OONI measurement data confirms Azerbaijan blocked access to TikTok during September border clashes

Earlier this week, on 12th September 2022, fighting erupted between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops along their border. Over the next few days, community members in Azerbaijan reported that the TikTok app was blocked locally.

We analyzed OONI network measurement data to investigate the block. We found that TikTok has been blocked in both Azerbaijan and Armenia over the last few days.

In this report, we share our technical findings. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, we found TLS and DNS level interference of TikTok domains and endpoints during the border clashes.

Background

On 12th September 2022, fighting erupted along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops. The next day, Russia brokered a ceasefire, but it was immediately breached. Another ceasefire was announced in the evening of 14th September 2022 by the secretary of Armenia’s Security Council. Within 2 days of clashes, more than 100 Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers were killed.

This is the latest fighting amid on-going clashes since the 44-day war Armenia and Azerbaijan fought in 2020.

In 1994, the Armenian military secured victory over Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven adjacent regions in the aftermath of the first Karabakh war. Since then, Nagorno-Karabakh has been under the control of its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state. The two sides often blamed each other for violating the 1994 ceasefire agreement over the years with continued fighting. These clashes culminated in September 2020 during the second Karabakh war, with Azerbaijan regaining control over the previously occupied seven regions, as well as one-third of Karabakh itself. A ceasefire agreement signed on 10th November 2020 ended the hostilities temporarily. Despite both sides pledging to make progress towards a final peace deal and a series of high level meetings taking place since the second war, no significant progress on achieving a final peace treaty has been made.  

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, access to several social media platforms was blocked in Azerbaijan. At the time (between September 2020 to November 2020), OONI data collected from Azerbaijan showed that several social media websites (such as facebook.com and twitter.com) presented signs of blocking, while the testing of WhatsApp and Telegram presented signs of TLS level interference.

During the latest clashes over the last days, OONI data shows that these social media platforms appear to be accessible in Azerbaijan, but TikTok started to present signs of blocking. On 14th September 2022, Azerbaijan’s state security services announced the temporary suspension of social media platform TikTok. According to the statement, the content circulating on the social media platform was revealing military secrets and forming wrong opinions in society. As a result, the State Security Service decided to temporarily block access to the platform. Similarly, OONI data shows that the testing of TikTok also started to present signs of blocking in Armenia from 13th September 2022 onwards.

Methods

Since 2012, OONI has developed free and open source software (called OONI Probe) which is designed to measure various forms of internet censorship, including the blocking of websites and apps. Every month, OONI Probe is regularly run by volunteers in around 170 countries, and network measurements collected by OONI Probe users are automatically published as open data in real-time.

This study involves the analysis of OONI measurements pertaining to the testing of TikTok, collected from local networks in Azerbaijan and Armenia over the last days. In particular, we analyzed OONI Web Connectivity measurements pertaining to the testing of the TikTok homepage (https://www.tiktok.com), as well as several other web resources that are needed for the TikTok web app and mobile app to function (hereafter referred to as “TikTok endpoints”). We thank a community member who kindly shared with us a list of TikTok endpoints, which were subsequently added (to the lists of URLs measured by OONI Probe users in Azerbaijan and Armenia) for testing. OONI’s URL prioritization system ensures that once URLs are merged into the Citizen Lab test lists, they are immediately prioritized for OONI Probe testing. As a result, measurements from the testing of TikTok endpoints were collected almost immediately from both Armenia and Azerbaijan (supporting this study).

OONI’s Web Connectivity experiment is designed to measure the accessibility of URLs by performing the following steps:

  • Resolver identification
  • DNS lookup
  • TCP connect to the resolved IP address
  • TLS handshake to the resolved IP addresses
  • HTTP(s) GET request

The above steps are automatically performed from both the local network of the user, and from a control vantage point. If the results from both networks are the same, the tested URL is annotated as accessible. If the results differ, the tested URL is annotated as anomalous, and the type of anomaly is further characterized depending on the reason that caused the failure (for example, if the TCP connection fails, the measurement is annotated as a TCP/IP anomaly).

Each Web Connectivity measurement provides further network information (such as information pertaining to TLS handshakes) that helps with evaluating whether an anomalous measurement presents signs of blocking (or is a false positive). Based on our heuristics, we are able to automatically confirm the blocking of websites if a block page is served, or if DNS resolution returns an IP known to be associated with censorship (and such fingerprints have been added to our database).

In the cases of Azerbaijan and Armenia, we have never come across block pages, limiting our ability to automatically confirm cases of blocking with confidence. Instead, ISPs in both Azerbaijan and Armenia appear to adopt different censorship techniques (as discussed, for example, in our previous research examining blocks in Azerbaijan), requiring more manual analysis of measurements for the confirmation of blocks. This study focused in the case of Azerbaijan, we analyzed network measurement data provided under the network_events keys of Web Connectivity measurements, which provided insight on TLS level interference of TikTok endpoints. In the case of Armenia, we analyzed both TLS handshakes and DNS query results. Another limitation to our study is the limited OONI measurement coverage from Azerbaijan (in comparison to Armenia and other countries). Generally, the larger the relevant measurement volume, the greater our ability in identifying and confirming blocks.

Findings

OONI data shows that both Azerbaijan and Armenia started blocking access to TikTok right after clashes erupted along their border.

Blocking of TikTok in Azerbaijan

We analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan from 13th-15th September 2022 and noticed that many of them appear to time out when attempting to establish a TLS handshake to the target endpoint.

While many such measurements are annotated (on OONI Explorer) as presenting DNS inconsistency, we were able to exclude that by validating that the returned IPs are able to complete a TLS handshake with a valid certificate for the target domain name. Moreover, when issuing an HTTP request with the appropriate headers, the response payload is consistent with the response from an endpoint served to a user in Europe. By inspecting the response header  and server certificate, it seems to be an Akamai cache.

To evaluate the extent to which the blocking is happening and establish if it’s in fact caused by an intentional block, we analyzed the values of the network_events keys of Web Connectivity measurements. These keys contain very rich information on every read and write operation performed during a TLS handshake.

In the following charts, we consider a single “datapoint” as a single network event transcript (i.e. a TLS handshake operation towards a certain IP, port, server_name tuple). When grouping the measurements by server_name, we can see that most domains fail quite consistently, yet some of them don’t fail as often as others.

Chart: OONI data on the testing of tiktok.com and TikTok endpoints in Azerbaijan between 13th-15th September 2022.

As is evident from the above chart, the testing of www.tiktok.com and Tiktok endpoints presented a relatively large volume of anomalies between 13th to 15th September 2022, following the eruption of border clashes on 12th September 2022. It’s worth noting though that while www.tiktok.com measurements (showing signs of blocking) were collected from Azerbaijan from 13th September onwards, TikTok endpoint measurements are only available from 14th September 2022 onwards (when they were added to the test list for Azerbaijan).

As a result, based on available OONI data, we can only confirm that the blocking of TikTok in Azerbaijan started the latest at the following times, on the following networks:

The OONI Probe testing of www.tiktok.com on 5 networks in Azerbaijan between 13th to 15th September 2022 can be further examined through the following chart, which shows that its testing consistently presented generic_timeout_errors on at least 3 networks by 15th September 2022.

Chart: OONI Probe testing of www.tiktok.com on 5 networks in Azerbaijan between 13th-15th September 2022.

In the above cases, we can see that attempts to connect to www.tiktok.com failed due to a connection timeout. Upon inspecting relevant network measurement data, we see that this always happened after the first write operation (the one responsible for writing the ClientHello which contains the server_name field (SNI)), which is consistent with the hypothesis that the block is some form of TLS based interference, possibly by looking at the SNI field of the ClientHello message.

The blocking looks quite consistent on a per domain basis, which is compatible with the hypothesis that it’s some sort of SNI-based TLS level block.

To additionally support this claim, we notice that several different domain names resolve to the same IP address. When looking at the TLS reachability of the same IPs on a particular network, but with a different server_name value, we can see (by reading the chart horizontally) that they are consistently reachable when a specific server_name is provided, as illustrated below.

Chart: OONI data on TLS handshake results by target IP on network AS531712 in Azerbaijan on 15th September 2022.

On the other hand, if you read the chart vertically you can see that the same IP is both reachable and unreachable depending on the domain_name value.

This strongly suggests that the block is intentional and a consequence of filtering of those particular domain names.

When looking at the subset of domain names that are not consistently blocked, we can see that they are consistently blocked within the same network, which leads us to believe that there are different filtering policies deployed across networks.

Chart: OONI data providing a per-ASN comparison on the testing of www.tiktok.com and TikTok endpoint domains in Azerbaijan between 13th-15th September 2022.

In summary, based on the analysis of 681 OONI metrics collected from 5 different networks in Azerbaijan, we conclude that:

  • The main TikTok website (www.tiktok.com) and several endpoints essential to its functionality were blocked on at least 3 different networks (AS29049AS41997AS31721);
  • On all networks where we identified blocking, it seems to be implemented by means of TLS level interference by dropping packets after noticing a disallowed server_name;
  • ISPs in Azerbaijan block TikTok based on different lists of TikTok endpoint domains, and there is some level of inconsistency.

Blocking of TikTok in Armenia

OONI data shows the blocking of TikTok in Armenia on 13th September 2022. Out of the 5 networks from which TikTok measurements were collected, we are able to establish that the blocking began on 2 of them on 13th September 2022. Specifically:

The following chart shares OONI data on the testing of www.tiktok.com and tiktok.com from 5 networks in Armenia between 13th-15th September 2022.

Chart: OONI data on the testing of tiktok.com and www.tiktok.com on 5 networks in Armenia between 13th-15th September 2022.

As is evident from the above charts, these ISPs in Armenia seem to employ a mix of different techniques to implement the blocking of TikTok. In the case of Ucom (AS44395), they appear to mostly return an NXDOMAIN error when the TikTok domain is queried.

In the case of MTS Armenia (AS43733), it’s interesting to note that upon querying the tiktok.com domain, the IP address 172.217.17.228 is returned, which is associated with www.google.com. It’s also worth noting that the TLS handshake timed out, which is not consistent with the behavior of the real server, which may indicate that they implement an additional TLS layer block on top of the DNS level interference.

It’s also interesting to note that the nameserver for MTS Armenia allows us to do a zone transfer for tiktok.com and through that we are able to see the tainted google IP A record:

$ dig @ns.mts.am tiktok.com axfr
; <<>> DiG 9.16.22-Debian <<>> @ns.mts.am tiktok.com axfr
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
tiktok.com.                1800        IN        SOA        ns2.mts.am. ns.mts.am. 2020101600 3600 600 1296000 3600
tiktok.com.                1800        IN        NS        ns2.mts.am.
tiktok.com.                1800        IN        NS        ns.mts.am.
tiktok.com.                1800        IN        A        172.217.17.228
tiktok.com.                1800        IN        SOA        ns2.mts.am. ns.mts.am. 2020101600 3600 600 1296000 3600
;; Query time: 95 msec
;; SERVER: 217.76.1.85#53(217.76.1.85)
;; WHEN: Thu Sep 15 23:54:58 CEST 2022
;; XFR size: 5 records (messages 1, bytes 196)

No other tested TikTok endpoints allow zone transfers from the MTS nameserver, nor any other domain which we tested. This might be due to the fact that to implement the block the zone for tiktok.com was set up quickly and they forgot to disable zone transfers on it.

By focusing our attention on the Ucom network (AS44395), we can see that not all TikTok endpoints appear to be blocked.

Chart: OONI data on the testing of TikTok endpoints on Ucom (AS44395) in Azerbaijan between 13th-16th September 2022.

Interestingly, starting from today (16th September 2022), the DNS response appears to be inconsistent and returns an IP address that has an expired letsencrypt certificate. When accessed, it will direct to:

http://it-nxd-domain.com/?terms=Google%20Server%20Cloud,Free%20Host%20Server,%20Create%20an%20Ecommerce%20Website%20for%20Free,Email%20Server%20Hosting%20Services&subid1=parrz.com.

$ openssl s_client -connect 95.216.36.80:443
CONNECTED(00000003)
Can't use SSL_get_servername
depth=1 C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 CN = it.domain.name
verify error:num=10:certificate has expired
notAfter=Jun 12 15:18:58 2021 GMT
verify return:1
depth=0 CN = it.domain.name
notAfter=Jun 12 15:18:58 2021 GMT
verify return:1
---
Certificate chain
 0 s:CN = it.domain.name
   i:C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
   a:PKEY: rsaEncryption, 2048 (bit); sigalg: RSA-SHA256
   v:NotBefore: Mar 14 15:18:58 2021 GMT; NotAfter: Jun 12 15:18:58 2021 GMT
 1 s:C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
   i:O = Digital Signature Trust Co., CN = DST Root CA X3
   a:PKEY: rsaEncryption, 2048 (bit); sigalg: RSA-SHA256
   v:NotBefore: Oct  7 19:21:40 2020 GMT; NotAfter: Sep 29 19:21:40 2021 GMT
---

In all other cases of blocking, we notice that the HTTPS request times out, which leads us to believe that they might be using some form of TLS level interference.

To summarize:

  • Armenia has been blocking TikTok since at least 13th September 2022 on at least two networks (AS44395, AS43733);
  • On most networks, TikTok interference was observed at the DNS level by returning an NXDOMAIN error, an IP address associated with www.google.com, or a set of unrelated IP addresses which contain an expired certificate for the server_name it.domain.name;
  • Not all tested networks in Armenia implemented the TikTok block and censorship techniques varied from network to network;
  • Several endpoints used by the TikTok app and website are also blocked on at least one network in Armenia.

Conclusion

Social media censorship often appears to be weaponized during conflicts and other moments of political turmoil around the world. By controlling the flow of information on social media platforms, governments may attempt to control the narrative surrounding political events. Over the last 6 years, OONI data has shown that access to major social media platforms is commonly blocked during elections and protests around the world. Earlier this year, Russia ramped up its censorship following the war in Ukraine.

Azerbaijan previously blocked access to social media platforms during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. In similar vein, both Azerbaijan and Armenia blocked access to TikTok during the border clashes over the last days. OONI data shows that Azerbaijan blocked TikTok by means of TLS level interference, while Armenia implemented both DNS level blocks and TLS level interference.

You can continue to monitor the reachability of TikTok (and other platforms) in Armenia and Azerbaijan through OONI data.

authorities arrest journalist, editor of an online news platform [Updated February 26, 2024]

[Update] On February 26, Zeynalli was sentenced to nine years behind bars, while Shukurov received a four-year sentence.  

[Update] On January 5, the Baku Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the December 29 court decision [see previous updates below]. According to the appellate court’s ruling, releasing Zeynalli under house arrest would interrupt the course of the investigation, reported Meydan TV on January 6, 2023.

[Update] On December 29, 2022, a local court in Baku ruled to extend the detention period of journalist Zeynalli for another three months, reported Meydan TV. Zeynalli’s lawyer said they will be appealing the decision. 

[Update] According to reporting by Meydan TV, The General Prosecutor’s Office claims that journalist Avaz Zeynalli conspired with others in extortion. The journalist is accused of collaborating with the head of Seda TV, Elnur Shukurov, in getting permission for land privatization in Baku and Sumgayit. Shukurov was arrested on September 15 on charges of unlawful influence on the decision of an official. The Prosecutor’s Office alleges that Shukurov and Zeynalli exerted influence over executive authority office employees to grant permission for land privatization.

According to Turan News Agency, Seda TV is a relatively small YouTube channel with just over 50k subscribers and is managed solely by Elnur Shukurov.

***

[Update] On September 16, during the court hearing, it was decided that the investigation could continue while Sadigov transferred under house arrest. 

***

Avaz Zeynalli is a journalist and editor of Khural newspaper. He was arrested on September 10 after a pro-government news platform falsely accused Zeynalli of extortion. The same platform also mentioned that human rights lawyer Elchin Sadigov acted as an intermediary in the alleged scheme. As a result, Sadigov was also arrested along with Zeynalli. Police also searched and confiscated the documents and devices of both Zeynalli and Sadigov. 

According to reports, Zeynalli was charged with “large-scale bribe-taking” and Sadigov with “complicity in bribe-taking.” Both are facing between 8 and up to 12 years in prison if found guilty. 

Both Sadigov and Zeynalli were sentenced to four months in pre-trial detention. 

Zeynalli served three years behind bars on bogus bribery, extortion, and tax evasion charges (between 2013 and 2016). Sadigov is known for representing cases of political prisoners in Azerbaijan. 

Litigating Pegasus in Azerbaijan: Addressing harms of the government-sponsored surveillance on civic groups in the absence of legal guarantees

In the following featured legal analysis, AIW looks at the litigation work carried out thus far in Azerbaijan on devices infected by Pegasus. Specifically, this legal analysis looks at how Pegasus spyware was deployed to monitor journalists, lawyers, and activists in Azerbaijan and the legal steps taken within the existing national legislative framework to mitigate the unlawfulness of the use of Pegasus against these groups and individuals.  

Background

Over the last few years, global-scale investigations carried out by international human rights organizations, investigative journalists, and/or whistleblowers have shown that the scale of the unlawful surveillance of individuals’ private lives through murky technology software has been pervasive, and widespread. Those findings also revealed the vulnerability of individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms to private technology companies and the states deploying that technology for their personal interests.

This has certainly been the case in Azerbaijan, where platforms like Azerbaijan Internet Watch (AIW) and others, have documented government-sponsored surveillance and cyber espionage activities. Especially vulnerable are the social and political activists. Several human rights monitoring organizations note the increase in cyber attacks on these groups in recent years.

***

Since 2011, Freedom House analyzes the state of Internet freedom in Azerbaijan in its annual Freedom on the Net report. Until now, each report indicated continuing deterioration of internet freedoms in the country.

Increased interventions on the internet freedoms often constitute a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms stipulated in national and international human rights documents, as such making states obligated to provide effective legal protection and recovery mechanisms against such violations.

However, as documentation and reports from recent years indicate, Azerbaijan thus far, failed to provide effective legal guarantees in cases of privacy violations through cyber-attacks, illegal collection of personal data, wiretapping, and account compromise. Despite routine calls made to the Azerbaijani authorities to investigate and bring perpetrators of cyber-attacks to account, no steps have been taken.

As a result, Azerbaijan continues to systematically fail in providing effective legal remedies and sound investigations against state-sponsored digital attacks and surveillance. Moreover, despite evidence-based reports of targeted and coordinated cyber attacks against activists, the government thus far has not investigated and/or provided effective legal guarantees.

***

In July 2021, an international collaborative reporting initiative #PegasusProject documented how NSO Group, an Israeli surveillance company, sold Pegasus, a hacking software, to authoritarian regimes to target human rights activists, journalists, politicians, and lawyers among others worldwide. The investigation and the list were coordinated and obtained by the Paris-based journalism nonprofit Forbidden Stories and advised by Amnesty International Security Lab.

The investigation determined that Azerbaijan was among the top 10 countries deploying Pegasus spyware.

Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which was one of the partners in the global investigation, discovered that out of the 50,000 phone numbers that were leaked, 1000 were from Azerbaijan. OCCRP was able to identify 245 numbers and as a result, concluded that a fifth of these numbers belonged to journalists, lawyers, human rights and political activists, politicians, and their family members. OCCRP published a list of identified civil society activists whose devices were confirmed to have traces of Pegasus spyware.

***

Following the Pegasus Project leak, on July 22, 2021, on the National Press Day in Azerbaijan, journalists and human rights defenders gathered in a virtual round table discussion titled “New digital threats to critical voices” initiated by the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety. The group discussed the importance of protection mechanisms against such mass surveillance and stressed the need to join efforts and seek legal remedy through domestic and international courts. As such, an operative group of lawyers was assembled to develop applications and appeals to domestic authorities and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

Since that meeting and at the time of writing this report a total of four groups were formed, led by different lawyers, representing in total of 62 applicants. It is worth noting that some victims hesitated to join these collective complaint groups due to safety concerns.

Complaints and lawsuits were lodged as early as August 2021. Lawyers and advocates representing all four groups, prepared complaints to the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan, claiming that their clients’ mobile devices were illegally infected by Pegasus spyware leading to violations of privacy, freedom of expression guaranteed under the national laws and European Convention on Human Rights, the right to effective remedies and the right not to be subjected to restrictions of Convention rights with improper motives or ulterior purposes (Article 18).

Applicants in the group of cases led by advocates and practicing lawyers requested the Prosecutor General’s Office to open a criminal investigation based on the evidence revealed as a result of the global investigation. Specifically, the lawyers noted that several articles of Azerbaijan’s Criminal Code – Article 156, “Violation of privacy”, 271, illegal access to a computer system, 272, illegal interception of computer data, and 302, “Violation of the legislation on operation-search activities”, were violated as a result of the committed criminal act.

According to Article 156 of the Criminal Code (“Violation of privacy”), actions that violate privacy are prohibited and are the basis for criminal liability. According to Article 156.1 of the Criminal Code, the distribution, sale, or giving to someone else, the illegal collection of information that is a secret of personal and family life, documents reflecting such information, video and photo recording materials, sound recordings, causes criminal liability. Article 156.1 of the Criminal Code aims to protect the information that constitutes the secret of personal life and is derived from the goal of protecting people’s constitutional right to privacy. The object of this crime is people’s personal life information.

According to Articles 271 (illegal access to a computer system) and 272 (illegal seizure of computer data) of the Criminal Code acts of deliberately entering a computer system or any part of it without the right to access it, by violating the security measures, or capturing computer data stored on a device, or with other personal intent are criminalized.

Article 302 of the Criminal Code (“Violation of the legislation on operation-search activities”) criminalizes unlawful measures by the persons authorized to carry out operational-search activities in the absence of the grounds established by legislation.

In all of the legal complaints submitted based on the list of violations mentioned in the paragraph above, the team of lawyers asserted that the findings of the Pegasus investigation, put their clients at risk of both secret surveillance and of having their communications data unlawfully intercepted by the authorities or third parties who own the software. None of the identified civil society representatives targeted by the spyware were under lawful investigation. As such lawyers demanded that the Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan launch a criminal investigation, including the possible role of the Azerbaijani law enforcement in the mass surveillance activities. The legal representatives of all clients said, the state is obligated to provide effective legal guarantees against the abuse of spyware tools against citizens as the latter may constitute unlawful interferences to the right to private life, freedom of expression, and in the case of failure to fully and duly investigate, violation of the right to an effective remedy.

Due to the lack of legal remedies in cases of severe privacy violations, within the Azerbaijani legislation, advocates and lawyers relied on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), and Article 18 (Limitation on use of restrictions on rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Between July 2021- July 2022, one of the advocates representing one of the four groups of applicants,  separately applied to the State Security Service [SSS], the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MIA], the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport [MDDT], as well as the Ombudsman office requesting an investigation, along with the Prosecutor General’s Office. None of the advocate’s appeals were successful. None of the institutions investigated the complaints or provided reasonable answers.

Overall, the lack of effective response on behalf of the law enforcement authorities, against complaints requesting to open a criminal investigation, indicates there were and still are significant flaws and delays in the investigation process, despite the evidence collected through forensic methodology by the international organizations. Nearly a year later, the law enforcement authorities are yet to take formal investigative actions, despite the complaints containing forensic evidence obtained from the examined mobile devices.

Court litigations

In all of the legal cases, the lawyers provided circumstantial evidence (contextual information) for how Pegasus infected the mobile devices of applicants. Specifically, the lawyers shared detailed information about the purpose of the Pegasus spyware and the potential state agencies that might use it. Relying on the existing national legislation the lawyers also established the legal grounds for using surveillance programs to intercept private communication or other private data from technological devices, including mobile phones.

Advocates representing the four groups submitted complaints to the local courts against the general prosecutor’s office for failing to explain why it sent lawyers’ Pegasus-related complaints to the State Security Services in the absence of justifications or notice. It was the responsibility of the General Prosecutor’s Office to investigate lawyers’ complaints, but instead, it sent them directly to State Security Services. This was unlawful and baseless. Yet, despite the unlawfulness of the act, the local courts did not satisfy these complaints and returned them without consideration (issued decisions in a similar text that they were considered inadmissible).

This explicitly demonstrates that the law enforcement authorities and domestic courts of Azerbaijan refused to effectively investigate the complaints and failed to provide any legitimate grounds for refusing the investigation in the first place.

One of the four groups involved in litigation procedure, includes activists, human rights defenders, journalists, and other public figures, who were previously subjected to different legal harassment by the government. Advocates and lawyers representing this group are demanding that the Prosecutor General’s Office investigate the possible role of the law enforcement authorities on the grounds that the use of spyware tools breached the defendants’ rights guaranteed under both the Constitution of Azerbaijan and the international treaties Azerbaijan is a party to. 

The complaint consists of the summary of the complaint itself, information about the applicant, and information on the use of Pegasus to track the defendants, including applicants’ claims and petitions based on the substantial and procedural grounds of the complaint.

In their fifteen-page complaint, the applicants referred to the findings of Pegasus investigations, alleging that their phones were tapped and infected with Pegasus. The complaint also stated that listening and monitoring of the complainant through the use of Pegasus violated Articles 32, “Right to inviolability of private life” and 47, “Freedom of thought and speech” of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, and Articles 8, 10 and 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as the breach was politically motivated. Lawyers also claimed that the surveillance was in violation of Articles 18 and 19 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee on the implementation of that Covenant.

In addition, 11 petitions were attached by the lawyers, to the submitted complaints, requesting certain actions from the Prosecutor General’s Office that was necessary for an impartial and comprehensive investigation. These petitions included:

  • Obtaining testimonies of applicants;
  • Submitting official requests to Amnesty International Forensics team and the OCCRP for forensic investigation of identified devices;
  • requesting the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service to obtain a list of persons who carried out the interception of the devices;
  • obtaining information on the purchasing of the spyware from the “NSO Group” company;
  • requesting information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Service, and the State Special Protection Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan about any relevant instructions on preventing human rights violations during the use of the Pegasus or similar programs;
  • obtaining information on whether the officials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Services, authorized to carry out an operation-search measure, were involved in training on legislation and human rights standards.

It was also noted that the applicants, were law-abiding citizens, engaged in public and political activities, and were not engaged in criminal activities. As such the targeting of these individuals with Pegasus, was politically motivated and criminal given the absence of any mandatory, investigative, or judicial acts, within the scope of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPrC) Article 177.3.5, and as a result, the use of Pegasus on their devices was in violation of targeted users’ rights and freedoms.

According to Article 443.1 of the CPrC, investigative actions over mobile phones and other communication devices are usually carried out on the basis of a judicial act. In the cases where these investigative actions are carried out without a court decision, on the basis of the investigator’s reasoned decision, after the completion of the corresponding investigative action, the investigator must inform the court conducting the judicial control and the prosecutor conducting the procedural management of the preliminary investigation within 24 hours and verify the legality of the investigative action carried out within 48 hours.

According to Article 215.1 of the CPrC, it is mandatory to conduct a preliminary investigation in all criminal cases, except for the investigation conducted in the form of simplified pre-trial proceedings for crimes that do not cause a great public danger.

Moreover, when responding to the lawyers’ complaints, the Prosecutor General’s Office, determined that the applicants’ complaints had to be sent to the Investigative Directorate of the SSS. Which is contrary to Article 215 of the CPrC and was contested by the lawyers who submitted a complaint to a local district court. The lawyers argued that it was illegal and unreasonable for the General Prosecutor’s Office to forward the complaint to the SSS for further investigation without any justification. At the same time, the transfer of the pre-trial investigation to the SSS, which is (potentially) a party of interest in the case, violates the procedural rights of the applicant on the personal life and freedom of expression, as well as the right to the effective remedy provided by Article 13 of the ECHR (taken together with Articles 8 and 10), because SSS will not be able to carry out the work related to the alleged illegal actions of its employees in accordance with the principle of objective impartiality. In addition, there are no normative legal grounds that could demonstrate the objective independence of the Investigative General Department of the SSS from other structural divisions of the Security Service.

Explainer: Lawyers reasoned that Pegasus was provided to the police and security agencies. From this point of view, based on the circumstances of the case, there are sufficient grounds to assume that the listening and online monitoring of the complainant was carried out by an employee (colleagues) of the police and (or) security agencies. In such a case, the prosecutor’s office cannot hand over the case of the preliminary investigation to the investigative body of the institution that carried out such hearing and monitoring. Otherwise, such an investigation would be subject to a conflict of interest in the case. In this regard, the elimination of conflict of interest in the investigation of a criminal case is one of the requirements of the criminal procedural legislation. Summarizing the above, it becomes clear: a) referral of the complaint to the State Criminal Court is a violation of the investigative responsibility defined in Article 215.2 of the Criminal Procedure Code; b) referral of the complaint to the DTC contradicts the principle of conflict of interests contained in Article 1.1 of the CPrC; c) referral of the complaint to the DTC is a violation of the human rights of potential victims (interested persons) defined by Article 1.4 of the CPrC, in this case, the right to request an effective procedural investigation; d) the referral of the complaint to the State Prosecutor’s Office is a contradictory decision and gives the impression that legal proceedings have been initiated to listen and monitor the complainant, as well as this referral was carried out by the wrong structural unit of the General Prosecutor’s Office.

Responses of law enforcement authorities

The General Prosecutor’s Office’s response to complaints was to forward the complaints to the State Security Service (SSS) for further investigation, without informing the applicants and without providing any explanation for the reasons for doing so.

The SSS, in all four groups of cases, refused to give an official written answer to the applicants about the investigation of their complaints (although they are required to do so by law). Officials from SSS informed lawyers verbally, that SSS did not monitor the applicants through Pegasus and therefore no written responses would be given.

As a result, advocates representing all four groups filed lawsuits against the General Prosecutor’s Office and the SSS for inaction and refusal to launch a criminal investigation.

It was not until August 2022, that the SSS started to summon a number of civil society members and journalists (applicants) to obtain their testimonies in regard to allegations of the tracking of their phones by the Pegasus software. Reflecting on the delayed response, one of the targeted civil society activists, and the chairperson of Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center, Anar Mammadli, said this was simply a sign of lack of action. 

In their responses to some of these complaints, the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs said it was not possible to conduct an investigation on the complaint. Moreover, in relation to some of the applicants, in their response, the General Prosecutor’s Office, said, “the information on the features of capturing and tracking personal secret information was not determined by means of the Pegasus spy program,” but stopped short of explaining how then the information was obtained if it was not through Pegasus.

Since the engagement of advocates in pursuing these cases in domestic courts, the proceedings in all four groups are pending at different instances. Only 15 applicants were sent to the Strasbourg Court thus far. Advocates are currently seeking to exhaust domestic remedies to apply to the ECHR in the remaining cases.

Conclusion and next steps in taking the Pegasus cases to the European Court of Human Rights

In addition to the Constitution and other national laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the right to privacy is recognized as an international human right in numerous international treaties to which Azerbaijan is a party. As a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Azerbaijan has binding obligations to protect rights to private life, including private communication and other private data, from infringements, including unlawful search-operation and surveillance activities of law enforcement authorities and any interference by third parties.

On September 20, 2009, Azerbaijan ratified the Council of Europe Convention of 1981 (Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108) for the protection of personal data which also falls within the scope of private life as protected by Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) making its application in Azerbaijan compulsory.

The ECHR reiterates that any interference can only be justified under Article 8, paragraph 2, if it is in accordance with the law, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims to which paragraph 2 of Article 8 refers, and is necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve any such aim (see Kennedy v. the UK, paragraph 130). 

In the context of handling complaints related to Pegasus cases by Azerbaijan’s law enforcement agencies and courts, the lawyers demonstrated, that the applicants were subjected to interferences to their right to private life contrary to the adopted national and international human rights documents. The lawyers’ subsequent complaints were related to the law enforcement and judicial authorities’ refusal to investigate complaints about those interferences, including secret surveillance without providing any explanations and sound reasons.

In all four groups of Pegasus litigations, the secret surveillance of mobile devices had no basis in domestic law as none of the applicants were declared as suspects or accused persons in any criminal investigations.

The Strasbourg Court has delivered many rulings on the protection of privacy and personal data against government-sponsored surveillance or state responsibility to protect individuals from violence by third parties (Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence. Updated on 31 August 2021. Para 107.) In order for surveillance to be in line with the Convention, certain legal safeguards should be provided both in legislation and practice, according to the case law of the ECHR.

Explainer: the law must be precise and clear as to the offences, activities and people subjected to surveillance, and must set out strict limits on its duration, as well as rules on the disclosure and destruction of surveillance data. Rigorous procedures should be in place to order the examination, use and storage of the data obtained, and those subjected to surveillance should be given a chance to exercise their right to an effective remedy. The bodies supervising the use of surveillance should be independent, and appointed by and accountable to parliament, rather than the executive.

At the moment, advocates and lawyers, are in the process of developing their clients’ applications to the ECHR alleging that the laws governing the matters of secret surveillance, as applied in practice, and also the refusal of the law enforcement authorities and courts to investigate allegations of surveillance, do not provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrary or abusive secret surveillance and/or accessing of private communications data. Lawyers also complained they had no effective remedy – domestically – in respect of those breaches which can be achieved through national legislation that strictly abides by the case law of the ECHR. The lawyers alleged that no effective remedy was available under Azerbaijani law and that SSS’s investigation could not be rendered effective since it is not an impartial and objective institution to review allegations of possible abuses and arbitrariness of its own officials. As regards the surveillance, a State could arguably be liable in respect of whatever system of surveillance without offering adequate and effective guarantees against abuse according to the well-established case law of ECHR.

According to Azerbaijan’s criminal law system, there are two judicial procedures that may be used by an individual wishing to complain about the acts of the investigative authorities:

  • complaint to supervisory-review and
  • judiciary (first and appeal court instances) under the CPrC.

However, as seen throughout the domestic litigation process in the course of the last year, the domestic courts stated clearly that the General Prosecutor’s Office forwarding the complaints to the SSS were not subject to judicial review, and the SSS’s lack of action was also not viewed as a sufficient ground to allow judiciary review. This makes it unacceptable that an individual cannot lodge such a complaint without having at least the concrete decision of the investigative authorities, which in fact, constitutes de-facto rejection to investigate the complaint containing allegation about a criminal act committed against him/her. In the absence of domestic remedies against potential surveillance measures under Azerbaijani law, an individual would hardly ever be able to have his/her right to effective remedies, respected and ensured. 

Explainer: In this connection, the case law of the ECHR notes that ‘In the sphere of secret surveillance, where abuses are potentially easy and could have harmful consequences for a democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge, judicial oversight offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure (Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], § 233; İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, § 96).’ The absence at the national level of a judicial review of the law enforcement authorities reactions (inaction or refusal to investigate without a decision) to the complaints of individuals containing alleged unlawful surveillance and other infringements of the right to privacy excludes the state’s obligation to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests.

Therefore, Article 8 of the ECHR likely be found as violated without the opportunity for judicial review of the inaction of law enforcement authorities constituting de-facto rejection to investigate the complaint containing allegations of violation of the privacy of individuals as they had not benefitted from the minimum degree of protection against abuses and arbitrariness. According to the case law of the ECHR, the absence of a judicial review of the overall covert surveillance system which was entrusted solely to the state body which was directly involved in requests for the use of special surveillance means amounted to a violation of Article 13 in the light of Article 8 owing to the lack of an effective remedy (see: Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, §§ 98-103).

As such these litigations expose that surveillance software not only harms individuals unlawfully targeted but also raises the question of insufficient legal guarantees in place to protect generally all individuals against possible unlawful surveillance and other kinds of privacy violations.

Finally, these litigations highlight the insufficient legal guarantees both in national legislation and practice, by creating significant legal precedent at ECHR, and by publicly uncovering and highlighting the inadequate national legislation which potentially can lead to gross human rights violations. Therefore, there is a greater need to challenge both national laws and the practice of state authorities’ system of secret surveillance, as the current system constitutes potential risks for interference with the rights of all users of telecommunication services guaranteed by the Convention and national laws.

Activist beaten, Facebook posts removed

Political activist Bakhtiyar Hajiyev was unlawfully detained yet again according to reports by Azerbaijani media. During the interrogation, which lasted six hours, Hajiyev’s Facebook posts in which he criticized the Ministry of the Internal Affairs were removed. 

In his own statement, Hajiyev said, he was threatened that less he removed the posts, and stops writing about the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he will face further measures. But activists said, his recent posts specifically targeted the ministry for not letting Hajiyev visit Shusha – a city in Karabakh that was captured following the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Hajiyev said he had no intentions to complain given there is nowhere to complain and that instead, he has submitted an official request to give up his Azerbaijani citizenship. “I am concerned about my life and no longer want to be a citizen of Azerbaijan. Let the head of state decide, whether the law enforcement can treat people this way,” the political activist told Turan News Agency in an interview.

The unlawful detention and interrogation are the latest, in attacks against the political activist. In April of this year, Hajiyev was kidnapped, taken to an undisclosed location, and was forced to remove several Facebook posts under duress that criticized the Ministry of the Interior, including the minister himself, for failing to investigate his case and being the perpetrators of threats and attacks against him. 

political activist arrested over a question asked during live online discussion

Magsud Aliyev, a political activist, was arrested on August 16 and sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention on charges of disobeying police according to local media reports. Speaking to Turan News Agency, Aliyev’s father, Faig Aliyev, said the family was not aware of their son’s arrest until they heard it from his friends, days later. 

Aliyev, reportedly asked a question during a live debate on August 12 with the leader of an opposition political party Popular Front, Ali Karimli about Ilham Aliyev and his general intentions. “If you have noticed, Aliyev most recently has been using terms like ‘foreign powers’ similar to the narrative often used by President Erdogan. He has also changed his style, wearing more tight clothes like President Zelensky. What do you think Aliyev is trying to do?” asked Aliyev during the Q&A session. 

A human rights organization, “Line of Defense” condemned the arrest of the activist. The managing director of the organization, Rufat Safarov said there is no doubt Aliyev was arrested because of the question he asked during the debate. “We suspect he was humiliated, beaten, and subjected to ill-treatment during detention. We will have more details soon once the lawyer, visits Aliyev,” Safarov told Meydan TV. 

Aliyev is known to share critical of the government posts on social media platforms according to Meydan TV reporting. 

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Internal Affairs dismissed the claims that the activist was arrested for the question. 

police demands arrest of a political activist [Updated September 5]

[Update] On September 5, a local court sentenced Rahimova to 460hours of community service. Rahimova’s lawyer said they will be appealing the decision. 

Gulnara Rahimova is a member of the opposition Popular Front party. On August 11, Rahimova shared a Facebook post in which she described how she was unlawfully detained while on her way to a protest on July 19. Together with Rahimova was another activist, Aziz Mamiyev who was beaten by the police during detention. The two were among several other activists detained by the police that day. “Today I have obtained the picture of one of the law enforcement officers involved in the beating [of Mamiyev]. I am sharing it so that everybody sees him,” wrote Rahimova. The officer in question has filed a complaint against Rahimova, on charges of slander and insult based on that Facebook post. 

Rahimova said in her defense that the post she shared on Facebook was not insulting or slanderous and that the charges and the accusation brought by the police officer are to silence her activism. According to Turan News Agency, Rahimova is an outspoken critic of the state and has faced persecution before.

A non-governmental organization “Line of Defense” said in an interview with Turan News Agency there was nothing slanderous in the Facebook post the political activist shared. “And she holds no responsibility over comments, that were made in response to her Facebook post,” told Turan News Agency, member of the organization, Zafara Akhmedova.

On August 24, during the preliminary hearing, a local court accepted the police officer’s complaint as a private criminal charge against Gulnara Rahimova. Moreover, her charges were aggravated. Thus, article 147 (slander) was reclassified to 147.2 (slander of a serious crime), which could land Rahimova up to a 3-year prison sentence.

 

authorities in Azerbaijan are considering law on social media – critics say

A recent conference organized by the Prosecutor General’s office in Baku on the recent violations of media legislation has raised eyebrows among civil society. On August 10, an event, titled, “Freedom of the Media and Information Security of Society under the Increasing Influence of Social Networks,” was held at the General Prosecutor’s Office.  Among the guests were representatives of pro-government and government media, as well as GONGOs. According to reporting by Turan News Agency, representatives of independent media or independent media experts were not invited and those who did attempt to attend the event were kicked out, violating Articles 25 and 5o of the Constitution. 

During the event, Prosecutor General Kamran Aliyev said the Prosecutor’s Office was determined to continue taking measures against published content in the media as well as on social networks deemed harmful to national security, not corresponding to reality, and/or identified as violating the rights of citizens.

A number of citizens have received warnings over their social media posts in recent weeks. In a statement published on July 30, the General Prosecutor’s Office said it has warned seven other users over their public posts shared on social media. The Prosecutor’s Office in a statement said the users were warned after the Prosecutor’s Office identified a violation of the Law on Media. Specifically, the statement said, 

During monitoring, it was identified that during the publication of news in media, provisions of Article 14.1.11 of the Law on Media were not observed [Facts and events must be presented impartially and objectively, and one-sidedness must not be allowed]. 

In order to prevent cases of violation of socio-political stability, human and citizen rights and freedoms, a number of relevant persons were invited to the Prosecutor General’s Office and the prosecutor took measures. 

As such, Sakhavat Mammadov, Rovshan Mammadov, Zulfugar Alasgarov, Elgun Rahimov, Fuzuli Kahramani, Zeynal Bakhshiyev and Ruslan Izzetli received a warning based on Article 22 of the Law on Prosecutor – to avoid cimilar negative incidents from taking place again.

The General Prosecutor’s Office repeats, in its appeal to media and social network users, that dissemination of unverified information that lacks clarificaition from the state institutions is unacceptable and holds one accountable according to existing legislation. 

Among those in attendance, was the head of the Press Council, Aflatun Amashov, who proposed to set up a commission in partnership with the Prosecutor’s Office that would regulate the media. For what purpose remains unclear, especially when there is no legislation in Azerbaijan that gives the prosecutor’s office authority to engage on issues of media ethics, media professionalism, or content regulation. 

In May 2022, AIW published a legal analysis about content regulation in Azerbaijan. At the time, an uptick in cases in which social media users faced punitive measures by the Prosecutor’s General Office for their online activism indicated that the Office has taken on a temporary role of taking measures against activists, journalists, and media within the scope of laws on information and media. But continuing involvement of the Office in handing out fines and warnings may indicate that in addition to punitive measures, there is a plan to introduce legal measures on social media platforms. 

Khalid Aghaliyev, a media law expert, told Meydan TV in an interview that the most recent discussions are a sign that the state is mulling over creating a law to regulate social media platforms. Aghaliyev also criticized the proposal of the Press Council to set up a commission. Nowhere in the world, there are institutions set up to regulate media. “These issues are regulated by independent journalists’ unions and their recommendations. But in Azerbaijan, independent journalism and media are problematic. They must be free, in the first place to get used to regulating themselves,” explained Aghaliyev.

Similarly, the head of Azerbaijan Internet Forum, Osman Gunduz, in a Facebook post said, the event organized by the Prosecutor’s Office sets a dangerous precedent. “Such steps create risks for the freedom of the Internet, the development of social media, and freedom of expression in general,” wrote Gunduz. 

Another media law expert, Alasgar Mammadli, writing in a Facebook post, criticized both the Press Council and the newly created MEDIA agency for failing to speak up at the event. After all, each of these institutions is responsible for reforms in the media, wrote Mammadli, and yet they could not say, “Dear Prosecutor’s Office, the functions in this area have been entrusted to me by presidential decree, do not interfere,” wrote Mammadli. 

member of political party re-arrested

Elnur Shahverdiyev is a member of a political party ReAL, and an avid critic of the state on social media platforms. According to information provided by his brother, Shahverdiyev was detained by the police on July 14 at his place of work. “Police showed up at the bakery where Shahverdiyev worked, and said, there was a complaint from a customer. They then forced him on the ground, handcuffed him, and detained him.” According to the brother, police said Shahverdiyev was sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention for disobeying police. 

But Shahverdiyev’s family as well as members of the ReAL party believe the grounds for the activist’s arrest were his posts on Facebook. As such, his posts shared between May 25 and July 14 were all removed from the platform after his detention. 

On August 15, Shahverdiyev was pressed with new charges, this time, drug possession, and sentenced to another 30 days in administrative detention, according to reporting by Turan News Agency.  

In an interview with Caucasian Knot, Natig Jafarli, a member of the political committee of the ReAl Party, questioned new accusations leveled against Shahverdiyev. “Elnur is known for his civil position; he sharply criticizes the country’s authorities and speaks about the human rights violations and officials’ arbitrariness,” Jafarli told Caucasian Knott.

several servicemen expelled from the army for using mobile device and sharing sensitive content on social networks

At least five servicemen were reportedly expelled from the army in August. 

According to reports, on August 2, junior sergeant Sanan Farajov and private Yusid Bayramli were expelled from the army for having shared photos and videos from the military service on their personal social media accounts. In a statement released by the Ministry of Defense, “Serious measures will be taken against military personnel who grossly violate the rules of military ethics, as well as the requirements of the charters and relevant orders which prohibit the use of smartphones during service. The dismissed servicemen shared footage on a live broadcast on their personal accounts on the TikTok social network.”

On August 3, an officer named Urfan Madatov, was also dismissed from the military on similar grounds. 

According to Qaynarinfo.az two more servicemen were dismissed on August 6, Seymur Suleymanzade and Afet Abdullayeva, on the grounds of using mobile phones during service, and sharing video and photo content on their personal accounts about the military service. Following the decision, the Ministry of Defense recalled that serious measures will be taken against any military personnel for violating the rules of military ethics, as well as the requirements and orders. 

Azerbaijani Armed Forces restrict the use of mobile phones among officers on the contact line between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The restriction was introduced in 2014, with the purpose to ensure secrecy on the line of contact. 

questioning over social media posts critical of government measures raise concern [updated August 3]

The questioning of political activist Ruslan Izzatli, on July 28 over his social media post renewed concerns over government oversight of social media platforms and its non-transparent approach to cherry-picking issues that it deems unfit for public discussion.

Izzatli was not the first person to receive a call from the Prosecutor General’s Office last month inviting him for a meeting. In an interview with one media platform, Izzatli explained that the prosecutor’s office refused to explain the reason for the meeting over the phone and asked that the political activist comes in person. 

During the meeting that took place on July 28, Izzatli was asked questions about a Facebook post in which the political activist shared some of the grievances of war veterans and servicemen since the second Karabakh war. He criticized the state for lack of measures in addressing these issues. “If Aliyev’s team can visit returned territories today it is because of the servicemen and war veterans. But their problems remain unaddressed,” wrote Izzatli in the said post.   

Izzatli was also asked whether he had evidence for the claims made in the post and why the political activist wrote the post in the first place. The political activist also said he received a verbal warning.

Separately, on July 30, the General Prosecutor’s Office said it has warned seven other users over their public posts shared on social media. The Prosecutor’s Office in a statement said the users were warned after the Prosecutor’s Office identified a violation of the Law on Media. Specifically the statement said, 

During monitoring, it was identified that during the publication of news in media, provisions of Article 14.1.11 of the Law on Media were not observed [Facts and events must be presented impartially and objectively, and one-sidedness must not be allowed]. 

In order to prevent cases of violation of socio-political stability, human and citizen rights and freedoms, a number of relevant persons were invited to the Prosecutor General’s Office and the prosecutor took measures. 

As such, Sakhavat Mammadov, Rovshan Mammadov, Zulfugar Alasgarov, Elgun Rahimov, Fuzuli Kahramani, Zeynal Bakhshiyev and Ruslan Izzetli received a warning based on Article 22 of the Law on Prosecutor – to avoid cimilar negative incidents from taking place again.

The General Prosecutor’s Office repeats, in its appeal to media and social network users, that dissemination of unverified information that lacks clarificaition from the state institutions is unacceptable and holds one accountable according to existing legislation. 

According to Alasgar Mammadli, a media law expert, Article 14 of the Law on Media, applies to journalists, newsrooms, and online news sites. But the majority of the men summoned to the Prosecutor’s Office this time were not journalists Alasgarli told Turan News Agency in an interview. The cited Article 14, cannot be used against individuals for expressing their thoughts. This is clearly an attempt to restrict freedom of expression said Mammadli. Journalist Sakhavat Mammadov who was among the group who received a warning agrees. Speaking with Turan News Agency on August 3, Mammadli said, that the warnings and questioning are meant to pressure activists and journalists and are clearly political orders. “Instead of calming people down, these incidents only raise tension and cause opposite effects. It shows there is an attempt to withhold information from the people, which only breeds rumors and disinformation.” 

AIW has analyzed the Law on Media and its implications on media freedom in Azerbaijan here. Among key findings were poorly worded definitions and excessive requirements and restrictions for online media content [see below Article 14 as an example]; challenging parameters of registration of journalists, especially those working for online media outlets and freelance journalists; and lack of oversight and checks and balances to monitor decisions taken within the scope of the new law. 

Article 14 of the Media Law requires that information published and (or) disseminated in the media (including online media) must meet at least 14 requirements. The law also requires that content published by media outlets should meet the requirements of the Law on Protection of Children from Harmful Information and the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information which provides an exhaustive list of requirements criticized for vagueness.

For instance, Article 14.1.6. of the law prohibiting media from using “immoral lexical (swearing) words and expressions, gestures” contradicts the requirements of the European Court of Human Rights standards as “prescribed by law” on the account that it lacks sufficient clarity and precision. The article also does not comply with a standard, “necessary in a democratic society,” “found in Articles 8-11 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides that the state may impose restrictions of these rights only if such restrictions are ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and proportional to the legitimate aims enumerated in each article.”  The text authorizes the authorities to consider any impugned statement or general criticism as an “immoral lexical (swearing) words of expressions”. With such a broad definition, this requirement has a chilling effect on journalists.

Article 14.1.11 of the law reads, “facts and events must be interpreted impartially and objectively, and one-sidedness must not be allowed.” A duty to impartial and accurate reporting and one-sidedness is likely to result in journalists refraining from exercising their right to freedom of expression without self-censorship. A failure of this requirement subjects the journalist to heavy sanctions. Furthermore, taking into account the existing political atmosphere in the country, such broadly defined restrictions can prevent journalists and other professionals working for online media from staying impartial without any interference.

Article 14.1.14  concerns published content according to which, “publication (dissemination) of information about the crime committed by a person in the absence of a court order that has entered into force should not be allowed.” Such a direct ban in general form could limit the freedom of expression, in particular, where certain cases are widely covered in the media on account of the seriousness of the facts and the individuals. The journalist also can be subject to disproportionate sanctions for publication or dissemination of information, which is already known to people, for instance in case of scandalous news about the corruption of officials. This clause heavily limits the primary duty of ensuring diversity and plurality of voices in the media.

Any imposed restrictions must meet the requirements as prescribed by law pursuant of legitimate aims (allowed by the international human rights law), necessary in a democratic society, such as proportionality, and non-discrimination.

In May, AIW looked into content regulation on the internet carried out by the Prosecutor’s office and how the measures in place, silence free speech often relying on the use of a restrictive law on Information, Informatization, and Protection of Information. This legal overview was prepared following an uptick of cases in which social media users faced punitive measures for their online activism by the Prosecutor’s Office. At the time, the analysis concluded that the Prosecutor General Office has taken on a temporary role of taking measures against activists, journalists, and media within the scope of laws on information and media and with the powers vested in the prosecutor’s office under the existing legislation on administrative offenses and the law of the prosecutor’s office. 

The day Ruslan Izzatli was questioned, Azerbaijan’s Press Council – nominally independent media regulation authority – held a press conference. Speaking at the briefing, the chairman of the Council Aflatun Amashov, expressed his concerns over circulating social media posts damaging the reputation of the Azerbaijani military. As such, the chairman said the council is ready to offer its recommendations on creating a legal framework to regulate social media platforms in Azerbaijan.

Speaking to Meydan TV, media law expert Khalid Aghaliyev said, the council’s proposal to regulate social media platforms is likely linked to the state’s intentions in having social media platforms open representatives in Azerbaijan and then use these representatives to further consolidate control mechanisms over social media platforms.