegedly spreading false information about the coronavirus infection on social networks, including WhatsApp instant messaging application.

April 6, 2020, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ press service, one person received a warning for allegedly spreading false information about the coronavirus infection on social networks, including WhatsApp instant messaging application.

Amid on-going arrests, detentions, and fines, on April 3, 2020, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement noting that press freedom must not be undermined by measures to counter disinformation about COVID-19.

Analysis of the law

Content regulation rules and policies which presumably touch on the freedom of speech must meet the strict criteria under international and regional human rights law. According to the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, a strict three-part test is required for any content-based restriction.

The Court notes that the first and most crucial requirement of Article 10 of the Convention is that any interference by a public authority with the exercise of the freedom of expression should be lawful.

The second paragraph of Article 10 stipulates that any restriction on expression must be “prescribed by law”. Furthermore, any restrictions need to be necessary for a democratic society [See Sunday Times v. UK (No. 2), Series A no. 217, 26.11.1991, para. 50; Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, No. 24246/94, 8.7.1999, para. 43.] and the state interference should correspond to a “pressing social need”.[See Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) (Application No. 26682/95), the judgment of 8 July 1999, Reports 1999; Sürek (No. 3) judgment of 8 July 1999.] The state response and the limitations provided by law should be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” [See Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, ECHR 1999-III.] Therefore, the necessity of the content-based restrictions must be convincingly established by the state [The Observer and The Guardian v. the United Kingdom, the judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 216, pp. 29-30, § 59.]

The Law on Information, Informatisation, and Protection of Information (Law № 460-IQ)

In 2017, the Law (1998) was updated with a series of restrictive amendments, converting the Law from a technical regulation into a content regulation.

Primary concerns of the Law concerning content regulation:

Owner of the Internet information resource, including owners of the domain name, host, and internet providers bear a strict administrative liability to remove the content manifestly prohibited under article 13-2.3 within 8 hours of notice;

In urgent cases, [when the legally protected interests of the state and society are threatened or there is a real threat to human life and health requires to do] the internet information resource may be temporarily restricted on the basis of a decision of the regulatory body – Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies [restriction is applied without a court order. Although an application is made to the court, the decision to close down the online information source remains in force until the court handles the case or the decision is annulled.]

In refusing to remove the content upon the government’s notice within the 9 hours, owners of internet information resources, owners of domain names, host, and internet providers will face a court sue with possible administrative sanctions.

Safeguards against removal and blocking procedures:

Article 13-3.1 of the law provides that the relevant executive authority (regulatory body) shall issue a warning to the owner of the Internet information resource and its domain name and the hosting provider in writing if it directly discovers cases of placement of prohibited information in the Internet information resource or identifies it based on substantiated information received from individuals, legal entities or government agencies;

Existing legislation and practice concerning content removal and blocking do not provide adequate safeguards against arbitrariness;

for instance, there is no requirement to inform the information resource owners, Internet and host providers or owners of other sites and their users before issuing the content removal warning, and failure to implement the warning leads to a penalty because the Code of Administrative Offenses provides for liability for both the posting of prohibited information and the failure to remove prohibited information posted on the Internet.

The Law on Information, Informatisation, and Protection of Information provide that warning about content removal is considered a mandatory requirement and that failure to obey is sanctioned under Article 388-1.1 of the CAO and possible court sue for block order.

Content removal and blocking procedures also lack transparency and fairness:

The law does not oblige the regulatory body to provide the information resource owners, internet and host providers, or other sites’ substantiated opinion reasoning for the content prohibited. In other words, the regulatory body and other state authorities can request to remove the content or block access to websites without any obligation to substantiate their demands.

Vague Terms and Quality Law Standards:

Sufficient clarity is the requirement of the quality law standard established by the ECHR case-law which requires that the law be both adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to foresee the consequences which a given action may entail, and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise [see Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000‑XI; and Ahmet Yıldırım, cited above, §§ 57 and 59].

In the list of prohibited information envisaged in the Law on Information, Informatisation, and Protection of Information, the definition of what entails prohibited content is described with vague expressions that are open to excessive interpretations. With these terms, the state authorities “enjoy” a broad discretion power to categorize any information as prohibited (Law № 460-IQ). 

For instance, article 13-2.3.2 of the Law (№ 460-IQ) classifies the information on the promotion of violence and religious extremism and calls for the separation of territorial integrity as prohibited content. The religious extremism and calls for the separation of territorial integrity are vague terms and lack sufficient clarity.

The Law on Combat with Religious Extremism (LCRE) adopted in December 2015, in article 1.0.1.1 defines religious extremism with vague and problematic expressions. The Law refers to acts as “humiliating national dignity,” “compromising religion,”  and “preparing, storing and disseminating religious extremist material” as amounting to religious extremism. Expressions such as “national dignity” or “humiliation of national dignity” are non-legal concepts that are not defined in the domestic laws and therefore subject to broad interpretation by the authorities applying them, opening the way to misinterpretation of the concept and its application in an arbitrary manner [Furthermore, article 1.0.1.6 of the LCRE refers to “forcing someone to practice any religion (religious belief), including performing religious ceremonies and rituals as well as to religious education” as another act of religious extremism, which is equally problematic and may collide with the idea of spreading ideas of religious beliefs and inviting others to join, as a part of exercising freedom of religion, subject to the interpretation of the two concepts by the authorities, in absence of any criteria or clear terms in place. As the ECtHR has ruled, freedom of religion and the freedom to change religion in particular cover activities aimed at persuading others to change religion.]

Procedural safeguards:

Another problematic provision is article 13-2.3.9 of the law, which classifies insult and slander as the prohibited content online. Generally, the legislation of Azerbaijan provides for both civil action and criminal prosecution of defamation. As to the criminal prosecution of defamation, as of March 2017, there are four articles in the Criminal Code that provide criminal liability for defamation. With the amendments to the Law on Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information and Code of Administrative Offences on 17 March 2020, defamation is now sanctioned under the code of administrative offenses.

In practice, police often apply this provision against people who allegedly insult police or other state officials. 

On June 27, 2020, police arrested and fined several individuals who criticized the singers who devoted a song to the police claiming, they allegedly insulted the singers on social networks, insulted their honor and dignity. Meydan TV’s investigation revealed that most of those punished were representatives of opposition parties such as the Popular Front, Musavat and public activists. They were punished under Article 388-1 (posting of information prohibited from dissemination on the Internet).

However, the application of this provision contradicts with the domestic legislation. In Azerbaijan, it is not up to the police to classify the information on the grounds of slander or insult and instead is defined exclusively by the respective domestic courts upon the complaints of the individuals.

According to well-established court practice, courts always decide to conduct an expert examination to assess whether information/opinion is insulting or slanderous, and then the judge relies on the result of the expert examination. Furthermore, the law does not exclude the possibility that the same statement may be subject to both civil and criminal proceedings for defamation. 

Furthermore, the law does not specify how the sanction might be imposed if alleged prohibited content is identified. It is not clear from the text whether the website user will bear the responsibility alone or together with the owner of the internet or host provider. It is seemingly left to the executive authority to decide. For instance, in the case of a media article that allegedly contains prohibited content, the government may block the website forever in parallel, imposing sanctions on the content owner (user of the information resource).

Proportionate and necessary:

As discussed above, if the restriction does not meet proportionality and necessity requirements, the content removal or blocking measures may lead to violation of freedom of expression guaranteed under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Law on Information, Informatisation, and Protection of Information fail to specify a definition of the categories of blocking orders, such as blocking of entire websites, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, ports, network protocols or types of use, like social networking, including a limit on the duration of the blocking order which is crucial parameters of the interference to assess whether applied methods are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society to limit the freedom of expression.

Conclusion

This ambiguous law gives extensive flexibility for the state to consider different, particularly critical views as false and government views as correct. The new amendments stipulate that the information shared on the Internet, which disrupts activities of the state institutions, is prohibited and punishable under the Code of Administrative Offences. While false information is also prohibited and punishable if such information threatens other socially dangerous consequences, which the law does not define. 

Such vague definitions and ambiguous expressions provide extensive discretion powers for the state authorities, allowing them to label critical views as false and prohibited. Given the abovementioned concerns, the Law on Information, Informatisation, and Protection of Information does not comply with international standards on freedom of expression. Its scope remains incredibly broad in terms of vague definitions, lack of safeguards, and procedural guarantees.

Journalist questioned over alleged extortion charges

December 14, freelance journalist Nurlan Gahramanli (Libre) reported being questioned at the Baku City Main Police Department over alleged extortion charges. But Gahramanli refutes the claims and believes, the reason for his persecution is his live coverage of Victory Day protests on December 10 that he did over Facebook

“A police officer named Fuad Babayev invited me to the bureau. He told me that I have allegedly blackmailed a man named Tabriz Ahliyarli via ‘Orange Media’ Instagram account in November [the account previously managed by Gahramanli, but which he no longer has access to according to Gahramanli himself]. I told him, I never heard of the name,” the journalist told Meydan TV. Gahramanli does not rule out that the allegation of blackmail and extortion is the work of the Organized Crime department that detained and questioned Gahramanli on October 30. During his detention, his phone was confiscated and the department had access to it. Gahramanli believes it is possible that the department employees established contact with Tabriz Ahliyarli using Gahramanli’s ‘Orange Media’ Instagram account to later blackmail Gahramanli and use it as proof that indeed he has made contact with the alleged victim.

“During the questioning by Fuad Babayev, I was threatened with a criminal case and imprisonment,” Gahramanli told Meydan TV. 

The journalist publicized his visit to the Organized Crime Unit via various online news platforms. The following day the Ministry of the Interior called him and told him his phone was under surveillance and that if I continue my journalist work, persecution will continue and that I will be arrested.”

Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Interior has refuted Gahramanli’s claim that he was beaten during his detention at the Organized Crime Unit. Instead, the ministry said in an official statement that Gahramanli received a warning from the relevant authorities, following a series of complaints by “many citizens” who have informed the Ministry of the Interior, Gahramanli made contacts and befriended Armenians on social platforms, liked and shared their public posts critical of Azerbaijan. “Nurlan Gahramanli was invited to the police following these appeals and after getting his statement, he was given a warning and released. Gahramanli’s claims that he is being prosecuted by the authorities are baseless,” said the statement.   

Azerbaijan September – November 2020 OONI Measurement Results

On September 27, the government in Azerbaijan introduced a series of restrictions on Internet access as a result of military operations in Nagorno Karabakh. Users in Azerbaijan were left with limited Internet access while access to a number of social media platforms, as well as communication apps, were restricted. 

Azerbaijan Internet Watch, and OONI collected data based on OONI measurements from Azerbaijan. Below is the report looking at data between September 2020 to November 2020. 

According to collected OONI data, Azerbaijan experienced the blocking of independent media websites as well as signs of potential circumvention tool site blocking. However, further OONI Prote testing is required to confirm these censorship events. Azerbaijan Internet Watch continues to monitor the situation. 

Starting on September 27, a number of social media services indicated signs of blocking in Azerbaijan. Among these were:

Whatsapp: between 27th September 2020 to 11th November 2020 , all OONI Probe WhatsApp tests showed signs of WhatsApp blocking. This is illustrated through OONI Probe WhatsApp measurements collected from multiple local networks in Azerbaijan. Previously according to the same measurements, no such instances were documented. The measurements indicated that attempted connections to WhatsApp’s registration service and web interface (web.whatsapp.com) failed. In some cases HTTP request to web.whatsapp.com succeeded while HTTPS request failed as illustrated below. 

This could be an indication of SNI based filtering of WhatsApp. We also observe that the tls_handshakes field presented failures, further suggesting that access to WhatsApp was blocked in Azerbaijan by means of SNI based filtering.

This pattern was seen across multiple ISPs in Azerbaijan between 27th September 2020 to 11th November 2020.

Telegram: Similarly to the testing of WhatsApp, OONI measurements presented signs of Telegram blocking in Azerbaijan between 27th September 2020 to 11th November 2020. But unlike WhatsApp, a few Telegram tests during this period were successful. This is illustrated through OONI Probe Telegram measurements collected from multiple local networks in Azerbaijan between 1st September 2020 to 27th November 2020. The following table illustrates OONI measurements collected from the testing of Telegram and WhatsApp on 5 different networks in Azerbaijan between September 2020 to November 2020.

We not only observed similarities between the date range of potential blocking (of WhatsApp and Telegram), but we also saw potentially similar censorship techniques, as the HTTP requests to Telegram Web (web.telegram.org) timed out as well. Similarly to WhatsApp, we observed a timeout in the TLS handshake, suggesting TLS level interference of Telegram as well. As a result, it is possible that internet users in Azerbaijan couldn’t use the Telegram and WhatsApp mobile apps (on the tested networks) during this time period (between 27th September 2020 to 11th November 2020), even though connections to the tested app endpoints succeeded.

Social media sites: apart from WhatsApp and Telegram, several social media websites presented signs of blocking as well, starting from early October 2020. These include:

It is however, important to note these sites’ limited testing coverage limits Azerbaijan Internet Watch and OONI’s confidence with respect to their blocking, and they have not been tested more recently especially after the conflict ended.

AIW and OONI continue monitoring the situation with blocking.

Azerbaijan not free in Freedom on the Net annual report

Azerbaijan ranked “not free” in this year’s Freedom House, Freedom on the Net report. Among key factors are the overall infrastructural challenges, a monopoly over ISPs, and distributed Internet traffic, state control over the information and communication technology, blocked access to most websites that host unfavorable news coverage, and new forms of restrictions introduced during COVID-19. 

According to the report, there is an overall decline in internet freedoms across the world:

Global internet freedom has declined for the 10th consecutive year: 26 countries’ scores worsened during this year’s coverage period, while 22 countries registered net gains. The largest declines occurred in Myanmar and Kyrgyzstan, followed by IndiaEcuador, and Nigeria. A record number of countries featured deliberate disruptions to internet service.

On the bright side, countries like Sudan and Ukraine experienced the largest improvements, followed by Zimbabwe find the report. And while Iceland was the top performer China was found to have the worst conditions for internet freedom. 

The report highlighted some new trends that have emerged globally: 

[…] this year Freedom on the Net observed intentional disruptions to connectivity in a record 22 out of 65 countries. Many of these disruptions, including Iran’s November 2019 countrywide blackout and shutdowns in Moscow in August and September 2019, were directly precipitated by protests. Such practices are an ultimate expression of contempt for freedoms of association and assembly, as well as for the right to access information.

Azerbaijan was ranked partly free last year. 

spotted: sandvine back at it, this time, in Azerbaijan

In August, when people in Belarus took the streets across the country in protest of election results where incumbent President Lukashenka secured yet another victory in a contested presidential election, authorities deliberately cut the internet. Quickly, experts concluded DPI technology may be in use. By the end of August, it was reported that this DPI technology was produced by the Canadian company Sandvine and supplied to Belarus as part of a $2.5million contract with the Russian technology supplies Jet Infosystems.

DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) is known as digital eavesdropping that allows information extraction. More broadly as explained here, DPI “is a method of monitoring and filtering internet traffic through inspecting the contents of each packet that is transmitted through an inspection point, allowing for filtering out malware and unwanted traffic, but also real-time monitoring of communications, as well as the implementation of targeted blockings and shutdowns.” 

Canadian company Sandvine is owned by American private equity firm Francisco Partners.

 

Sandvine technology has been detected in many countries across the world, including in Ethiopia, Iran, as well as Turkey, and Syria as previously reported. One other country where Sandvine technology was reportedly deployed is Azerbaijan

In Azerbaijan, the DPI deployments have been used since March 2017. This was reported in January 2019, when VirtualRoad, the secure hosting project of the Qurium – Media Foundation published a report documenting fresh attacks against Azerbaijan’s oldest opposition newspaper Azadliq’s website (azadliq.info). The report concluded: “After ten months trying to keep azadliq.info online inside Azerbaijan using our Bifrost service and bypassing multi-million dollar DPI deployments, this is one more sign of to what extent a government is committed to information control”.  

Another report released in April 2018 showed evidence of the government of Azerbaijan using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) since March 2017. The report also found out that this specialized security equipment was purchased at a price tag of 3 million USD from an Israeli security company Allot Communications.

Now, according to this story reported by Bloomberg, Sandvine worked with Delta Telecom – Azerbaijan’s main internet provider and owned by the government to install a system to block live stream videos from YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram. “The social media blackout came last week after deadly clashes with Armenia. As a result, people in Azerbaijan couldn’t reach websites including Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, LinkedIn, Twitter, Zoom, and Skype, according to internet monitoring organization Netblocks,” wrote Bloomberg. 

Azerbaijan Internet Watch has been monitoring the situation on the ground since September 27, the day when clashes began. Together with OONI, Azerbaijan Internet Watch reported that access to several social media applications and websites was blocked. 

Access to the Internet remains throttled in Azerbaijan as of writing this post. Many of the social media applications remain accessible only through a VPN provider. As a result, authorities have resorted to other means in order to prevent users from using VPN services. From banks to ISPs encouraging users not to use VPN services, this account on Facebook made a list of VPNs alleging they were of Armenian origin in order to discourage users.

country-wide internet disruptions reported in Azerbaijan [updated]

[UPDATE] On November 12, access to the Internet was finally restored across the country in Azerbaijan. This was shared in an announcement shared by the Ministry of Communication, Transportation and High Technologies on November 11. In a statement, the Ministry said:

The temporary restriction on Internet access imposed in our country in order to prevent large-scale provocations and cyber incidents committed by the Republic of Armenia will be lifted on November 12, 2020, with the exception of the territories liberated from occupation and former frontier zones.

The Ministry expresses gratitude to millions of Azerbaijani Internet users for their understanding in connection with the restriction on Internet access over the past period.

It should be noted that the Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies imposed restrictions on the provision of Internet in the country on September 27, 2020.

ABC.az, a local online news platform, reported that restrictions remained in territories liberated from occupation and territories that previously belonged to the frontline zone.

November 11, the Cabinet of Ministers said it had no information about the lifting of restrictions on Internet access in the country while addressing Turan News Agency. Meanwhile, the head of an opposition Popular Front party Ali Karimli called for an immediate end to restrictions imposed on Internet access and to social media platforms. Unlike Karimli, the head of Azerbaijan Internet Forum, Osman Gunduz, sees gradual transition as an alternative. “Although the military operations are over, keeping restrictions imposed on social media platforms is needed.” Gunduz suggested keeping restrictions on WhatsApp and YouTube as these were two of the most popular platforms where false information about the fighting made rounds. In contrast, the head of the Internet Forum, it would be suitable to lift the ban on Twitter because this platform is widely used to disseminate information about the war to an international audience. Gunduz said similar restrictions are common practice across countries including in Europe and the UK where governments restricted internet access during mass protests. “In the UK, during acts of terrorism, the government restricted access to social media platforms.” Azerbaijan Internet Watch, could not verify this statement. Unlike Azerbaijan, the UK is ranked “free” in Freedom on the Net ranking by Freedom House. Similarly, most of the European countries, are categorized under “little or no censorship, and surveillance” countries.   

As of November 7, access to the Internet remained limited with users of state operators Baktelecom and Aztelekom remaining largely disconnected or with slower than usual internet speed. The rest of the providers worked in a limited capacity while access to social media platforms remained blocked. 

October 21, President Ilham Aliyev in an interview with the Japanese Nikkei newspaper said restrictions on Internet access and on the use of social media platforms in Azerbaijan are only temporary. “Once active fighting is over we will restore all access.”  

October 20, State Security Service encouraged Azerbaijani citizens to refrain from using VPN providers when trying to access social media platforms that have been inaccessible as a result of the restrictions imposed by the government. It warned that some of the VPN providers such as SkyVPN is not trusted and can steal persona information. To its credit, the SSS is correct about the poor quality of this specific VPN service.

October 13, on the 16th day of escalated tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Internet access remains throttled in Azerbaijan. The Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies claims throttling is in line with government orders given the active state of military operations. But not to everyone. Independent media and journalists complain they have had issues posting news since the start of the recent conflict on September 27 on their websites and social media accounts. In addition to slowing down the Internet, on October 8, a story reported by Bloomberg identified the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology in Azerbaijan to effectively block access to many of the social media platforms in the country as well. However, this is not the case for government news outlets and government institutions. The latter’s access to uninterrupted and undisrupted Internet highlights the inequality of access to information both by those who produce independent news as well as the audience of these platforms. Experts say that blocking specific content may align with the existing legal framework, however, throttling access to the Internet altogether is a violation of user rights.

October 10, while the spokesperson for the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies, Gunel Gozalova said in a statement to Report.az, that the ministry remains uncertain about the duration of the government imposed internet limitations, independent economy expert Togrul Mashalli, has raised the issue of the economic costs, the recent internet disruptions are posting. Writing through his personal Telegram channel, Mashalli wrote, “it is not just the social media platforms that are limited, but other services too. And this is happening across the whole country. According to the Netblocks Cost of Shutdown Tool, Azerbaijan’s economy is suffering from a total of 44.8millionUSD loss per day. So over the 13 days, this adds up to a 582,4million USD. Since the Internet has not fully been turned off, the total losses are probably around 200-250million USD (we should take into account that social media platforms are often an important part of local internet economy).”

October 9, Gunel Gozalova, spokesperson for the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies, said, the government has not shut down the internet. “We have only restricted the Internet. So no one can say, there is no internet at all […] The restrictions introduced are simply to prevent unwanted, unverified, war-related content on social networks. We have taken these measures to protect Azerbaijan’s positions in cyberspace.” The spokesperson said, she does not have any information about how long these restrictions will last. Other experts as the head of Azerbaijan Internet Forum, Osman Gunduz said, the restrictions should be taken with an understanding: “it is possible that we don’t have access to certain information and we can’t analyze what is happening as a result. We think if social media platforms and the internet remained completely open to access it would have been better. But this is not the case. It is normal that given the military situation this step was taken. This is legal. However, I am for having additional measures in place especially for those wanting to fight anti-Azerbaijan propaganda online. It is necessary to set up centers and create a suitable environment for media, experts, and others who have experience working in an international environment.”

October 8, ABC.az local online news platform released a list of VPN providers claiming they were allegedly Armenian providers. The list includes the following VPN services: Express VPN, Nord VPN, VPN 360, CyberGhost VPN, HMA Vpn, Surfshark VPN. While finding the right VPN provider is often challenging, and some of the listed companies do have murky ownership presenting these services as Armenian owned is inaccurate and misleading. Instead, ABC.az could have offered this source for comparisons of numerous VPN services.  

October 3, a number of mobile operators came forward refuting claims of limiting access to users relying on VPN services from their devices.  Nar mobile said they have not introduced any additional limitations to their users relying on VPN services, adding that within the recently introduced internet restrictions and for the sake of protecting their users’ information, users of the mobile operator may face restrictions while accessing “Nar+” application and “nar.az” website. “Information on your mobile devices, as well as passwords used for other applications can be stolen by third parties when using VPN applications. We call on our subscribers to protect their security and advice against the use of VPN applications,” said the mobile operator in an interview with MediaPost. 

Another mobile operator Bakcell, said, no extra restrictions were applied by the operator. The company did however encourage its clients to resort to the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies on rules and recommendations about the use VPN services. “Given the current environment, citizens should accept the circumstances with an understanding and follow cyber security rules. It is also important, to pay attention to the origins and trustworthiness of the applications in use.”

Azercell Telekom said it bears no responsibility over its users devices, as well as their security and that it only provides its clients with internet connection within the scope of its telecom services, which include access to social media platforms and websites. 

October 1, Government in Azerbaijan continues to pose limitations to Internet access as tensions continue on the front line. Joining them are internet providers and telecom companies. According to Azerbaijan Press Agency (APA), Azerfon mobile company (with alleged ties to the ruling family) told its users, that its website and the mobile application won’t be accessible for users, using VPN. At the time of writing this update, the website was inaccessible from abroad, without a VPN.  

September 30, according to the most recent reports Internet access remains throttled in Azerbaijan. Users report: 

  • Bakinternet (ISP)- not working
  • Access to social media platforms not possible without a VPN;
  • Whatsapp app and its web extension are not working (without a VPN); 
  • WiFi connections are down for some; 
  • Internet speed is slow; 
  • Gmail is accessible without a VPN; 
  • Some banks [ex. Rabitabank] has informed its customers their mobile app won’t be accessible if users have VPN active; 
  • Bakcell [mobile operator] and Kapitalbank mobile apps are not accessible when VPN is used;

On its website, Bakinternet (an ISP for Bak Telecom) shared a similar statement seen earlier on the website of the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies: “In order to prevent provocations from Armenia, access to the Internet has been limited.” 

Translation: 

Employees are asked to delete VPN apps at the workplaces;
They are told using VPN is dangerous;
AzerTac (state news agency) published articles and aired TV shows discussing the dangers of VPN;

According to the VPN service Surfshark website, the sale of VPN in Azerbaijan witnessed a sharp increase as the country moved to block social media platforms starting September 27. “An increased number of Azerbaijanis are turning to Surfshark VPN, leading to an ongoing spike in sales. As a VPN service, Surfshark allows users to overcome government blockades. It doesn’t matter if the new restrictions are imposed via a relatively simple DNS-level block or a sophisticated deep packet inspection, a VPN can open access to blocked media.”

As users in Azerbaijan began increasingly reliant on VPN providers rumors of imposed fines against those who are accessing the blocked content began circulating online. However, the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies said, this was not true and that the government body, cannot impose fines. There is also no such legislation in Azerbaijan on the use of VPNs. Instead, the ministry representative encouraged Azerbaijani users, to rely on government media, and stop looking for news on social networks.  


September 29, as clashes on the front line continued on the third day, Internet access in Azerbaijan remained spotty. Users continued reporting difficulties accessing social media platforms. Access to government websites remained spotty. The Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies did not share any further updates on how much longer the situation will last. 


September 28, according to the most recent reports from Azerbaijan, users continued to face difficulties accessing social media platforms unless using VPN services. 

Government websites that were mostly inaccessible yesterday were restored.

The Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies (MCHT) has not made any further statements about the duration of currently imposed throttling. 

Instead, MCHT did issue a warning to users of VPN services in the country with the caveat they were unsafe, collecting private user information, and also capable of infecting devices with malware. The Ministry failed to mention the amount of surveillance technology used by other government institutions against citizens in Azerbaijan. 

***

Based on OONI Measurement results it was possible to confirm that the following applications were blocked in Azerbaijan:

According to measurements, the Facebook messenger app was reachable

Similarly, according to measurements access to the Telegram app was available on some networks. 


As tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated on the front line on September 27, Internet users in Azerbaijan began reporting issues accessing the Internet, social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and others), and communication apps (WhatsApp, Telegram).

Translation: Looks like they are only limiting access to social media platforms. There are no problems when accessing the Internet [sites]. It is possible to access other websites. 

Issues accessing the internet began already a day before.

Azərbaycandakı internet istifadəçiləri ölkədəki internetin surətindən şikayət edirlər. Bir çoxu xeyli yavaşladığını, foto və videoların açılmadığını deyirlər. Sizdə vəziyyət necədir?

Posted by Hebib Müntezir on Saturday, September 26, 2020

Translation: In Azerbaijan, internet users are complaining about internet speed. Many are saying its slowed down, having difficulties loading videos and images. What is the situation on your end?

Throughout the day, users continued reporting issues with access, speed and lack of information on how much longer the limits on access will continue.

At around 10 AM local time, the Ministry of Transportation, Communication, and High Technologies issued a statement in which it claimed the Ministry was behind internet disruptions.

Ministry of Transportation, Communication and High Technologies Screenshot

At some point, all websites with gov.az extension were down.

All .gov.az also websites are down including https://t.co/DbfCTYL84y and https://t.co/WJUKYKdrQR https://t.co/N20cYTu7c4

— Cavid ⛧ (@cavidaga) September 27, 2020

According to a global #KeepItOn campaign, “Public safety, national security, or stopping fake news are commonly used to justify shutdowns.” Looking at data collected as a result of the campaign there is a significant annual growth in the number of shutdowns reported across the world. Last year alone, 1706 days of internet access were disrupted by 213 internet shutdowns across 33 countries according to #KeepItOn campaign. 

Internet disruptions of various forms and scale in Azerbaijan are not new. Since April, a leader of an opposition party has had his internet cut off. Sometimes they are reportedly caused as a result of technical incidents. In other cases, access to internet is intentionally slowed down especially around political events. 

While some users online commented on internet disruptions as necessary measure to prevent spread of unconfirmed information, others argued the decision to simply throttle the connection was an easy solution especially when there is no way, the authorities can control social media platforms. 

Azerbaijan Internet Watch continues to monitor developments on the ground.

parliament in Azerbaijan is discussing law on hate speech

Parliament in Azerbaijan is set to discuss a draft law on hate speech. While independent critics say there is no need for a separate law, given the existing legal framework that does offer context on hate speech, there is suspicion it is another law with an intention to harm independent voices. 

On September 17, Zahid Oruc, member of the parliament and the head of the Human Rights Committee at the National Parliament, suggested parliament adopts a new law on hate speech. Oruc said the main goal of the law would be to prevent hate speech in information space. While promising, the draft law will be released for public discussion before it goes to the parliament during the fall session, the MP also added the draft law, may consider including social media platforms as part of the information space.

Azerbaijan Internet Watch talked to Elesger Memmedli, a media law expert in Azerbaijan about the draft law. Memmedli thinks there is no need for a separate law on hate speech because Azerbaijan already has plenty of laws that can be amended to regulate hate speech. “What is worrying is the intention. At the moment, the draft law is aimed at political speeches and other instances. But the likelihood of this law to be used as a limiting norm is high.”

The tradition of using existing legal framework or laws against opposition or independent voices goes back to the case of the then opposition journalist Eynulla Fatullayev, explained to Azerbaijan Internet Watch, lawyer Khaled Aghaly. At the time of the sentence [in 20o7] Fatullayev was accused of terrorism, defamation, and incitement to racial hatred. Like Memmedli, Agahly agrees there is no need for a new law when Azerbaijan has Article 283 of the Criminal Code – on Excitation of national, racial, social, or religious hate and hostility.

During the height of the pandemic in Azerbaijan, the parliament introduced a series of amendments to existing laws that were then used to prosecute activists explains Elesger Memmedli. “Shortly after [the amendments] scores of activists were rounded up, including members of [opposition] Popular Front. Some were taken straight from their homes and sentenced to lengthy administrative detention,” recalls Memmedli [some of these arrests were captured here]. 

In 2017, when changes were made to the law on religious terrorism, two prominent members of the Popular Front were arrested relying on the existing legislation, even though it was clear, it was a setup, as neither of the activists had any religious affiliation or background explains Memmedli. 

  • In July, a court convicted Faig Amirli, an APFP member and financial director of the now-closed pro-opposition Azadlig newspaper, on bogus charges of inciting religious hatred and tax-evasion. He received a suspended sentence.
  • In January 2017, a Baku court convicted senior APFP member Fuad Gahramanli to 10 years’ imprisonment for inciting religious and ethnic hatred; he posted criticisms of the government on Facebook.

 

So while hate speech may be a legitimate concern the existing examples tell a different story says Memmedli. 

Meanwhile, Zahid Oruc, vowed the drat law, would not limit the freedom of speech. 

facebook page affiliated with opposition hacked, again

On September 10, the Facebook page that belongs to an online news website bastainfo.com was hacked. Bastainfo.com is affiliated with the opposition party Musavat and is known for often running into problems with the authorities. Its editor was handed a five year suspended sentence in February 2019. The website bastainfo.com remains blocked for access in Azerbaijan. 

In January 2020, Azerbaijan Internet Watch reported how several Musavat party social media accounts were targeted. According to preliminary reports five Facebook pages, one Facebook group, and one website were targeted. 

Bastainfo.com page was targeted then as well. The page lost followers. During last week’s attack, bastainfo.com page lost some 5k followers, and content that was shared since 2017. 

Hacking and compromising Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube accounts (because these are popular platforms used by journalists and activists) is common in Azerbaijan and isn’t new. The online harassment of prominent accounts began several years ago at first, mostly on the level of government-sponsored trolls. Over the years, as the ruling government developed an interest in spyware technology, the types of attacks became more sophisticated while state-sponsored trolling and reliance on automated bots even though still used, became secondary. In each of these cases, finding the perpetrators have not been possible. And in cases when it was clear the attacker was an automated bot/state-sponsored troll the platform took no action. We finally know why. A former Facebook employee, Sophie Zhang, wrote a memo after getting fired from her job at the company revealing how the company dealt with fake accounts and bots. Among the countries, she has worked on and analyzed was Azerbaijan. “Ms. Zhang discovered that the ruling political party in Azerbaijan was also using false accounts to harass opposition figures. She flagged the activity over a year ago, she said, but Facebook’s investigation remains open and officials have not yet taken action over the accounts.” 

government in Azerbaijan threatens activists with interpol, again [update September 14]

On September 8, seven Azerbaijani dissidents who now live in various cities across Europe were targeted by the government of Azerbaijan. In addition to being formally charged with a crime in their absence and arrest warrants issued, the authorities have vowed to ask Interpol for their extradition.

The story goes back to last year when an Azerbaijani blogger, Elvin Isayev was extradited to Azerbaijan from Ukraine. Isayev lived in Russia since 1998 and was known for his critical views of the government. He acquired Russian citizenship in 2001. 19 years later, a court in St. Petersburg ruled to strip him of Russian citizenship and expel him. The following month Isayev moved to Ukraine, after an interim measure of the European Court of Human Rights called “Rule 39” suspended his deportation. Three months later he went missing only to appear in Azerbaijan where the Azerbaijan State Migration Service claimed Isayev was deported, a statement that was later refuted by Ukraine’s State Migration Service which said it never ordered Isayev’s deportation.

Few days after his “arrival” in Azerbaijan, Isayev was charged with calling for mass riots and public incitement against the ruling government. Now, the Prosecutor General office is seeking the deportation of seven men accusing them of the same crimes.

Ordukhan Babirov, Gurban Mammadov, Orkhan Agayev, Rafel Piriyev, Ali Hasanaliyev, Tural Sadigli, and Suleyman Suleymanli have been now charged in their absence. Many of these men are known for their online media activism, managing popular opposition YouTube channels, and for organizing street protests across European capitals in support of political prisoners in Azerbaijan, highlighting human rights violations and other advocacy engagements. One of the targeted men, popular activist, Ordukhan Babirov (known as Ordukhan Temirkhan Babirov) wrote in a Facebook post “[…] how many more times are they are going to give my name to Interpol”.

In an interview with OC-Media Tural Sadigli, activist and editor of Azad Soz [Free Speech] online news platform, said he faced a criminal case in 2019. “I was slighly surprised. They can’t reach us, they cannot stop our activities, so they use such forms of pressure,” Sadigli told OC Media.  

This is not the first time, the government in Azerbaijan is resorting to Interpol. But according to Interpol, “[it] cannot compel the law enforcement authorities in any country to arrest someone who is the subject of a Red Notice. Each member country decides what legal value it gives to a Red Notice and the authority of their law enforcement officers to make arrests.

The persecution against activists at home and abroad is on-going. For years, the ruling Baku tried silencing dissident voices both inside the country through threats, intimidation, and arrests and abroad through public shaming campaigns, and targeting of remaining family members. 

A week ago, a court in Baku sentenced veteran dissident Tofig Yagublu to four years and three months in jail on bogus charges. A campaign calling for his freedom #FreeTofigYagublu and #TofiqYaqubluyaAzadliq was launched and many of the targeted activists mentioned in this story have been rallying behind the campaign. Similarly, a youth activist who is among the organizers of the September 9 rally in support of Yagublu, was also targeted online and blackmailed.